Kotwal v. Tran et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER signed by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 8/19/13 re 18 Motion Reversal of dismissal. For reasons set forth, DN 18 Motion "for Reversal of dismissal based on a proposed amendment from current dfts to the dft's institution" is DENIED. cc:counsel (SJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-00695-H

DR. GIRISH J. KOTWAL

PLAINTIFF

V.
DR. HIEU TRAN, DR. MARIA LOU CORONEL,
and DR. KIMBERLY DOHERTY

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On June 5, 2013, this Court dismissed the two count complaint of Plaintiff, Dr. Girish J.
Kotwal, against Defendants, Drs. Hieu Tran, Maria Lou Coronel, and Kimberly Doherty.
Plaintiff, a former professor at Sullivan University’s College of Pharmacy, brought the action
against Defendants, who are various personnel in the College of Pharmacy, alleging that they
discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, national origin, gender and age. The Court
ruled that Plaintiff’s action could not be maintained against the individual Defendants because
individuals cannot be held personally liable for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Now Plaintiff has filed a “motion for
reversal of dismissal based on a proposed amendment from current defendants to the defendant’s
institution.” ECF No. 18.
I.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure direct that federal courts “should freely give leave
[to amend a complaint] when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). However, this liberal
standard is altered when the plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint after the court has dismissed
the action. Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002). “[W]hile Rule 15 plainly
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embodies a liberal amendment policy, in the post-judgment context, [courts] must also take into
consideration the competing interest of protecting the finality of judgments and the expeditious
termination of litigation.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has outlined the procedural steps a party must take to obtain postjudgment relief of this nature:
Following entry of final judgment, a party may not seek to amend their
complaint without first moving to alter, set aside or vacate judgment
pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. [Generally, a plaintiff will move] to alter judgment in the
district court pursuant to Rule 59(e), and on appeal, ask this court to vacate
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).
Id. at 799. In sum, a claimant wishing to reopen his case must meet the requirements of Rule 59
or 60 “[i]nstead of meeting only the modest requirements of Rule 15.” Leisure Caviar, LLC v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010). Additionally, the Court must be
“mindful of not only potential prejudice to the non-movant, but also the movant’s explanation for
failing to seek leave to amend prior to the entry of judgment.” Morse, 290 F.3d at 800.
Plaintiff’s motion, stylized as a “motion for reversal of dismissal based on a proposed
amendment from current defendants to the defendant’s institution,” ECF No. 18, seeks to reopen
the action so he may amend his complaint to substitute defendants. However, Plaintiff does not
cite to any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure as an avenue to do so, let alone argue that he has met
any associated requirements. Notwithstanding, the Court appreciates that Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, and will evaluate his motion as a Rule 59(e) motion. See Hodges v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr.,
238 F.3d 421, *1 (6th Cir. 2000) (construing a pro se motion “based on the well-settled precept
that the petitions of pro se litigants are held to an especially liberal standard”) (internal quotation
omitted).

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II.
Under Rule 59(e), motions to alter or amend are generally granted for four principal
reasons: (1) if there is a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening
change in controlling law; or (4) to prevent manifest injustice. Gencorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l
Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). “Such motions are extraordinary and sparingly
granted.” Marshall v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1175046, *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007). Here,
Plaintiff argues that the case has not been tried on the merits, and therefore he should be
permitted to amend his complaint to substitute Sullivan University for the individual
Defendants.1 He seems to argue that he should be granted relief in order to prevent manifest
injustice. “[A] showing of manifest injustice requires that there exist a fundamental flaw in the
court’s decision that without correction would lead to a result that is both inequitable and not in
line with applicable policy.” Hazelrigg v. Ky., 2013 WL 3568305, *1 (E.D. Ky. July 11, 2013)
(quoting McDaniel v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 2084277, *2) (W.D. Tenn. July 17,
2007)).
Plaintiff fails to argue that the Court’s June decision is fundamentally flawed so as to
warrant relief under Rule 59(e). Indeed, it was his oversight not to name Sullivan University in
his complaint or request to add Sullivan University as a party before this Court entered judgment
against him. The Court appreciates that Plaintiff is unfamiliar with the court system and the
procedural implications of court filings. However, before Plaintiff filed the instant action, he
pursued a charge of discrimination against Sullivan University with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. ECF No. 4-2. The EEOC action, which was ultimately dismissed,

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The Court dismissed his complaint because he improperly sought to impose individual liability under Title VI and
the ADEA. Ostensibly, Plaintiff learned after that ruling that he should have proceeded against Sullivan University,
an entity that can be held liable under those Acts.

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involved the same set of factual allegations as contained in Plaintiff’s complaint. Evidently, then
Plaintiff knew Sullivan University to be a possible party in the present case, but affirmatively
chose not to add Sullivan University as a defendant. Plaintiff does not proffer any explanation
why he did not pursue this action against Sullivan University. The situation does not strike the
Court as one warranting Rule 59(e) relief, and as such, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion “for reversal of dismissal based on a
proposed amendment from current defendants to the defendant’s institution” is DENIED.

August 19, 2013

cc:

Counsel of Record

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