Steele v. Potter

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 8/5/2011; re 6 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the Alternative MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by John E. Potter ; a separate order will be entered this date dismissing the complaint with prejudice.cc:counsel (TLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE

ROBERTA Y. STEELE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11CV-124-S

PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General
United States Postal Service

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on motion of the defendant, Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster
General for the United States Post Office (“USPO”), to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary
judgment in this action alleging race and gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and
retaliation. The plaintiff, Roberta Steele, has not responded to the motion.
Roberta Y. Steele is an African American woman employed as a sales/Service Distribution
Associate at the Louisville, Kentucky Air Mail Facility. She is employed in “959 status” as a
permanently injured employee. Steele worked 26 hours per week on the assessment team after the
National Reassessment Program reduced her hours from forty hours per week. In September 2009,
Steele contacted the manager of Business Mail Equipment Unit (“BMEU”)to see whether she could
obtain a “detail” position to supplement her 26-hour schedule. She requested early morning hours
before she began her other job. When her request was denied, she filed a complaint with the United
States Postal Service Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging
discrimination on the basis of her race. She alleged that two injured Caucasian women were
permitted to pick up hours at the BMEU after her request was denied. Steele claimed that she had

worked at the BMEU previously and had been trained in the position, where the Caucasian women
were unqualified for the job. The EEOC conducted an investigation and issued a final agency
decision concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that Steele was subjected to
discrimination as alleged. EEOC Decision, p. 10.
Steele’s complaint in this case also contains claims of gender discrimination, hostile work
environment and retaliation which were not raised before the EEOC. The claims are must be
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d
359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010)(“As a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring claims in a lawsuit that
were not included in his EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974)”); McFarland v. Henderson, 307 F.3d
402, 406 (6th Cir. 2002)(“In permitting federal employees to sue under Title VII, Congress
conditioned the government's waiver of sovereign immunity upon a plaintiff's satisfaction of
‘rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations.’ Brown v. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 833, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976)".
The USPO has moved for summary judgment on Steele’s claim of race discrimination.
Having failed to respond to the motion, the EEOC decision stands uncontroverted in the record.
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact arises when there is “sufficient evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252
(1985). The evidence presented must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 779 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1985). To survive summary

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judgment, a non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and prove “specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The EEOC found that Steele had
not made out a prima facie case because the two Caucasian women who were given work in the
BMEU were not similarly situated to Steele. These two women “were available and willing to work
the later shift and/or longer hours to accommodate the needs of the BMEU unit during the relevant
timeframe. Therefore, they were not similarly situated to [Steele].” The EEOC stated further that
“[a]dditionally, it should be noted that...two African Americans...were given hours in the BMEU.
As these employees are within the complainant’s protected class, it cannot be concluded that
management harbored discriminatory animus towards employees of that class.” Decision, p. 7.
The EEOC went on to find that even assuming for the sake of argument that a prima facie
case of race discrimination had been made out, management had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for their actions, and pretext had not been shown:
Ms. Snyder testified that the Louisville Business Mail Acceptance Unit was critically
short staffed and was looking to borrow help “as needed” from other departments
until the Bulk Mail Tech jobs could be filled through the established craft bidding
process. She clarified that a “detail” never existed. Rather, the work sought by the
complainant was to be provided to the BMEU unit on an “as needed” basis. She
averred that the complainant contacted her and requested to pick up extra hours in
the BMEU starting around 8 am as she would drop her child off at day care, on her
way to the unit. Ms. Snyder explained that she informed the complainant that she
thought that the BMEU might be able to use her a couple of hours a day prior to
reporting to the Fern Creek Post Office to her assigned position. However, after
talking with the supervisor of the unit, it was realized that the hours that the
complainant was available would not work for the needs of the unit. The unit did not
open until 9:00 a.m. and the task for which the complainant would have been needed
did not begin until 10:00 a.m. According to Ms. Snyder’s testimony, the early
morning hours for which the complainant sought were already adequately covered
and the unit’s need was for the mid to late afternoon hours. Two Caucasians and two
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African-Americans who were available during the needed hours were borrowed and
utilized for the work as their hours accommodated the BMEU’s needs in the mid/late
afternoon...Mr. White testified that both of the white female workers...initially
worked the later hour shift, but that [one white female worker] was subsequently
permitted to work the earlier shift due to an increase in the volume of work...[Her]
shift to the earlier hour shift transpired months after the complainant was denied an
opportunity to work in the unit.
Decision, pp. 7-9.
We conclude that the EEOC’s unchallenged decision that the evidence did not support a
finding that Steele was subjected to race discrimination was a sound determination. We conclude
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the USPO is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. A separate order will be entered this date dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 5, 2011

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