Price-Woodson v. United Auto Workers Local 862 et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale. Defendant Voith Industrial Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 23 ) and Defendant United Auto Workers Local 862's Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims (DN 24 ) are granted. A separate judgment will be entered this date. cc: Counsel(JAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
ANGELIQUE PRICE-WOODSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:13-cv-618-DJH

UNITED AUTO WORKERS LOCAL 862 and
VOITH INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants.

* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Voith Industrial Services, Inc. and United Auto Workers Local 862 (“the
Union”) have each moved for summary judgment in this case. (Docket Nos. 23, 24) The
defendants argue that Plaintiff Angelique Price-Woodson cannot prevail on her claims of
retaliation, hostile work environment, breach of duty by the Union, and breach of contract by
Voith. Because Price-Woodson has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to any of her claims, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be granted.
I.

FACTS
Price-Woodson worked for Voith from 2008 until her termination on January 29, 2013.

Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Voith and the Union, PriceWoodson was required to notify her direct supervisor in advance of any absences from work.
(D.N. 24-6 at PageID # 319) The attendance policy set out in the CBA establishes a point
system under which an employee receives a half point “for tardiness or early quit,” one point
“for an absence with advance call-in,” and two points “for an absence with no call, no show.”
(Id. at PageID # 320) Upon accumulating eight points, an employee is subject to dismissal. (Id.
at PageID # 321)

1

The CBA also outlines a grievance procedure for resolving disputes that arise from the
agreement. (Id. at PageID # 316) Under the grievance procedure, an employee has seven days
“from the date at which the employee is otherwise aware of the violation to file the grievance or
the matter will be considered closed.” (Id. at PageID # 317) The CBA further provides that
“[t]he parties may mutually agree in writing to extend time limitations at any step of the
procedure.” (Id.)
Price-Woodson testified to the following facts. She was scheduled to work on January 27
and 28, 2013, but did not go to work either day. (D.N. 23-5 at PageID # 146) She understood
the attendance policy, and she was aware that she had accrued a substantial number of points.1
(Id. at PageID # 147; D.N. 23-6 at PageID # 158) She tried three times on January 27 to contact
her direct supervisor, Andrew Simpson, in compliance with the policy. (D.N. 23-5 at PageID #
147) However, she did not reach Simpson, and she did not attempt to contact anyone else
regarding her absence. (Id.) Later that day, she received a call from union chairman Ted Hunt
advising her that she had been suspended and should not come to work on January 28.2 (Id.)
On January 29, Simpson’s supervisor, Scott Lallo, called to inform Price-Woodson that
her employment was being terminated because of the attendance points she had accumulated.
(Id. at PageID # 148; see D.N. 23-3 at PageID # 114) Hunt was also on the line. (D.N. 23-5 at
PageID # 148) During the call, Price-Woodson did not state that she wished to file a grievance
or challenge her termination in any way.3 (Id.) She did not speak to a union representative about
filing a grievance until at least two weeks later, when she called Hunt to “ask[] him to help [her]
1

Price-Woodson had been suspended on January 15, 2013, for reaching 7.5 points. (See D.N.
23-8 at PageID # 232)
2
According to Voith, Price-Woodson was absent without notice on both January 27 and January
28. (See D.N. 23-3 at PageID # 115-16)
3
Hunt recalls asking Price-Woodson whether she wanted him to file a grievance and being told
no. (D.N. 26-1 at PageID # 424; see also D.N. 23-2 at PageID # 110)
2

in getting [her] job back.”4 (Id. at PageID # 149) It is undisputed that no grievance was ever
filed regarding Price-Woodson’s termination. (See D.N. 23-2 at PageID # 111)
Price-Woodson also testified that she suffered pervasive sexual harassment by a number
of her coworkers at Voith. (See, e.g., D.N. 23-4 at PageID # 133-35) However, she did not
report those incidents.5 (Id. at PageID # 129-30, 133-36, 139) Likewise, she did not complain of
racial harassment to Voith or the Union. (See id. at PageID # 137-38)
II.

ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is required when the moving party shows, using evidence in the

record, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 56(c)(1). For purposes of summary
judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). However, the Court “need consider only the
cited materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 136
(6th Cir. 2014). If the nonmoving party “fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to
properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the fact may be
deemed undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)-(3). To survive a
motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to each element of each of her claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

4

Hunt believes that this call was “about a month after [Price-Woodson’s] termination.” (D.N.
26-1 at PageID # 424)
5
Price-Woodson did testify that she complained to then-Union chairman Bob Johnson about a
coworker inappropriately touching her; however, that incident occurred outside of work, at a gas
station. (See D.N. 23-4 at PageID # 136, 138)
3

322-23 (1986) (noting that “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”).
Under this standard, Price-Woodson cannot withstand the defendants’ summary judgment
motions. Her response to the motions, which consists largely of conclusory assertions and
irrelevant legal arguments, contains virtually no citations to the record.

