Matthews v. Roberts

Filing 83

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 2/13/2014; re 68 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jessica Brown Roberts ; an appropriate order shall issuecc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-00503

ELAINE MATTHEWS

Plaintiff,

v.
JESSICA BROWN ROBERTS

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Jessica Brown Roberts’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 68.) Plaintiff Elaine Matthews has responded. (Docket No.
74.) This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, Roberts’s Motion will
be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On May 20, 2013, Matthews filed a Complaint against Roberts, the County Attorney of
Meade County, Kentucky. Matthews’s Complaint demanded both injunctive relief and monetary
damages as a result of Roberts’s alleged misuse of her elected office.
Specifically, the Complaint centers on Matthews’s desire to protest Broadbent Wildlife
Sanctuary (“the Sanctuary”), a business owned by Mary Ann Tobin and located on U.S.
Highway 60 in Guston, Meade County, Kentucky, and Matthews’s subsequent arrest, which she
alleges was in retaliation for this protest. Since February 2012, Matthews has protested the
Sanctuary’s alleged mistreatment of a whitetail deer known as Briana (“Briana”). Matthews
describes a deep affection for Briana, having bonded with the animal. For many months,
Matthews sat in a lawn chair along U.S. 60 with signs describing Briana’s mistreatment, some of
which include objectionable language. (See Docket No. 24 at 2.) Matthews has filed a number of

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lawsuits and motions arising out of these circumstances; previous filings describe her widespread
concerns and allow for a fuller understanding of the facts at hand.
On May 19, 2013, Matthews encountered Meade County Deputy Sheriff Brian Haag in
the course of her protesting. According to Matthews, Haag threatened to cite Matthews for
criminal trespass unless she removed herself, her vehicle, and her signs from the roadside.
Matthews alleges that Haag claimed to have acted on the orders of Roberts, (Docket No. 1 at 2);
Haag’s affidavit contradicts this contention, (see Docket No. 68-4).
According to Roberts, her office received numerous complaints regarding Matthews’s
activities. (Docket No. 68-5 at 1.) She therefore inquired with the Kentucky Department of
Highways (“KDH”) as to Matthews’s right to protest on the right-of-way. KDH personnel
informed her that citizens cannot protest within highway right-of-ways unless they have applied
for and received a permit to do so, and that Matthews had done neither. (Docket No. 68-5 at 12.) Roberts communicated this information to the Meade County Sheriff’s Department. (Docket
No. 68-5 at 2.) Roberts claims to have had no contact with Deputy Haag before he traveled to
Matthews’s protest site on May 19, 2013. (Docket No. 68-5 at 2.)
Roberts then deposed Kevin Blain of the KDH on October 21, 2013, in an effort to
confirm the procedure to obtain a permit for right-of-way activities. Blain testified that any
person, including Matthews, wishing to access the right-of-way must complete an Application
for Encroachment and be granted a permit. Blain testified that Matthews had not received such a
permit and would not be granted access to the right-of-way. (Docket No. 68-6.)
On October 30, 2013, after reviewing a Criminal Complaint against Matthews filed by
Tobin, Meade County District Judge Harold Goff found that probable cause existed to believe
that Matthews had committed third degree criminal trespass.

2

After Goff signed an arrest

warrant, Matthews was arrested and booked in the Meade County Detention Center. (Docket
No. 45 at 1.) As a condition of her release, Matthews agreed not to enter Meade County except
to appear in court. (Docket No. 45 at 1.) It is undisputed that Roberts did not issue an arrest
warrant for Matthews, nor did she place nonfinancial conditions upon her release.
Matthews now urges the Court to restrain Roberts from “interfering” with her right to
protest at her chosen site along U.S. 60. In her Amended Complaint, Matthews alleges that
Roberts wrongly processed the criminal complaint and issued an improper arrest warrant in order
to stop her from exercising her First Amendment right to protest. (Docket No. 45 at 2.) She
further contends that Roberts had prior knowledge that Judge Goff would condition Matthews’s
release on her agreement to refrain from entering Meade County. (Docket No. 45 at 2.) Finally,
she explains that the stifling of her right to protest is particularly distressing to her as it
exacerbates the childhood abuse and trauma that she survived. (Docket No. 1 at 1.)

STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court
must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and
determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The “[s]ummary judgment procedure is
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

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determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal
quotations omitted).
“[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue of material
fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989). A “material” fact is
one whose resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commerical Union Ins. Co.,
260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). An issue is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Henson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143,
1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual
disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala,
205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). Moreover, no genuine issue of material fact exists when the
“record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Accordingly, a
factual dispute that “is merely colorable or is not significantly probative” will not defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296
(6th Cir. 1993); see also Int’l Union, v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999).
The essential question is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a
jury question as to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the
basis of its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a
genuine dispute regarding material facts and must present a jury question as to each element of
the claim. Davis v. McCourt, 226 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2000); Mt. Lebanon Pers. Care Home,
Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). Failure to prove an essential

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element of a claim renders all other facts immaterial. Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Elvisly
Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 1991).
Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party may not “rest upon
its mere allegations or denials of the opposing party’s pleadings,” Havensure, L.L.C. v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 595 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), nor may it “rely
on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact,” Street v.
J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, the opponent of the motion
must point to specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material demonstrating
“evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
If the nonmoving party cannot meet her burden of proof after sufficient opportunity for
discovery, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Furthermore, federal courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe,
951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se
complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d
16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court is not required “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff,” as this would “transform the district court
from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278.
It is against these standards that the Court reviews the following facts.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Matthews’s Amended Complaint
As an initial matter, the Court considers Roberts’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint (Docket No. 47), to which Matthews has responded, (Docket No. 49). Roberts argues
that because Matthews failed to file a motion requesting the Court’s leave to file her “Verified
Amended Complaint,” this filing is impermissible and must be stricken.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) explains that outside of the Rule 15(a) twentyone days period, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent
or the court’s leave.” The Court notes that Matthews requested no such leave.

However,

abundant authority establishes a lenient standard for evaluating the pleadings of a pro se
plaintiff.
The judicial tendency is to disregard the deficiencies of a lengthy,
unorganized complaint, particularly in a case in which a dismissal
with leave to replead probably would not result in a substantially
better drafted or more illuminating pleading. This reluctance on
the part of the federal courts to dismiss for deviation from the
short-and-plain statement standard understandably manifests itself
most predominately and most frequently when the plaintiff is
appearing pro se.
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1217.
Although a district court is not required to conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf, the
United States Supreme Court has unanimously held that a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings must be
held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines 404 U.S. at
520. Furthermore, Rule 15(a)(2) itself advises that “[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.”
For these reasons, the Court denies Roberts’s Motion to Strike. (Docket No. 47.) The
Court will construe Docket No. 45 as both a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and

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as an Amended Complaint itself. Finally, the Court will consider Robers’s Motion for Summary
Judgment to encompass the contents of both the initial and amended complaints.

II.

Elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim
The Court will first consider the heart of Matthew’s claims: that Roberts violated her

First Amendment rights by inferring with her protest of Briana’s treatment. The Court must
determine whether Matthews has alleged sufficient facts that, taken as true for purposes of
Roberts’s Motion, would satisfy the three elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must establish:
(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected
activity; (2) that the defendant’s adverse action caused the plaintiff
to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the
adverse action was motivated at least in part as a response to the
exercise of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998).
a.

Matthews engaged in protected conduct.

First, to succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that she “was engaged in a
constitutionally protected activity.” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 678). Matthews contends that she
engaged in protected activity by voicing her opinion regarding Briana’s treatment, speech that
she characterizes as her civic and religious duty. Although the Court makes no judgment as to
the legitimacy of Matthews’s convictions, it notes the Supreme Court’s teaching that speech
regarding “matters of public concern . . . is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.”
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly

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considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.”
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (internal quotation marks admitted).

