Mason v. Bolton et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge John G. Heyburn II. For the reasons stated, the instant action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc:Plaintiff, pro se; counsel of record (ERH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
JASON ONTERIA MASON
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12CV-794-H

JOHN DOE #1 et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jason Onteria Mason filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(DN 1). He also filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees (DN 3) which was
granted by the Court (DN 5). This case has been proceeding, and there are presently dispositive
motions pending. However, on November 14, 2013, Plaintiff notified the Court that he had been
released from incarceration and provided the Court with his address (DN 62). Accordingly, the
Court entered an Order on November 27, 2013, directing Plaintiff to either pay the filing fee for
this action or file a non-prisoner application to proceed without prepayment of fees within 30
days from entry of the Order (DN 66). The Order further stated that, “Plaintiff is WARNED
that failure to comply with this Order will result in dismissal of this action.” Over 30 days
have passed since the entry of the Order, and Plaintiff has failed to pay the filing fee as directed
by the Court’s Order or file a non-prisoner application to proceed without prepayment of fees.
Additionally, he has not filed any document with the Court explaining this failure or requesting
additional time in which to comply. The Court’s record reflects that he has simply taken no
action regarding this matter.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the

district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). Although federal courts afford pro se
litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading
rules, the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other procedures
readily understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or failure to
pursue a case. Id. at 110. “As this court has noted, the lenient treatment generally accorded to
pro se litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than
a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d at 110). Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their
calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties
seeking relief.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).

Because Plaintiff failed to comply with the Court’s Order (DN 66) and has failed to take
any action in this case subsequent to entry of the Order, the Court concludes that he has
abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action.
Therefore, by separate Order, the Court will dismiss the instant action.
Date:

January 22, 2014

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of record
4412.003

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