St. Clair v. Snow et al
Filing
9
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 4/19/13; Court CONSTRUES the letter (DN 6) as a motion to amend the complaint and GRANTS the motion. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a form for filing a petiti on for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Plaintiffs claim against Defendant Seay in his official capacity fails to state a claim and will be dismissed. Remainder of this action isSTAYED pending the final disposition of the criminal c ase against Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing within 30 days of the final disposition of the state criminal action against him. Plaintiff is WARNED that his failure to do so will result in the dismissal of this civil action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendants Seay and Marion CountyDetention Center as parties to the action.cc: Plaintiff, pro se, Defendants, Nelson County Attorney, Marion County Attorney (DAK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV-P640-S
MACK THOMAS ST. CLAIR III
PLAINTIFF
v.
JONATHAN SNOW et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mack Thomas St. Clair, III, filed the instant pro se 28 U.S.C. § 1983 action
proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on the initial review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997). Subsequent to filing the complaint, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Court (DN 6). Because
the letter alleged facts not included in the complaint, the Court CONSTRUES the letter (DN 6)
as a motion to amend the complaint and GRANTS the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The
claims therein will be screened as part of the Court’s initial review.
For the reasons set forth below, several of the claims will be dismissed, and the
remainder of the action will be stayed.
I.
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Nelson County Detention Center, sues Jonathan Snow,
a detective with the Nelson County Sheriff’s Office; Jack Seay, Nelson County Circuit Judge;
the Marion County Sheriff’s Office; the Nelson County Sheriff’s Office, and the Marion County
Detention Center. He sues all Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff
raises a number of allegations concerning his arrest, including allegations that he was arrested
without probable cause, that he was not mirandized, and that he was arrested under a “John Doe”
warrant.1
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III.
Injunctive relief
As relief, Plaintiff states that he seeks injunctive relief in the form of expungement and
release. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release
1
At this stage, the Court must “(1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers,
USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466
(6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
2
or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot seek expungement
or release through the instant § 1983 action. Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief will therefore
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a form for filing a petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, should Plaintiff choose to do so.
Claim against Defendant Seay
Plaintiff sues Defendant Circuit Judge Seay but does not state any specific claims against
him in the complaint or amendment. In any event, judges are entitled to absolute immunity for
actions arising out of all acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Judicial immunity is available even if the judge acts
maliciously, corruptly, or in bad faith. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam).
Absolute judicial immunity is not diminished even if the judge’s exercise of authority is flawed
or if there are procedural errors. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). A plaintiff may
recover damages against a judge only when the judge has acted in “clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” Id. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871)). Furthermore,
“[a]bsolute immunity is not available if the alleged wrongful conduct was committed pursuant to
a non-judicial act, i.e., one not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity, such as terminating an
employee.” Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 272 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988)). In the instant case, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant acted in
the absence of jurisdiction or that his claims arise out of any non-judicial act. Therefore, the
individual-capacity claim against Defendant Seay will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
3
Plaintiff also sues Defendant Seay in his official capacity. An official-capacity claim
brought against a state-court judge is deemed a claim against the Commonwealth of Kentucky
itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must allege that a “person” acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right
secured by the Constitution or federal law. See § 1983. States, state agencies, and state officials
sued in their official capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under
§ 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim
against Defendant Seay in his official capacity fails to state a claim and will be dismissed.
Marion County Detention Center
Plaintiff names as a Defendant the Marion County Detention Center, but he alleges no
factual allegations concerning this Defendant. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that a complaint “shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While the Court is aware of its duty to
construe pro se complaints liberally, Plaintiff is not absolved of his duty to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by providing Defendants with “fair notice of the basis for his
claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). To state a claim for relief,
Plaintiff must show how each Defendant is accountable because the Defendant was personally
involved in the acts about which he complains. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76
(1976). Because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts involving Defendant Marion County
Detention Center, the claim against it will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
4
Remainder of claims
“If a plaintiff files . . . any . . . claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a
pending or anticipated criminal trial[], it is within the power of the district court, and in accord
with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a
criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). Plaintiff has identified
himself as a pretrial detainee. Given the nature of Plaintiff’s claims and the on-going criminal
proceedings against him, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the remainder of this action is
STAYED pending the final disposition of the criminal case against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing within 30 days of the final disposition of
the state criminal action against him. Plaintiff is WARNED that his failure to do so will
result in the dismissal of this civil action.
IV.
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for injunctive relief and claims against Defendants
Jack Seay and the Marion County Detention Center are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendants Seay and Marion County
Detention Center as parties to the action.
Date:
April 19, 2013
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Nelson County Attorney
Marion County Attorney
4411.010
C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
h r s . i sn I Sno u g
e
I
r
U i dSae Ds i C ut
nt tt ir t o r
e
s tc
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?