“A

statement’s arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial character . . . is irrelevant to the question
whether it deals with a matter of public concern.’” Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378, 387 (1987)).
Of course, Matthews’s choice of where and when to protest is not beyond regulatory
reach but is “subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.” Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). However, the Court need not consider the
validity of such restrictions for purposes of the instant analysis and will assume that Matthews
has stated sufficient facts to satisfy the first Bloch element.
b.

Roberts took no adverse action against Matthews and therefore
caused no injury.

Secondly, a plaintiff must allege that “the defendant’s adverse action caused the plaintiff
to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that activity.” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 678. As discussed above, Matthews contends that
Roberts was one of many public officials who deprived her of her right to protest—specifically,
she alleges that Roberts took adverse action against her by ordering her arrest. The injuries that
she alleges were caused by this adverse action include her arrest, incarceration, and the bond
conditions to which she agreed. “[A]rrest is particularly suited to chill this [constitutionally
protected] conduct.” Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 361 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Bloch, 156
F.3d at 679-80).
However, the second part of this element—causation—presents a fatal obstacle to
Matthews’s case.

To survive summary judgment, Matthews’s allegations must plausibly

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establish that Roberts was legally responsible for Matthews’s arrest.

She must, therefore,

establish both cause in fact and proximate cause.
“Cause in fact is typically assessed using the ‘but for’ test, which requires us to imagine
whether the harm would have occurred if the defendant had behaved other than it did.” Powers
v. Hamilton Cnty. Public Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Matthews
cannot demonstrate that but for Roberts’s allegedly commanding Meade County law
enforcement personnel to arrest her, she would have avoided arrest. Although Matthews claims
that Roberts directed Meade County law enforcement officials to arrest her, Matthews’s telling
of the facts lacks a direct link to the alleged deprivation. She has not demonstrated that Roberts
caused the constitutional injury she claims.
First, Matthews alleges that Roberts told her that she must cease protesting or face arrest.
However, as this Court concluded in ruling on a similar motion in a parallel proceeding, the
pleadings do not support an inference that a county attorney can establish county policy to
regulate protest along a state highway.
A county attorney’s statutory duties include the duties to represent
the county’s interest in litigation and to give legal advice to county
officers. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 69.210. The statute explicitly
provides that “when so directed by the fiscal court” the county
attorney shall, among other things, defend the county in all civil
actions, § 69.210(1). Because these provisions either retain final
authority within the fiscal court or are otherwise silent on the issue,
there is no basis for concluding the county attorney possesses final
policymaking authority – a point which reflects the tradition that
an attorney acts not as a principal but as the agent of the principal.
Matthews v. Roberts, 2013 WL 17736466, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2013).
Next, Matthews claims that Deputy Haag cautioned that she would be arrested if her
protest continued and alleges that Roberts directed this ultimatum. However, Kentucky law
contradicts this conclusion, because no county attorney holds the authority to order the sheriff to

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effect an arrest. Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 69.210 – 70.010 et seq. Rather, the county attorney provides
legal advice. Although the sheriff may act in accordance with this advice, the decision belongs
to him and is not legally caused by the county attorney.
Moreover, Matthews does not contest that she neither applied for nor received a permit to
use the right-of-way. More importantly, she disputes neither that Deputy Haag was dispatched to
the site of the protest based on a complaint call from a private citizen, nor that the Meade County
Sheriff’s Department had been instructed that no one had permission from the KDH to access the
right-of-way for purposes of conducting a protest. (Docket No. 68-4 at 2.) Therefore, Matthews
has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that but for Roberts’s alleged actions, she would not
have been arrested.
Turning to proximate cause, the Court considers whether it was “reasonably foreseeable
that the complained of harm would befall the § 1983 plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s
conduct.” Powers, 501 F.3d at 609. As discussed above, Matthews cannot demonstrate that her
arrest resulted from Roberts’s actions. The record reflects no activity in this case by Roberts
herself except for her call to the KDH. Furthermore, there is no showing that Roberts advised
law enforcement personnel that probable cause existed; rather, Judge Goff signed the arrest
warrant without consulting Roberts. Matthews has not demonstrated causation under § 1983.
Because there is no direct relation between Matthews’s asserted injury and the injurious
conduct she alleges, she cannot satisfy the second Bloch element.

c.

