Hopson v. Kentucky Bar Association et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 8/31/2012; 3 motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED; plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed by separate order.cc: plaintiff pro se, defendants, Jefferson County Attorney (TLB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
DE’ANDRE HOPSON
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-505-S
KENTUCKY BAR ASS’N et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, De’andre Hopson, pro se, moves to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) in this case (DN 3). The Court concludes that Plaintiff cannot without
undue hardship pay the fees or costs in this action. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion (DN 3) is GRANTED.
This matter now stands submitted for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
I. FACTS
Plaintiff names as Defendants the Kentucky Bar Association, a number of attorneys,
(private attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, and state-court judges), and Benny Berry, a private
citizen.1 He alleges that he has been discriminated against because of his race and his disability
and mentions the “Civil Rights (1964) Act.” It appears that Plaintiff has pending criminal
charges against him in Kentucky state court and also has been involved in several civil statecourt suits and that at different times during the course of these actions he has hired various of
the private attorneys listed as Defendants. He alleges that he has been used for his money and
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The private attorneys who are named Defendants are “Ahren” Whaley, Scott Barton,
Frank “Miscagni,” Keith “Kamniesh,” Karl Truman, Casey McCall, Tim McCall, Scott Cox,
Sam “Auguair,” Robert “Shadd,” and Neil Roy. The prosecutors whom he names as Defendants
are “Ryan” Conroy, “Jhon Blavenijich,” and Dana Cohen. The state-court judges whom he
names as Defendants are “[Judge] Susan Gibson” and “[Judge Charles] Charlie Cunningham.”
that they “railroad[ed]” him for the opposing party knowing that the charges on him were false
and refused to do his wishes in court. He also alleges that “two of these attorneys openly lie to
courts bout helping Gary Huffman indite me illegally to grand jury claiming to federal court to
Judge Coffman to release warrant off Benny Berry to turn and get seal put on case to prosecute
me off a lie.”
Much of Plaintiff’s allegations against the private attorneys who represented him in the
past involve dissatisfaction with their handling of his case or not following his instructions. He
does allege that Defendants Cox and Tim McCall “were used to get federal warrant tooken off
Benney Berry, who was a fugitive on run cause of guilt. Attorneys lied to federal judge to get
me put under investigation so I could be charged instead of real perpatrater.”
Plaintiff attaches to his complaint over a hundred pages of exhibits. As relief, Plaintiff
requests that triple attorney’s fees be returned, that Defendants be disbarred, that a public
announcement be made as to attorneys’ wrongdoings, that he be awarded $1,000,000 in damages
for emotional distress, and that federal charges be applied to the correct parties.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604-05. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if
the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
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the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v.
City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint, or portion thereof, should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Civil Rights Act of 1964
“Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the plaintiff must establish
subject matter jurisdiction.” Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir.
2005). Federal courts hear only cases allowed under the Constitution or cases which Congress
has entrusted to them by statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994). Here, Plaintiff cites to the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964, a federal statute which does
confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear certain types of claims. However, nowhere does
Plaintiff make allegations that would fall within the ambit of that Act.
Plaintiff does not specify the Title of the CRA under which he brings his claims. The Act
guarantees equal voting rights by removing registration requirements and procedures biased
against minorities, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e); prohibits segregation or discrimination in places of
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public accommodation involved in interstate commerce, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a; deals with the
desegregation of public schools, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq.; mandates nondiscrimination in the
distribution of funds under federally assisted programs, 42 U.S.C § 2000d; and bans
discrimination by trade unions, schools, or employers involved in interstate commerce or doing
business with the federal government, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. None of these titles of the CRA
have any bearing on the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Additionally, nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint does he explain what his “disability” is or
allege that any of Defendants’ actions were taken because of his race. Although he states in a
conclusory manner that this is a “discrimination complaint of my race black also my disability”
(emphasis in original), he makes no allegations of how he was discriminated based on race or
disability.
In addition to his complaint not stating a claim under the CRA, Plaintiff’s claims against
the state-court judges and the prosecuting attorneys must be dismissed for the additional reasons
explained below.
State-court judges
Plaintiff’s claims against the state-court judges, Judges Gibson and Cunningham, must be
dismissed because monetary damages against the state judges are barred by the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity, under which judges are immune from monetary liability for
decisions made within the scope of their official functions. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-54 (1967); Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief against these Defendants, although not barred by the doctrine of judicial
immunity, also do not succeed. The only injunctive relief he seeks which would apply to the
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state-court judges is “for courts to take of[f] false charges to allow me freedom of
embarrassments.” He seems to be referring to pending state-court charges against him. “[A]
federal court should not interfere with a pending state criminal proceeding except in the rare
situation where an injunction is necessary to prevent great and immediate irreparable injury.”
Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 743 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)). “Younger abstention in civil cases requires the satisfaction of three elements. Federal
courts should abstain when (1) state proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve
an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will afford the plaintiff an adequate
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.” Hayse v. Wethington, 110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir.
1997).
Plaintiff has a pending criminal case, over which the state has an important interest in
adjudicating, and this Court will not interfere with that on-going Kentucky state-court
proceeding. Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Gibson and Cunningham for injunctive relief also
fail to state a claim.
Claims against prosecuting attorneys
Plaintiff’s claims against the prosecutorial defendants, Defendants Conroy,
“Blavenijich,” and Cohen, are also barred by immunity. In broad terms, Plaintiff’s claims
against the prosecutorial defendants relate to their conduct in their role as advocates. To the
extent the prosecutorial defendants were acting in their roles as advocates, i.e., initiating and
pursuing a criminal prosecution and presenting the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s case, they
enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976); see
also Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that prosecutors were
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absolutely immune from claim alleging that they conspired to knowingly bring false charges
despite claims of failure to investigate facts and alleged commission of perjury before the grand
jury). Moreover, federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officers in the
performance of their duties. Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Superior Court, 474 F.2d 1275, 1276
(5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Haggard v. Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Conroy, “Blavenijich,” and Cohen will be
dismissed based on immunity as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint.
Date:
August 31, 2012
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Jefferson County Attorney
4411.009
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