v. Mason et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 4/2/13; For reasons stated herein, action will be dismissed by separate Order.cc: Plaintiff, pro se, Defendant (DAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV-P638-H
JASON ONTERIA MASON

PLAINTIFF

v.
KEIVN HUIGDON

DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jason Onteria Mason filed the instant pro se 28 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding
in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on the initial review of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For
the reasons that follow, the action will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC) at the
time he filed this suit.1 He sues Keivn2 Huidgon, whom he identifies as the Chief of Police of the
Shively Police Department, in his individual and official capacities. As his statement of the
claim, Plaintiff states, “My first admendment was violated. On Aug 25 ‘2012 J. Cheney and W.
Singleton and M. Spalding Kevin Huigdon is, in charge of Shively P.D. I was arrested for
Disorderly Conduct, 2 Degree.” Plaintiff further states as follows:
Spalding didn’t places Police Sirens on nor was he behind me in a vehicle. As I was
walking into the Speedway at 3800 Dixie Hwy Louisville Ky. Spalding approached

1

Plaintiff recently filed a notice of change of address in which he indicates that he is no
longer incarcerated at LMDC. The Court notes that the VINE Link website shows that Plaintiff
is still in the custody of LMDC on work release. See www.vinelink.com.
2

Plaintiff spells Defendant’s first name as “Keivn” and “Kevin.” He spells the first name
as “Keivn” in the case caption and in the portion of the complaint where Defendants are to be
listed. The Court therefore uses the spelling “Keivn” in the case caption.

me. Speedway . . . is private property. As Spalding approached I asked for his
delegation of Authority - Oath of Office and Jurisdiction. He didn’t reply. I told him
I didn’t consent to the conversion. Then I was placed under arrest. I told Spalding
he was kidnapping me. I was charged with 7 charges involving Disorderly Conduct
2nd degree.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

2

of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a
claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).
To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a
pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to
the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
The only Defendant named by Plaintiff is Huigdon. However, based on the allegations,
Defendant Huigdon did not take part in Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff does not even allege that
Defendant Huigdon was present for the arrest. To state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must show
how each Defendant is accountable because that Defendant was personally involved in the acts
about which Plaintiff complains. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976). Here, Plaintiff
fails to plead any specific wrongdoing committed by Defendant Huigdon.
To the extent that Plaintiff sues Defendant Huigdon, the Chief of the Shively Police
Department, based on his supervisory authority, the doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right
to control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors.

3

Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 691 (1978); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
Rather, to establish supervisory liability in a § 1983 action, “[t]here must be a showing that the
supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly
participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least
implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending subordinate.” Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citing Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., Ky., 668 F.2d
869, 872-74 (6th Cir. 1982)). As Plaintiff made no such allegation against Defendant Huigdon,
all claims against Huigdon will be dismissed for failure to state claim upon which relief may be
granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the action will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

April 2, 2013

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4412.010

4