Roberts did not act with a retaliatory motive in response to
Matthews’s protest.

The final element of a First Amendment retaliation claim requires the plaintiff to show
that “the adverse action was motivated at least in part as a response to the exercise of the

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plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Bloch, 156 F.3d at 678. Although Matthews alleges that
Roberts was motivated by Matthews’s comments criticizing Briana’s treatment, she presents no
evidence to support this claim. Moreover, Roberts can point to a number of nonretaliatory goals,
including her receipt of a number of complaints regarding Matthews’s improper presence on the
right-of-way. (Docket No. 68-1 at 20.)
In sum, Matthews has not made out a prima facie claim for relief against Roberts under
§ 1983 for her First Amendment claims. Matthews has identified no evidence in the record from
which a jury could infer that Roberts violated her First Amendment rights; instead, she merely
offers malicious accusations and conclusory statements, pointing only to her own understanding
of the circumstances.1

III.

Absolute prosecutorial immunity
Regardless, even assuming that Matthews had set forth the prima facie elements of a First

Amendment claim, Roberts would nonetheless be immune from suit based on the doctrines of
absolute and qualified immunity.
a.

The application of absolute immunity depends on the
prosecutor’s function at the moment in question.

Two kinds of immunities are recognized under § 1983. Most public officials are entitled
only to qualified immunity, shielding them from damages liability for the performance of their
discretionary functions when “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982)). However,
1

Moreover, in light of the foregoing analysis, Matthews is not entitled to injunctive relief on the merits, as she lacks
standing to pursue such relief. See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of Morristown, 2012 WL 2501102, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. June
1, 2012); accord, Miller v. Jones, 483 F. App’x. 202 (6th Cir. 2012). Matthews has made no showing of future harm
that would rise above the speculative level.

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some officials perform “special functions” that entitle them to absolute protection from damages
liability. Id. at 268-69. In such cases, “the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden
of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.” Id. (citing Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)).
The Supreme Court initially considered whether prosecutors should enjoy immunity in
actions brought under § 1983 in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). The Court explained
the rationale underlying prosecutorial immunity at common law, pointing to “concern that
harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from
his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the
independence of judgment required by his public trust.” Id. at 422-23. The Court confirmed that
the public policy rationale underlying the common law rule of immunity is also the foundation of
absolute immunity for state prosecutors under § 1983. Imbler’s limited holding did not address
the prosecutor’s administrative or investigative roles:

“We hold only that in initiating a

prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for
damages under § 1983.” Id. at 430-31.
The Court elaborated upon the absolute immunity principle in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.
478 (1991). In Burns, a prosecutor appeared before a judge to seek a search warrant without
disclosing that the plaintiff had “confessed” under hypnosis or that she had later abandoned this
confession.

After being exonerated, the plaintiff sued the prosecutor under § 1983. The

prosecutor claimed that absolute immunity shielded her from such suit. The Court determined
that the prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity for his appearance in the courtroom to present
evidence in support of the motion for a search warrant, as such activities were “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and “also connected with the initiation

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and conduct of a prosecution.” Id. at 492. The Court acknowledged that “the duties of the
prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a
prosecution and actions apart form the courtroom.” Id. at 486. However, Burns concluded that
the prosecutor’s advice to law enforcement personnel during the investigative phase was cloaked
only in qualified immunity: “Indeed, it is incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely
immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only qualified
immunity for following the advice.” Id. at 495.
The Supreme Court has established a functional approach for determining whether
government officials enjoy absolute immunity or the more general standard of qualified
immunity—that is, the Court must consider “the nature of the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. at 486.

