Hall v. Beckstrom

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 9/28/12 adopting Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW in full; Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED, and this Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; the certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) is DENIED. This is a final order.cc:counsel, Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin (DAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-CV-404-H
TYREESE HALL

PETITIONER

V.
GARY BECKSTROM, Warden

RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, Tyreese Hall, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging his state court conviction for the robbery, sodomy and murder of
Clifton Agnew. Petitioner was alleged to have robbed Agnew, kicked him, punched him, and
knocked him unconscious and then impaled him on a wooden stick puncturing his rectum and
left lung. Agnew died seven weeks later. Petitioner denied all the charges. Nevertheless, at trial
the jury convicted him on all counts and the court sentenced him to life without the possibility of
parole for 25 years for the murder, a 25-year sentence for first-degree sodomy, and a 20-year
sentence for first-degree robbery.
As provided by statute, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court
of Kentucky. On appeal, he raised 11 arguments for reversal of his conviction. All of the
constitutional arguments that Petitioner now raises in this §2254 petition were included on his
direct appeal. On December 1, 2009, a divided Kentucky Supreme Court entered its final
opinion rejecting all of Petitioner’s claims of error. Hall v. Commonwealth, App. No. 2007-SC359, 2009 WL 4263142 (Ky. Dec. 1, 2009).
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s rulings may be summarized as follows. It held that the
testimony of Kaye Thomas, though erroneously admitted in the guilt phase, was a harmless error.

It concluded that hearsay testimony concerning Larry Milligan’s pre-trial identification was also
error, but a harmless one. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting
individual voir dire questioning. It also held that Petitioner’s acknowledged mental retardation
rendered neither his initial post-arrest statement to police nor his subsequent statement on July
20, 2004, to be involuntary in violation of Miranda. Finally, it held that the trial court did not err
to deny an instruction either on extreme emotional disturbance or one of second-degree
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of wanton murder.
The Supreme Court did reverse and remand the conviction of Petitioner’s co-defendant
Derek Edmonds. Eventually, the trial court entered an amended judgment on Edmonds’ sodomy
conviction to reduce his sentence to life, rather than a sentence of life without parole. Justices
Noble and Minton dissented based on their view that the erroneous admission of Kaye Thomas’s
testimony was not harmless error and that the Defendants were entitled to an instruction on
second-degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense.
Thereafter, Petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus which raises seven
claims of constitutional error. First, Petitioner argues that permitting Kaye Thomas to testify at
length during the guilt phase, violated his due process rights. Second, that the trial court violated
his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it allowed several witnesses to give hearsay
testimony concerning the absent eyewitness statements and identification of Larry Milligan.
Third, that both the April 6, 2004, tape-recorded statement and the July 20, 2004, telephonic
statement violated his Sixth Amendment rights under the Miranda decision. Fourth, that when
he trial court limited and restricted his voir dire, it violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Fifth, that by refusing to strike for cause certain jurors the trial court violated his Sixth

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and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Sixth, that by refusing to give lesser included instructions on
murder under extreme emotional disturbance and second-degree manslaughter, the trial court
denied him his right to due process. Finally, that he was denied his right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when he was forced to stand trial
before a death-qualified jury, even though he was not subject to the death penalty.
After a full briefing which contained excellent presentations on both sides, the Magistrate
Judge issued a 130-page opinion thoroughly analyzing each of Petitioner’s claims. The Court
has now conducted its own review of these issues. As to each of the issues which Petitioner has
raised, the Magistrate Judge has conducted a thorough analysis. As to each issue this Court must
ask whether the Magistrate Judge was incorrect and whether this Court can add anything of
value to the discussion of it. It must also be noted that Petitioner’s counsel has filed
comprehensive and well argued objections to the Magistrate’s report. Several of the issues
raised are those upon which reasonable minds could differ. Petitioner has argued admirably and
vigorously, but not differently than he did originally to the Magistrate.
In the end, this Court cannot improve upon the Magistrate’s comprehensive analysis.
Any additional comment would tend to confuse rather than clarify. The Court adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s analysis in full and particularly adopts his concluding words which are
worthwhile to repeat here:
The Court has carefully examined each of the seven issues, and their
respective subparts, raised by the petitioner in his well-drafted memorandum of
law. Review of Hall’s arguments and the persuasive responses of the Warden
leads the Court to several important conclusions. First, and perhaps foremost, it
cannot be said in any sense that Hall’s trial was error free. It was not. The trial
court undeniably erred, albeit purely as a matter of state evidentiary law, in the
admission of those portions of Kay Thomas’s testimony that went beyond
humanizing the victim. Likewise, the trial court again erred, repeatedly
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although harmlessly, in permitting various prosecution witnesses to testify to
Larry Milligan’s out-of-court identification of the petitioner, when Milligan
did not appear to testify at trial in violation of both the Confrontation Clause
and state hearsay law. The federal Constitution, however, does not presume to
require perfect trials, merely those that are fundamentally fair. Wright v.
Dallman, 999 F.2d 174, 179 (6th Cir. 1993)(citing Rose v Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
579 (1986)). Hall received such a trial according to the decision of the
Kentucky Supreme Court, which appears to be neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of the controlling precedent of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Second, the Court concludes with equal confidence that Harrington v
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-787, 178 L. Ed.2d 624 (U.S. Jan 19, 2011), and its
stringent standard for habeas corpus relief, represents a bellwether
development in the law of habeas corpus that cannot be ignored in the outcome
of this action. Few matters in life are not subject to reasonable debate among
fair-minded persons. It follows perforce that whether this court, or any other
for that matter, might have sat more comfortably in dissent, or the majority, in
Hall v. Commonwealth, App. No. 2007-SC-359, 2009 WL 4263142 (Ky. Dec.
1, 2009) is entirely irrelevant to the proper outcome of these proceedings. So
long as fair-minded jurists could debate the existence of arguments, based on
existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, that would support the outcome below
that outcome must be upheld even in the face of strong arguments by the
petitioner. That is exactly what has occurred in the present case. Consequently,
the Court, in accordance with Harrington, and for the reasons set forth more
fully above, shall recommend that Hall be denied habeas corpus relief so that
he may continue to serve his life sentence without the possibility of parole for
25 years.
This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions as to each specific issue and most
particularly its general assessment set forth above.
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court adopts the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge in full; the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus is DENIED, and this Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c) is DENIED.
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This is a final order.

September 28, 2012

cc:

Counsel of Record
Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin

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