Meanwhile, the

defendants provide ample citations, including to Price-Woodson’s own testimony. The facts
presented by the defendants show that summary judgment is warranted on each of her claims.
A.

Counts One, Two, and Three (Hybrid Claim)

In the first two counts of her complaint, Price-Woodson alleges that Voith breached the
CBA and the Union breached its duty of fair representation. (See D.N. 1 at PageID # 2-4) Such
claims are completely preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and together
are construed as a “hybrid” claim under LMRA § 301. Gilreath v. Clemens & Co., 212 F. App’x
451, 459 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)). To
prevail against either defendant on her hybrid claim, Price-Woodson must show both that the
Union breached its duty of fair representation and that Voith breached the CBA. See Chapman v
UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S. 554, 570-71 (1976)). First, however, she must demonstrate that she exhausted internal
union remedies. See id. at 685.
The Sixth Circuit has long held that “the duty to initiate a grievance remains with the
plaintiff.” Long v. Gen. Motors Corp., 19 F. App’x 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Steen v.
Local 163, UAW, 373 F.2d 519, 520 (6th Cir. 1967)). It is undisputed that under the CBA, the
deadline for Price-Woodson to file a grievance was seven days from the event giving rise to the
grievance—i.e., her termination. (See D.N. 24-6 at PageID # 317) It is likewise undisputed that

4

Price-Woodson failed to timely initiate the grievance process and that no grievance was ever
filed regarding her termination. (See D.N. 23-5 at PageID # 148) She has presented no evidence
excusing this failure. Cf. Chapman, 670 F.3d at 686. Thus, her hybrid claim is barred for failure
to exhaust internal union remedies. See id.; see also Leffler v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Union, Local 880, 787 F.2d 591 (table), *6-*7 (6th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of
§ 301 claim for failure to exhaust union remedies where plaintiff’s grievance was filed one day
late).
In any event, a union breaches the duty of fair representation only if its actions are
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Linton v. UPS, 15 F.3d 1365, 1369 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)). And “‘a union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in
light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is
so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational.’” Id. (quoting Air Line Pilots
Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)). Although Price-Woodson maintains that the Union
acted arbitrarily in declining to pursue a grievance concerning her termination, the undisputed
facts show that the Union’s conduct was in accordance with the CBA, which provides that if a
grievance is not filed within seven days, the matter will be deemed closed. (D.N. 24-6 at PageID
# 317)

Price-Woodson admits that she did not request that a grievance be filed until

approximately two weeks after her termination—a week after the deadline had passed.6 (See

6

Price-Woodson suggests that the Union could have filed a grievance beyond the deadline, but
the testimony she cites does not show that an extension of the deadline would have been
available in her case. (See D.N. 26 at PageID # 373-74 (citing Hunt depo., D.N. 26-1 at PageID
# 424)) Hunt testified that that there are times when a grievance may not be filed within the
seven-day timeframe because the Union or Voith seeks an extension to “allow them to collect all
the evidence that they need to better prepare their case.” (D.N. 26-1 at 424) No extension was
sought in Price-Woodson’s case, Hunt said, because she had not initiated the grievance process
before the seven-day period expired. (See id. at PageID # 424-25) Moreover, Hunt’s
acknowledgment that extensions are sometimes available is less significant than Price-Woodson
5

D.N. 23-5 at PageID # 148) The Court cannot find that the Union acted irrationally by merely
observing a contractual deadline. See Linton, 15 F.3d at 1369.
Count Three of Price-Woodson’s complaint is titled “pendant [sic] jurisdiction” and
reasserts the claims of Counts One and Two under “the common law and the labor law of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.” (D.N. 1 at PageID # 5) As Price-Woodson appears to concede,
these claims are completely preempted by the LMRA.7 See Powers v. Cottrell, Inc., 728 F.3d
509, 516 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has ruled that ‘the pre-emptive force of § 301 is
so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization.’” (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 7
(2003)). Consequently, Count Three also fails for the reasons discussed above.
B.

Count Four (Retaliation/Public Policy)

In Count Four of the complaint, Price-Woodson alleges that Voith attempted to sabotage
her claim for unemployment benefits by making false statements about her during her
unemployment proceedings. (See D.N. 1 at PageID # 6-7) In making these statements, PriceWoodson asserts, Voith “was substantially motivated by the desire to discriminate and retaliate
against [her] for trying to grieve about her discharge.” (Id. at PageID # 7) Price-Woodson’s
only support for this claim is her assertion that on appeal of her unemployment claim, Voith’s
representative “utterly failed to prove that [she] was guilty of excessive attendance points.” 8

suggests, as the CBA itself provides that “[t]he parties may mutually agree in writing to extend
time limitations at any step of the procedure.” (D.N. 24-6 at PageID # 317) Again, the problem
is that Price-Woodson did not timely initiate the procedure—a duty that rested on her. See Long,
19 F. App’x at 203.
7
Price-Woodson acknowledges that “her common law third party contract claims, and her policy
claims” . . . . are subsumed by her [h]ybrid claims.” (D.N. 26 at PageID # 408)
8
Like most statements in Price-Woodson’s brief, this assertion is unaccompanied by any citation
to the record. However, there is no dispute that Price-Woodson ultimately obtained
unemployment benefits. (See D.N. 23-6 at PageID # 169)
6