“The question, then, is whether the

prosecutors have carried their burden of establishing that they were functioning as ‘advocates.’”
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. State prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for their conduct “in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, insofar as that conduct is intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 479 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Although the timing of the prosecutor’s actions plays an important role in the Court’s
analysis, it does not comprise the entire inquiry. In Buckley, the Supreme Court determined that
the prosecutors lacked probable cause to arrest or initiate judicial proceedings against the
defendant. The Court characterized the prosecutors’ role as “entirely investigative in character,”
explaining that “a prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he
has probable cause to have anyone arrested.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. Buckley clarified that a
prosecutor will not necessarily enjoy absolute immunity for all of his actions after a probable

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cause determination; even after probable cause has been established, a prosecutor who engages
in “police investigative work” will be entitled to only qualified immunity. Id. at 274 n.5.
In sum, several principles govern the Court’s consideration of immunity in the case at
bar. First, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity when acting as an advocate. See, e.g., Imbler,
424 U.S. at 430-31; Burns, 500 U.S. at 491; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273-74; Ireland v. Tunis, 113
F.3d 1435, 1443 (6th Cir. 1997). Second, investigatory actions taken prior to the existence of
probable cause are not entitled to absolute immunity—and even after the establishment of
probable cause, actions unrelated to the advocacy role may not be protected. Buckley, 509 U.S.
at 274 n.5. The Court’s inquiry hinges upon whether she acts within the scope of her official
duties as a prosecutor or is instead merely giving legal advice or investigating. Howell, 668 F.3d
at 349 (citations omitted). “[T]he critical inquiry is how closely related is the prosecutor’s
challenged activity to his role as an advocate intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.” Id. at 349-50 (citing Ireland, 113 F.3d at 1443). Finally, a prosecutor’s
decision to initiate a prosecution is subject to absolute immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431;
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; see also Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2002).

b.

Roberts enjoys absolute prosecutorial immunity for activities
related to the issuance of the warrant and subsequent arrest.

Roberts maintains that she was in no way involved with the arrest warrant at issue,
(Docket No. 68-1 at 9); even assuming arguendo that Roberts was somehow involved, she
nonetheless enjoys absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Sixth Circuit instructs that
commanding an arrest can fall within the scope of a prosecutor’s role as an advocate, entitling
her to immunity. See Howell v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351, 352 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, as in
Howell, a state judge reviewed a criminal complaint against Matthews and determined that

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probable cause existed. Even assuming that Roberts was closely involved with this process, she
would nonetheless enjoy immunity:

“[A] prosecutor’s decision to initiate a prosecution,

including the decision to file a criminal complaint or seek an arrest warrant, is protected by
absolute immunity.” Id. at 351 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31; Ireland, 113 F.3d at 1446).
Moreover, while Roberts’s contact with the KDH was arguably investigative and not
subject to absolute immunity, 2 Matthews does not allege that the call itself violated her
constitutional rights—nor can the Court conceive of a scenario in which it would. Therefore,
Matthews has presented no compelling argument as to how any of Roberts’s alleged actions
surrounding the arrest could be deemed investigatory rather than prosecutorial. Accordingly,
Roberts is entitled to absolute immunity from Matthews’s claims.
IV.

