Chest v. Rippy
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 8/26/13; the Court will enter a separate Order of dismissal consistent herewith. cc: Plaintiff (pro se); Defendant (JLS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
GREGORY LEE CHEST
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV-293-S
LYNN RIPPY
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Gregory Lee Chest filed a pro se complaint. He filed an application to proceed
without prepayment of fees, which has been granted. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis, this Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the
reasons that follow, the complaint will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on a general-complaint form against Lynn Rippy. As
grounds for filing this case in federal court, Plaintiff alleges, “Patent Infringement law Violation
of Unjust EnRichment 6.02 D Unjust EnRichment.” He alleges that the “Infringers Conduct was
Direct & Purposeful” and that “The Infringer” obtained his “Plans and Ideas on Paper and
Place[d] Them Into Action By Illegal Inappropriate means.” He asks that “all Idea/Plan Rights
[be] Restored to [him] as Inventor/Owner/and/Originator.”
As to the first instance of alleged infringement, Plaintiff reports that years ago he was an
inmate at the “now closed River City Jefferson County Department of Corrections work release
center.” He states that he was on work release and that, by contract, he was required to return at
a certain time or else he would be charged with escape and his property would be destroyed.
Plaintiff reports that when he returned late to the facility on a particular occasion, he was
charged with escape and was told that his property “had already been taken.” He states,
“Repeatedly I asked For my Property, But Received No Answer.” He continues:
Later In The Same year Department of Corrections Director Joe Payne Came To
River City To meet with River City Work Release and Job Search Inmates. I
Gregory Lee Chest was at Recreation when I Heard Corrections Department Head
Joe Payne Talking To Inmates Concerning Houses was going To be built and The
Construction Company Building The Houses was going To be useing River City
Corrections Work Release Inmates who Signed Into A Rehabilitation Program. I
told Joe Payne That Those plans He addressed To The Inmates was My Ideas I Had
originated In Jail and my Property was pureposefully Taken (confiscated) at River
City.
With respect to the second instance of alleged infringement, Plaintiff alleges that he was
released from jail in May 2004 and began living on the streets. He reports that in April 2004, on
his way to a teeth-cleaning appointment, “I . . . placed [] my Black Back Pack Into The Bushes at
[] old Louisville Medical College . . . Aiming to Return and Regather my Property.” Later that
day before he could get back to his property, he was arrested and taken to jail. He, therefore, had
to leave in the bushes his black bag containing “My Adult Retraining Program With The Layout
Outlined on Paper Illistrating The Steps For the Program [] Joined To By The Recycling
Aluminum and Plastic Section To Help Profide Economic Financial Input To Help Finance and
Stablize needed Funding Into the Adult Retraining Program Helping to Aid Trainees with
clothing and Housing.” Plaintiff claims that his outline “Is Now The Same Outline For Youth
Build Green Campus Part of the National Initiative Youth Build Louisville.”
As relief, Plaintiff requests that (1) “Patent Idea Rights For Youth Build Louisville be
instated to Nameing E.g. I Gregory Lee Chest as The Inventor + Originator”; (2) “In Future
News Paper Articles or Television News I Gregory Lee Chest Be Named as Inventor +
Originator of Youth Build Plans”; (3) “I Gregory Lee Chest Have the Ownership and Authority
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To Use the Formula Make Up Ideas For My Future Adult ReHabilitation Center”; and (4) “In
Future School Plans, That lynn Rippy or Youth Build Nationally Disolv all Idea Plans For
Useage Belonging To I Gregory Lee Chest.”
II.
Upon review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court must dismiss a case at any time if
it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss
a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the
factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2)
take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561
F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d
1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the
duty “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518
F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III.
A. Federal Claim
Plaintiff alleges a patent infringement claim. To state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, “a party alleging direct infringement need only comply with Form 18 [of the Appendix
of Forms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].” Cronos Techs., LLC v. Camping World Inc.,
No. 1:12–CV–147–R, 2013 WL 3936899, at *2 (W.D. Ky. July 30, 2013) (citing K–Tech
Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that
“to the extent any conflict exists between Twombly (and its progeny) and the Forms regarding
pleading requirements, the Forms control”) and In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing
Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1333-36 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same)). Form 18 requires:
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(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff owns the patent; (3)
a statement that defendant has been infringing the patent by making, selling, and
using [the device] embodying the patent; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given
the defendant notice of the infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction and
damages.
Cronos Techs., LLC, 2013 WL 3936899, at *3 (quoting In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “To comply under Form 18, a complaint for direct patent
infringement must identify the type of product with enough detail to give the defendant notice as
to which product it must defend.” Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff does not allege ownership of a patent. He alleges only that
his ideas/plans1 were taken by others. He additionally fails to allege having given notice to
Defendant Rippy of the infringement. In fact, he fails to allege any facts involving Defendant
Rippy. He only names her as Defendant and lists her in the relief section of the complaint form.
Plaintiff wholly fails to “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court, therefore, will dismiss the patent infringement claim due to Plaintiff’s failure
to plead facts sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. State-Law Claim
Plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment is a state-law claim.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Because the Court will dismiss the federal patent
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It is questionable whether Plaintiff’s ideas/plans are patentable, see 35 U.S.C. § 101, but
the Court need not decide that issue here.
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infringement claim over which it has original jurisdiction, it will decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim and dismiss it without prejudice. See Runkle
v. Fleming, 435 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen, as here, ‘all federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law
claims.’”) (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
Additionally, diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 does not exist because
Plaintiff alleges neither the requisite amount in controversy, see § 1332(a) (providing that “the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs”), nor
that he and Defendant are diverse in citizenship. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437
U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (“[D]iversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen
of a different State from each plaintiff.”).
The Court will enter a separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:
August 26, 2013
C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
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U i dSae Ds i C ut
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cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4411.005
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