Hopson v. Aguair Law Office et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr on 4/19/13; The Court will dismiss the complaint by separate order.cc:Plaintiff (pro se) (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
DEANDRE HOPSON
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV-769-M

AGUAIR LAW OFFICE et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Seeking damages, Plaintiff DeAnDre Hopson filed a pro se complaint against well over
twenty Defendants, many, if not all, of whom he has sued in other actions filed in this Court.1
Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997).
Upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court must dismiss a case at any time if it
determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, the action will be dismissed.
As grounds for filing this action in federal court, Plaintiff alleges obstruction of justice
and a violation of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“Hate
Crimes Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 249.
Obstruction of justice is a federal crime. The federal obstruction of justice statutes, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., do not provide for a private cause of action or civil remedies. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Reed, 29 F. App’x 202, 204 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Hamilton possesses no private right of
action against the defendants for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1506, and 1509.”);

1

See, e.g., Hopson v. Huffman et al., 3:12CV-262-S; Hopson v. Kentucky Bar Association
et al., 3:12CV-505-S; Hopson v. Shakes et al., 3:12CV-722-M; Hopson v. Secret Service et al.,
3:12CV-770-H; Hopson v. Spencer et al., 3:12CV-744-M.

Marshall v. Green, No. 3:10CV–224–H, 2010 WL 1959514, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 17, 2010)
(“Obstruction of justice is a criminal charge that does not provide a private cause of action.”).
Plaintiff’s obstruction of justice claims will be dismissed.
As to Plaintiff’s claims under the Hate Crimes Act, courts have held that the Act, 18
U.S.C. § 279, creates no private right of action. See Turner v. Tierney, No. C 12–6231 MMC,
2013 WL 1003634, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) (citing Loos v. Oregon Dep’t of Corr., No.
3:11-cv-00208-BR, 2012 WL 385385, at *6 (D. Or. Feb. 6, 2012); Chicago Title & Land Trust
Co. v. Rabin, No. 11-cv-425, 2012 WL 266387, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2012); Godfrey v. Ross,
No. CIV. 2:11–2308 WBS EFB, 2011 WL 6012607, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011); Benitez v.
Rumage, No. C–11–208, 2011 WL 3236199, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2011); Wolfe v. Beard,
No. 10-2566, 2011 WL 601632, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2011); Lorenz v. Managing Director, St.
Luke’s Hosp., No. 09 Civ. 8898(DAB)(JCF), 2010 WL 4922267, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2010),
report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 4922541 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010)). “The Hate
Crimes Act does not confer rights on a specific class of persons, but rather criminalizes certain
offenses based on, among other traits, a person’s national origin, gender, or sexual orientation.”
Wolfe v. Beard, 2011 WL 601632, at *3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)). “Moreover, the statute
specifically provides for criminal enforcement, and authorizes penalties including
imprisonment.” Id. “Because neither personal rights nor private remedies exist in the statutory
text, the Court concludes that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action.”
Chicago Title & Land Trust Co. v. Rabin, 2012 WL 266387, at *4.

2

The Court finds the cases which have addressed the issue persuasive and also concludes
that the Hate Crimes Act does not provide for a private cause of action. Plaintiff’s claims under
that Act will be dismissed.
Finally, “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous,
devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Plaintiff’s complaint meets this
standard and will be dismissed on this basis as well.
For the reasons set forth more fully above, the Court will dismiss the complaint by
separate Order.
Date:

April 19, 2013

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4414.005

3