Qualified immunity
Even were Roberts not entitled to absolute immunity, the Court holds in the alternative

that she is entitled to qualified immunity for all of the actions of which Matthews complains. “In
addressing civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts must always begin with the
following question: who did the plaintiff sue, and in what capacity? This is an important
question, as it determines what the plaintiff must prove, and what defenses are available.”
Dilingham v. Millsaps, 809 F. Supp. 2d 820, 834 (E.D. Tenn. 2011). The burdens of proof

2

“A prosecutor performing an investigative function before she has probable cause to arrest a suspect cannot expect
to receive the protection of absolute immunity.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 n.5.
Investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for the
initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute
immunity. For example, a prosecutor who performs the investigative functions
normally performed by a detective or police officer search as searching for the
clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a
suspect be arrested is entitled only at most to qualified immunity.
Prince v. Hicks, 198 F.3d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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applicable to Matthews and the defenses available to Roberts vary based on the capacity
question.
Matthews does not clearly specify the capacity in which she sues Roberts, but references
her in the context of her official position. The Court will construe the complaint as a claim
against Roberts in her official capacity as county attorney. See Meade v. Fackler, 2011 WL
43225, *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2011) (construing allegations against a government official with
unspecified capacity as claims against defendants in their official capacities). In an abundance of
caution and with the goal of providing a comprehensive analysis, the Court will also address
Roberts’s immunity in her personal capacity.
a.

Official capacity

To the extent that Matthews has sued Roberts in her official capacity, she has simply sued
Meade County.

See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”). Local
governing bodies are considered “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and can therefore be
sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of City
of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
The determination that Roberts defends this action in her official capacity fixes the
applicable standard of liability. To establish personal liability, a § 1983 plaintiff must show only
that the official acted under color of state law to cause the deprivation of a federal right.
Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. However, a local government is not liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Rather, “in an official-capacity action, the governmental
entity is liable “only when the entity itself is a ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation.’”
Graham, 473 U.S at 166, quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981). “[I]t is

16

when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible under § 1983.”

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

To subject the local

government to § 1983 liability, the official in question must be responsible for “establishing final
governmental policy respecting such activity.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 470
(1986).
Matthews’s pleadings do not contain sufficient allegations that Meade County itself was
the moving force behind her alleged deprivation.

In the course of her many accusations,

Matthews does not allege that that Roberts acted pursuant to an official policy or custom. 3
Having determined that Roberts did not violate Matthews’s constitutional rights, the Court finds
that Roberts is entitled to qualified immunity in her official capacity.
b.

Individual capacity

Because Matthews at times indicates that she wishes to sue Roberts “as an individual”
(Docket No. 1 at 1), the Court will also consider Roberts’s individual capacity. Because Roberts
is a public official who is being sued for the performance of her job duties, she is entitled to
qualified immunity, shielding her from liability for monetary damages “insofar as [her] conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Qualified immunity is a matter of law for the court. Everson, 556 F.3d at 494 (citations
omitted).

“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

3

Matthews’ previous filings reflect this principle. “Jessica Brown Roberts is a rogue county attorney acting
illegally, acting outside of government: she does NOT reflect the county government to which she was elected . . . .
She is NOT representative of her county government, her county government is not involved in this, her illegal acts
put her outside of her county government.” (Case 3:12-CV-00828, Docket No. 26 at 1-2.)

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reasonable person would have known.’” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.
2008) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). To resolve a government official’s qualified immunity
claims, the Court considers whether (1) the facts that the plaintiff has alleged or shown establish
the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was “clearly established” at the
time of the alleged misconduct. Stoudemire v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir.
1999). Unlike absolute immunity, the burden falls to the plaintiff to refute a properly-pleaded
defense of qualified immunity. Howell, 668 F.3d 344 at 353 (citing Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d
1003, 1007 (6th Cir. 1999)). Roberts has properly raised qualified immunity in her motion for
summary judgment.
As discussed above, Matthews, on whom the burden of defeating qualified immunity
rests, has not demonstrated that Roberts violated her constitutional rights. Accordingly, her
claims against Roberts are subject to qualified immunity and must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court having found that there was no underlying constitutional violation, Meade
County Attorney Jessica Brown Roberts cannot be held liable for Matthews’s alleged injury.
Therefore, Matthews cannot overcome Roberts’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and Docket
No. 68 is GRANTED. A appropriate order will issue.

cc:

Counsel
Elaine Matthews, pro se

February 13, 2014

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