Hopson v. Aguair Law Office et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 1/15/13; By separate order, the Court will dismiss this action. cc:Plaintiff (pro se), Defendants (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
DEANDRE HOPSON

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV-771-S

AGUAIR LAW OFFICE et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff DeAndre Hopson filed a pro se complaint. Because he is proceeding in
forma pauperis, this Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons that follow,
the complaint will be dismissed.
I. STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff filed his action on a general complaint form. In the section of the complaint
directing him to state the grounds for filing this case in federal court, he states: “War crimes
statue also obstruction of justice crimes against humanity.” He names the following individuals
and entities as Defendants: Aguair Law Office, Adam Solinger, Weinburg Foundation, Ruth
Spencer, DeAunn A. Hospon, Stockyards Bank, A’One Entertainment, Chase Bank, Recole
Oneal, U of L Hospital, Floyd Memorial Hospital, Jewish Hospital, Baptist East Hospital, Emory
Hospital, and “Cash Crash (Fraud Company).”
As the statement of claims, Plaintiff alleges that Adam Solinger of Cash Crash is trying
to take over Plaintiff’s company, A’One Entertainment, by using Plaintiff’s girlfriend, Ruth
Spencer, and “trying to coach her into destroying me.” He further alleges that Solinger
“aggravated idenity theft to put a bunch of false claims in my name and move it to my buisness
acount and now been caught defrauding insurance company wit Ruth’s Ann forgery” and that

Solinger is “trying to use his Best Friends the Weinburgs to help him get me erased so they can
take my medical lawsuit illegally filed and settled by them.” He additionally claims that “Chase
Bank and Stockyard Bank also PNC to hide and embbezzell money for kick back to be given
them. Banks have been notified, now they trying to get my xwife involved to legal get money
out. And railroad me to prision, useing they attorney Weinburgs pyramid scheme.”
In an attachment to the complaint, Plaintiff references Defendant Weinburg Foundation
and states:
These terrorist belieave tha Death in Fighting a religous war against their enemys
puts them in eternal Heaven. That Turning against their religous vows, By informing
Authorities About their enimies puts them in eternal Death. Now they are ready to
commit suicide.
These Folks are wageing and getting Finicaly secured, to wage a Holy war, Stageing
Frieghtingly Destructive lone wolfs, cults, and radical movements, their members
Heads Filled with Schemes of mayhem and Destruction and slavery. Obstructeing
our court systems to join in with minipulateing statagies. To Defraud Finacale
Insurace companys Pyramid Scheme combines a Fake, yet seemingly credible
Buisness with a simple-to understand yet sophistacated-sounding money makeing
Formula which is used For profit . . . .
In another attachment to the complaint, Plaintiff states that the hospital Defendants are
“Effecting Interstate Commerce” and references 18 U.S.C. §§ 1006 and 1033.
As relief, Plaintiff requests $7 million “to seek medical help for my milpracticed
surguries”; $25 billion in both punitive and monetary damages against each person listed;
$50 billion in special damages for embarrassment and intentional infliction of emotional
disturbance; $25 million for pain and suffering; and $25 million in “punishing special damages.”

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court must dismiss a case at any time if
it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

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not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the
duty “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and their powers are enumerated
in Article III of the Constitution and in statutes enacted by Congress. Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); see generally, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330 et seq. The burden
of establishing jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff. Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 215 F.3d 608, 611
(6th Cir. 2000); Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assocs., Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 606 (6th Cir. 1998).
A. Federal Question
Under the federal-question statute, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. As the grounds for filing this action in federal court, Plaintiff asserts, “War crimes
statue also Obstruction of Justice Crimes Angaist Humanity.” These grounds are criminal in

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nature and do not provide for private causes of action or civil remedies. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501
et seq. (obstruction of justice); see, e.g., Hamilton v. Reed, 29 F. App’x 202, 204 (6th Cir. 2002)
(“Hamilton possesses no private right of action against the defendants for alleged violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1506, and 1509.”); Marshall v. Green, No. 3:10CV–224–H, 2010 WL
1959514, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 17, 2010) (“Obstruction of justice is a criminal charge that does
not provide a private cause of action.”); Hohensee v. Bush, No. 09 0424, 2009 WL 565701, at *1
(D.D.C. Mar. 5, 2009) (“The prosecution of war crimes is the exclusive domain of international
tribunals.”).
Plaintiff also cites to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1066 and 1033 in an attachment to the complaint.
Sections 1066 and 1033 are criminal statutes which also provide for no private causes of action
or civil remedies. See, e.g., Bardes v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:11CV340, 2011 WL
1790816, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 10, 2011) (“Section 1033 establishes only criminal penalties for
various forms of fraudulent conduct by persons involved in the interstate insurance business and
Section 1034 allows only the United States Attorney General (and, thus, by clear implication, not
private plaintiffs) to seek civil penalties and injunctions for violations of . . . Section 1033.”);
Dykes v. PCA Fed. Credit Union, No. 1:09-MI-00579, 2010 WL 1529295, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb.
4, 2010) (“[C]ourts have determined that 18 U.S.C. § 1006 does not provide a private right of
action.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff alleges state-law claims of medical malpractice and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Section 1367(c) of title 28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent
part, that “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . .

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if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Having dismissed the federal claims, the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
B. Diversity of Citizenship
In seeking damages for medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Plaintiff may be attempting to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. That statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States; . . . .” § 1332(a)(1). There
must be “complete diversity between the plaintiffs and defendants, i.e., ‘diversity jurisdiction
does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.’”
Medlen v. Estate of Meyers, 273 F. App’x 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)) (emphasis in Owen). While Plaintiff alleges
an amount in controversy that exceeds the statutory requirement, he does not demonstrate that
his citizenship is different from all of the named Defendants. Thus, he fails to invoke this
Court’s diversity jurisdiction.
By separate Order, therefore, the Court will dismiss the action.
Date:

January 15, 2013

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4411.005

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