Weathers v. Anderson et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 5/3/2012; the court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion.cc: plaintiff pro se, defendants (TLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11CV-683-H
LARRY WAYNE WEATHERS

PLAINTIFF

v.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ANDERSON et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Larry Wayne Weathers filed a pro se complaint (DN 1) and an amendment
thereto (DN 4). Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must review the
complaint and its amendment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons that follow, the complaint
will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on a general-complaint form against District Court Judge
Anderson, Assistant County Attorney Susan Mcain, and Police Officer Paul O’byran (from the
Springfield police station). As grounds for filing this action in federal court, he asserts: “5th
Amendment of the United States Constitution Double Jeopardy, 14th Amendment Due process
and the Equal protection of the law.”
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant O’byran falsified “the citation by putting the wrong
violation code causing the plaintiff to have to stay in jail longer than prescribed by Kentucky law
thus violating the 14th Amendment the Equal Protection of the law.” He further alleges that
Defendants Judge Anderson and prosecutor Mcain violated the Fifth Amendment “by inflicting
multible punishments on the plaintiff when their was only one corse of conduct, meaning

Plaintiff should have had a payable fine instead of being Jailed. Mutible Times.” He claims that
Defendants are in violation of due process and equal protection of the laws. Finally, he states,
“Failure to properly train officials led to these deprivations against the Constitution of the United
States.” As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their official
capacities.
In the amendment, Plaintiff added only that he states and alleges that “Defendants acting
under color of state law deprived rights garenteed by the constitution of the United States[.]
Then the rest of the Complaint remains the same.”
II.
Upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court must dismiss a case at any time if
it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss
a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the
factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2)

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take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561
F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d
1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the
duty “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
A. Defendants Judge Anderson and Assistant County Attorney Mcain
These Defendants, as state officials sued in their official capacities for damages, are
absolutely immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“This [Eleventh Amendment] bar

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remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.”); Boone v.
Kentucky, 72 F. App’x 306, 307 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Boone’s request for monetary relief against the
prosecutors in their official capacities is deemed to be a suit against the state and also barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.”); Bennett v. Thorburn, No. 86-1307, 1988 WL 27524, at *1 (6th Cir.
Mar. 31, 1988) (concluding that an official capacity suit against a judge who presided over state
court litigation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Additionally, Defendants sued in their
official capacities for damages are not “persons” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046,
1049 (6th Cir. 1994).
Consequently, the § 1983 official-capacity claims for damages against Defendants Judge
Anderson and Assistant County Attorney Mcain in their official capacities for damages must be
dismissed.
B. Defendant Officer O’byran
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166
(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Plaintiff
indicates that Defendant Officer O’byran is a police officer at the police station in Springfield,
Kentucky. Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendant, therefore, are actually against
the City of Springfield. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,

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whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
There are at least four avenues a plaintiff may take to prove the existence of a
municipality’s illegal policy or custom. The plaintiff can look to (1) the
municipality’s legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken
by officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training
or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations.
Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, Plaintiff alleges a
failure to train.
“The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983 liability ‘where the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.’” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)) (emphasis in Slusher).
“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Thus,
when city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission
in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to
retain that program. The city’s “policy of inaction” in light of notice that its program
will cause constitutional violations “is the functional equivalent of a decision by the
city itself to violate the Constitution.” A less stringent standard of fault for a
failure-to-train claim “would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on
municipalities . . . .”
Connick v. Thompson, – U.S. –, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (internal citations omitted); see
also Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (“[M]unicipal liability under § 1983

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attaches where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from
among various alternatives by [the relevant] officials . . . .”).
Plaintiff merely states in his complaint that “[f]ailure to properly train officials led to
these deprivations against the Constitution of the United States.” This is insufficient to impose
liability on the city. See Stanley v. Landers, No. 09-cv-52-PB, 2009 WL 3757389, at *1 (D.N.H.
Nov. 9, 2009) (finding conclusory assertion that guard was not adequately trained is insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss after Iqbal). Plaintiff does not attribute this failure to train to any
individual or entity. He fails to provide any facts regarding the alleged training that was omitted
or how the lack of training led to his injury. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege any prior
allegedly unconstitutional conduct which would have placed the city on notice that its training
was inadequate, Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (“Without notice that a course of training is
deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a
training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”), or to allege that his injury
was a “‘patently obvious’ consequence of the deficiency in the training program.’” Siler v.
Webber, 443 F. App’x 50, 55 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361).
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a basis of
liability against the City of Springfield. Consequently, the official-capacity claims against
Defendant Officer O’byran must be dismissed.
The Court will enter a separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:

May 3, 2012

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4412.005

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