Calloway v. Beasley et al
Filing
5
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III; IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants Officers Beasley, Kelsey, Soto-Perez, and Reeves are DISMISSED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff 's claim against Defendant King is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Defendant King as a party to this action. The Court will enter a separate Order directing service on Defendants against whom claims have been permitted to proceed.cc:Plaintiff(pro se); Defendants; Jefferson County Attorney (ERH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13CV-410-S
KIM V. CALLOWAY
PLAINTIFF
v.
OFFICER RODERICK BEASLEY et al.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kim V. Calloway filed the instant pro se action. Since Plaintiff is proceeding in
forma pauperis, this Court must review the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 548 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth herein, some of Plaintiff’s claims will be
dismissed and some will be permitted to proceed for further development.
I.
Plaintiff sues the following officers of the Louisville Metro Police Department (LMPD)
in their individual and official capacities: Officer Roderick Beasley, Officer Steve Kelsey,
Officer Jorge Soto-Perez, and Officer Clayton Reeves. He also sues Jefferson County District
Court Judge Katie King but does not identify in which capacity he sues her.
Plaintiff states that on April 21, 2012, the defendant-police officers illegally entered his
home “without permission over Plaintiffs expressed verbal objections not to do so, and, searched
Plaintiffs home for what they expressed (for guns), without probable cause or search warrant.”
He contends the search violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fourth
Amendment. He states that he was arrested and jailed, “charged with domestic violence.” He
further states that on October 25, 2012, the domestic violence charge was dismissed by
Defendant Judge King. He reports that he pleaded guilty to contempt of court and “was probated
30 days in jail for one year.” Plaintiff states:
Plaintiff’s right to equal protection and due process of law under the 6th and 14th
Amendments of the United States Constitution to be charged and probated for
contempt of court where Plaintiff was informed by his public defender lawer to bring
his material witness to court (who was complaining witness in state court) to defend
against a false charge in the first place. The court did not have jurisdiction to compel
Plaintiff to plead guilty of contempt.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $500,000 each in compensatory and punitive damages.
II.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this Court must review the instant
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); McGore, 114 F.3d at 608-09. Upon review, the Court must dismiss
a case at any time if it determines that an action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The duty to be
less stringent with pro se complaints, however, “does not require [the Court] to conjure up
unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted), and
the Court is not required to create a claim for a pro se plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the “courts to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the
district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Official-capacity claims against LMPD officers
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against the Defendant LMPD officers are actually
against their employer, the Louisville Metro Government. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985). However, a municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978); Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff
must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury
was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d
358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to
establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d
282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation
omitted)).
Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendant police officers acted pursuant to any
municipal policy or custom with respect to the search of his home. Plaintiff’s complaint appears
to allege an isolated event affecting only him. See Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th
Cir. 1999) (“No evidence indicates that this was anything more than a one-time, isolated event
for which the county is not responsible.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims
against Defendants Officers Beasley, Kelsey, Soto-Perez, and Reeves will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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Individual-capacity claims against LMPD officers
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits searches and seizures absent probable cause or a warrant based on probable cause. See
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Based upon the allegations in the complaint, the Court will allow
Plaintiff’s claim alleging an illegal search of his home to proceed against Defendants Officers
Beasley, Kelsey, Soto-Perez, and Reeves in their individual capacities. In allowing these claims
to proceed, the Court passes no judgment on their ultimate outcome.
Claim challenging conviction for contempt of court
Plaintiff also alleges that his rights to equal protection and due process were violated
when he was “charged and probated for contempt of court . . . .” He states that he pleaded guilty
and that he is currently on probation. The Court construes his allegations as a claim against
Defendant King for his conviction for contempt of court in Jefferson District Court. However,
this claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), wherein the Supreme Court
recognized that a plaintiff may not file a § 1983 suit challenging his conviction or sentence if a
ruling on his claim would necessarily render the conviction or sentence invalid, until and unless
the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by Executive Order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff has not alleged
that his contempt-of-court conviction has been overturned or otherwise invalidated.
Furthermore, judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions arising out of all acts
performed in the exercise of their judicial functions. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). Judicial immunity is available even if the judge acts maliciously, corruptly, or in bad
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faith. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). Absolute judicial immunity is not
diminished even if the judge’s exercise of authority is flawed or if there are procedural errors.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant King challenging his conviction for
contempt of court will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
III.
For the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Officers
Beasley, Kelsey, Soto-Perez, and Reeves are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant King in
connection with his conviction for contempt of court is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Since no claims remain against Defendant King, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
terminate her as a party to this action.
The Court will enter a separate Order directing service on Defendants against whom
claims have been permitted to proceed.
Date:
cc:
October 8, 2013
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Jefferson County Attorney
4411.010
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