Hopson v. Spencer et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 5/14/13; For reasons stated, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss Plaintiffs complaint.cc: Plaintiff, pro se (DAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
DeANDRE HOPSON
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-80-H

RUTH ANN SPENCER et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, DeAndre Hopson, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint.1 This matter is
now before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be
dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff sues multiple Defendants: Ruth Ann Spencer; Judge Collins; Susan Gibson;
Dana Cohen; Ryan Conroy; Judge Gerber; Jennifer Coffman; Denise Rainey; Denetra Hopson;
DeAunna Hopson; Tara Williams; Felicia Pennerman; Nicole Pennerman; Nicole Pearson; Ms.
Barton; Doctor of Clarksville (woman); Diane Jones; Brenda Rainey; Thelma Lightsey; Finacale
Sgt. (Molley); Domestic Violence Sergeant (Ms. Nunn); Chase Bank Manager; Preston Hwy
location; police reporter; Carlyn Hopson; federal clerk of courts; Teresa Grey; Michael Holts;
CPS Services, KY; David Weinburg; and Adam Solinger. The first page of his complaint
mentions, among other things, the “Matthew Shepards and James Byrd Act hate crime
prevention sexual orientation,” whistleblowing action, and “medicaid medicare act false claims
act.” His lengthy complaint contains a rambling, disjointed narrative of a vast conspiracy or

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The Court notes that this is the sixteenth lawsuit Plaintiff has filed in this Court since
May 21, 2012. Many of his cases contain overlapping Defendants and claims.

conspiracies. For example, Plaintiff alleges: “These folks are after Hopson’s life and children’s
life as action show, to hide there injustice of killing it’s own people, citizens of the United
States. But robbing it’s Federal Reserve company. Causing complete clear and present danger,
genocide also wars against one another.” His complaint does not contain a demand for the relief
sought.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608-09. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if
the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v.
City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint, or portion thereof, should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only if it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
While a reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall,
454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough

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facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Whistle-blowing
Although near the beginning of his complaint, Plaintiff writes, “Whistle Blowing
Action,” he does not cite to a specific statute, and there are several federal statutes prohibiting
retaliation against whistleblowers. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1221 (Whistleblower Protection Act); 31
U.S.C. § 3730(h) (False Claims Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Federal Water Pollution Control
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (Clean Air Act); among others. None of these statutes would apply to
the facts alleged by Plaintiff. Any whistleblower claims will be dismissed.
False Claims Act
Plaintiff’s complaint references the False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA is found at 31
U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. It “is an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing submission of false
or fraudulent claims to the federal government.” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health
Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003). Under the FCA, a private individual, known as a
relator, may bring suit alleging FCA violations on behalf of the government; such an action is
known as a qui tam action. Id.; United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 342
n.5 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the United States is the real-party-in-interest in FCA litigation”).
However, qui tam actions cannot be brought by a pro se relator. Because “a qui tam
relator . . . sues on behalf of the government and not himself[, h]e therefore must comply with
the general rule prohibiting nonlawyers from representing other litigants.” United States ex rel.
Szymczak v. Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc., 207 F. App’x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted); see also Jones v. Jindal, 409 F. App’x 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States

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ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92-94 (2nd Cir. 2008); Timson v. Sampson, 518
F.3d 870, 873-74 (11th Cir. 2008); Rogers v. Sacramento Cnty., 293 F. App’x 466, 467 (9th Cir.
2008); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 F. App’x 802, 803 (4th Cir.
2007) (per curiam); Brantley v. Title First Titling Agency, No. 1:12-cv-608, 2012 WL 6725592,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2012); Carter v. Washtenaw Cnty., No. 09–14994, 2010 WL 3222042,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2010).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action, he is prohibited from
bringing an FCA claim, and that claim will be dismissed.
Hate Crime Prevention Act
Plaintiff cites to the Matthew Shepherd and James Bird Hate Crime Prevention Act,
found at 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2). However, this is a criminal statute, and Plaintiff, as a private
citizen, has no authority to initiate a federal criminal prosecution. Jermano v. Taylor, No. 1110739, 2012 WL 4021115, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2012) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s claim
under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act).
Remaining claims
Plaintiff’s complaint almost exclusively contains broad and conclusory allegations that
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Abner v. Focus: Hope, 93 F. App’x 792, 793 (6th
Cir. 2004) (stating that the court is not “required to accept non-specific factual allegations and
inferences or unwarranted legal conclusions”). These conclusions are not supported by factual
allegations that would “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Plaintiff’s complaint is rambling, disjointed, implausible, and fails, as it is
required to do, to contain “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material

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elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Additionally, under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain “a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief.” Plaintiff requested no relief in his complaint and, thus, fails to comply with the
federal rules.
Finally, “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous,
devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.
1999) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Plaintiff’s complaint meets this
standard and will be dismissed on this basis as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint.
Date:

May 14, 2013

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4411.009

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