Hopson v. Secret Service et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 2/7/13. For reasons stateddismissal is appropriate. By separate Order, therefore the Ct will dismiss the action. Before doing so, however, the Ct will issue an Order to show cause why Pltf should not be barred from filing future lawsuits without tendering the $350 filing fee.cc:Plaintiff Pro Se (SJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
DE’ANDRE HOPSON

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV-770-H

SECRET SERVICE et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, De’Andre Hopson, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint. This matter is
now before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 14 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be
dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff sues the Secret Service, the FBI, Adam Solinger, Gary Hoffman, Dana Cohen,
Mitch McConnell, Susan Gibson, the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office, Weinburg Attorney at
Law, Scott Miller, Dr. Harbetch at U of L Hospital, U of L Hospital, Jewish Hospital, Robert
Eggart, Frank Mascagni, Charlie Cunningham, and Baptist East Hospital. His complaint
mentions 42 U.S.C. § 14141, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, “Whistle Blowing! Report on terrorist activitys
and pyramid schemes!” He alleges:
U of L Hospital doctor has instored vaginal mesh inside of a person’s
face trying to kill me. Also other named hospitals reused my
treatment for help of torture. All Defendants are of Jewish
Foundation community and are building a terrorist cell around me to
strip all civil libertys and rights as a U.S. American citizen, also
connected with Hospitals giveing false repots on medical
examinations about medical injuries. All attorney are connected in
web. Weinburg attorneys at law has direct investment relations to
these family orientated Jewish communities, all tampering wit[h] a
witness under legal process.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Federal Reserve is using a Ponzi scheme to defraud the

government and to extort him into making false statements and using intimidation, murder, legal
kidnapping, obstruction of justice, bribery, and “military tactics to take hostages of DeAndre’s
children in attempt to erase Hopson because of his religious beliefs as a Christian. Also to
silence Hopson from telling about the giant illegal pyramid designed to defraud U.S. financial
institutions.”
As relief, Plaintiff wants the Court to “warn Homeland Security of terrorist activity for
starting a holy war[;] provide military court proce[]dures to protect public and president from
harm”; protect all federal buildings from future terrorist attacks; give him his Thirteenth
Amendment rights; and provide “injunctive relief in all state courts because of obstruction of
justices terrorist Jewish cells around [him.]” He also requests monetary and punitive damages
and attorneys fees in the trillions of dollars. He attaches what appears to be a definition of a
terrorist cell; a list of what appears to be actions Defendant Weinberg has perpetrated on him
including attempting to assassinate him, kidnapping his children, killing his sister, and sending
agents to blow up his studio; and two other pages of handwritten notes, the import of which is
lost on the Court.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604-05. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if
the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore,

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dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v.
City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint, or portion thereof, should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Jurisdiction
“Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the plaintiff must establish
subject matter jurisdiction.” Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir.
2005). Federal courts hear only cases allowed under the Constitution or cases which Congress
has entrusted to them by statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994). As to possible federal-question jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s complaint mentions 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141 and 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
Under § 14141(a) of title 42 of the U.S. Code:
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent
thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental
authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law
enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any
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governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of
juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
That statute only applies to juveniles, and it does not create a private cause of action. CP,
ex rel. Powell v. Tennessee, No. 3:10-CV-126, 2010 WL 2598105, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. June 24,
2010). Instead, it allows only the Attorney General to bring a civil action to “obtain appropriate
equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b). As
such, Plaintiff cannot bring a cause of action under this statutory section.
Section 2441 of title 18 of the U.S. Code, entitled “War crimes,” makes it a crime to
commit a war crime either inside or outside the United States. However, federal criminal
statutes like this one do not create a private right of action. See Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of
Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003); Swift v. Bush,
Civil Action No. 10-7388, 2011 WL 2517143, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2011) (“Federal criminal
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 2441 do not create a private right of action. ”). Only a United States
Attorney may “prosecute for all offenses against the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 547(1). Thus,
Plaintiff fails to establish jurisdiction under this statute as well.
Nor can Plaintiff bring this suit based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff resides in
Louisville, Kentucky. It appears that most, if not all, Defendants are citizens of Kentucky.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States; . . . .” § 1332(a)(1). There must be
“complete diversity between the plaintiffs and defendants, i.e., ‘diversity jurisdiction does not
exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.’” Medlen v.
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Estate of Meyers, 273 F. App’x 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)) (emphasis in Owen). While Plaintiff alleges an amount in
controversy that exceeds the statutory requirement, he does not demonstrate that his citizenship
is different from all of the named Defendants. Thus, he fails to invoke this Court’s diversity
jurisdiction.
Additionally, “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous,
devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations meet the standard set forth in Apple v. Glenn, and dismissal is appropriate for that
reason as well.
III. CONCLUSION
By separate Order, therefore, the Court will dismiss the action. Before doing so,
however, the Court will issue an Order to show cause why Plaintiff should not be barred from
filing future lawsuits without tendering the $350.00 filing fee.
Date:

February 7, 2013

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4412.009

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