Hartman v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 10/1/13: The Commissioners decision denying disability benefits is SUSTAINED and the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. cc:counsel, JDM (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTON NO. 3:12-CV-526-H
CATHERINE A. HARTMAN

PLAINTIFF

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Catherine Hartman, has appealed the Commissioner’s denial of her application
for disability benefits. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the matter should be remanded to
the Commissioner for a proper assessment of Plaintiff’s physical residual functional capacity
(“RFC”). Defendant filed objections, arguing that the ALJ did not inappropriately substitute his
judgment for that of medical services. Plaintiff replied in support of the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to remand.
The question at issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) may base his
RFC upon a review of all the evidence without having a medical opinion setting forth a specific
functional assessment. The question before the Court is a purely legal one, as there is no
question that sufficient medical testimony supports the Commissioner’s decision to deny as a
general matter.
Having reviewed all the pleadings, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not
inappropriately substitute his judgment for a medical source and need not rely on a specific
medical opinion to support his RFC finding. The RFC is based on the ALJ’s review of all
relevant evidence in the record, not just medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) and
(3).

In 2011, consultative medical examiner Dr. Martin Huecker opined that “patient can sit
or stand 30 to 40 minutes each and has to continue alternating” and noted concern for claimant
“lifting anything more than 10 pounds.” Admin. R. at 285. The ALJ ultimately determined that
claimant was capable of more strenuous activity, namely:
“…lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and walk six
hours in an eight hour workday; can sit six hours in an eight hour workday; no
limits on pushing and pulling; can occasionally climb ropes, scaffolds, and
ladders; can frequently climb ramps and stairs; and claimant has limitations on
exposure to full body vibration.”
DN 10-2 at 44.
This finding is supported by the record as a whole. In his findings of fact, the ALJ relied
on medical evidence gathered by a variety of doctors.1 As to the weight the ALJ gave to the
Huecker opinion, the Magistrate acknowledged “the ALJ…reasonably noted…Dr. Huecker’s
ultimate conclusion was questionable because of his comments that Ms. Hartman could get on
and off the examination table without assistance and that Ms. Hartman did not appear to have
given full effort during her examination.” DN 14 at 6. Further, other medical evidence
including X-rays and MRIs that post-dated and slightly pre-dated the Huecker consultative
examination support the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Hartman’s functional capacity is greater than
Dr. Huecker opined.
The Magistrate Judge dismissed certain evidence relied on by the ALJ as “just treatment

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Aside from Dr. Huecker, Doctors Werner, Alur, and Reed also examined claimant. Viewing the composite
documentation of all the medical evidence, the ALJ found “no evidence of nerve root compression, or other more
extensive degenerative changes” and also that claimant “maintains the ability to ambulate effectively.” DN 10-2 at
47. The ALJ was also influenced by the Huecker’s note that claimant gave “questionable effort” during the
consultative examination, noting it on three separate occasions in his finding of residual functional capacity to
perform light work. Id. at 46-48.

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notes and test results.”2 However, it is the ALJ’s duty to evaluate the record as a whole. See
Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 4767020, at *7-8 (“[T]he ALJ is charged with the
responsibility of determining the RFC based on her evaluation of the medical and non-medical
evidence.”). Moreover, the regulations specifically contemplate the use of this evidence in
coming to an assessment of residual functional capacity: “We will consider any statement about
what you can still do that have been provided by medical sources, whether or not they are based
on formal medical examinations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). For all these reasons, this Court
does not require that the ALJ need rely upon a medical opinion that specifically discusses
physical function.
The Magistrate Judge points to a Western District of Kentucky opinion for a rule that an
RFC finding must be supported by at least one medical opinion. Brown v. Colvin, 2013 WL
1703885, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2013). However, there is no unequivocal law in the Western
District except as set forth by the Sixth Circuit. Here, along with non-medical evidence, the ALJ
has evaluated not one but four doctors’ evaluations in determining claimant’s residual
functionality. Rather than “play[ing] doctor,” id., the ALJ has properly evaluated all available
evidence before rendering his RFC finding. “An ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a
medical expert by weighing the medical and non-medical evidence before rendering an RFC
finding.” Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010). The evidence
here meets that standard or any other applicable one.
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision denying disability benefits

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is SUSTAINED and the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This is a final order.

October 1, 2013

cc:

Counsel of Record
Magistrate Judge James D. Moyer

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