(D.N. 26 at PageID # 399) This, she contends, “leaves an apparent retaliatory motive to be
inferred from V[oith]’s conduct.”9 (Id.) Without citation of authority, she urges the Court to
recognize “the tort of a wrongful abuse of civil U[nemployment] I[nsurance] proceedings.” (Id.
(emphasis removed)) Even if she could identify a legal basis for such a claim, she has offered no
evidence to support it. Summary judgment is therefore proper on this count as well.
C.

Count Five (Retaliation/Kentucky Civil Rights Act)

Price-Woodson also alleges racial and gender discrimination under the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act (KCRA). She asserts that while employed by Voith, she “was visited with gender
and racially motivated harassment of a severe and pervasive nature . . . constituting a hostile
work environment”; that she complained to Voith and the Union about the hostile work
environment; and that the defendants retaliated against her for those complaints “by VOITH
discharging the Plaintiff, and by the union failing to provide fair representation to her” in
connection with her termination.10 (D.N. 1 at PageID # 7-8) Price-Woodson devotes little
discussion to these claims in her summary judgment response, and she cites no evidence to
support them. Although she asserts that she has direct evidence of retaliation (see D.N. 26 at
PageID # 401), she fails to present any evidence in support of this contention, much less
evidence that “requires no inferences to conclude that unlawful retaliation was a motivating
factor in [Voith’s] action.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., 515 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008)

9

The heading accompanying this argument declares that “Voith’s participation in Plaintiff’s U.I.
claim is a signature of sorts of its retaliatory animus.” (D.N. 26 at PageID # 399)
10
Count Five does not expressly refer to the Union’s failure to act following Price-Woodson’s
termination but simply states that the Union “fail[ed] to provide fair representation to her in the
manner described above.” (D.N. 1 at PageID # 8) The complaint’s only description of an
alleged lack of fair representation pertains to Price-Woodson’s firing. (See id. at PageID # 3-4)
Accordingly, the Court reads Count Five as referring to the Union’s inaction following her
termination, not to any failure by the Union concerning the alleged harassment.
7

(citing Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003)) (defining “direct
evidence”). Her retaliation claims thus cannot survive on a direct-evidence theory.
The claims fail under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework as
well. That test, which applies in cases involving circumstantial evidence, requires a prima facie
showing by the plaintiff that “(1) [s]he engaged in protected activity, (2) this exercise of h[er]
protected civil rights was known to the defendant, (3) the defendant thereafter took an
employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”11 Id. (citing EEOC v. Avery Dennison
Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 860 (6th Cir. 1997)). Price-Woodson cannot satisfy the first two elements
of this test because her own testimony, as cited by the defendants, establishes that she did not
complain of racial or sexual harassment to Voith or Union representatives. (See D.N. 23-4 at
PageID # 129-30, 133-39) She offers no evidence whatsoever to rebut the defendants’ showing
on this point.
Price-Woodson’s hostile work environment claim fails for similar reasons. An employer
may be either directly liable or vicariously liable on a claim of hostile work environment; the
applicable standard depends on whether the perpetrator was the plaintiff’s coworker or her
supervisor. Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 813 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013)). An employer is subject to direct
liability for unlawful harassment by a plaintiff’s coworker “if the employer was negligent with
respect to the offensive behavior.” Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2441. The negligence standard is met if
the plaintiff shows that “the employer’s response to [her] complaints ‘manifest[ed] indifference

11

Retaliation claims brought under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act are subject to the same
standard as Title VII claims. Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., 757 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 435 (6th Cir. 2009)).
8

or unreasonableness in light of the facts the employer knew or should have known.’” Waldo,
726 F.3d at 814 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517
F.3d 321, 333 (6th Cir. 2008)). Vicarious liability exists where the alleged harasser is the
plaintiff’s supervisor—meaning that “the employer has empowered [the alleged harasser] to take
tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect ‘a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” Vance, 133 S.
Ct. at 2443 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
Price-Woodson testified that she was harassed by her immediate supervisor, Andrew
Simpson, as well as Hunt and various other coworkers. (See D.N. 23-4 at PageID # 127)
Although she asserts in her summary judgment response that Simpson and Lallo “are
‘supervisors’ within the meaning of Vance” and that “Hunt is in the nature of a supervisor” (D.N.
26 at PageID # 390), nothing in the record suggests that either Hunt or Simpson was authorized
“to take tangible employment actions against” Price-Woodson.12 Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443. The
fact that Lallo—Simpson’s supervisor—called to inform Price-Woodson of her termination
indicates that Simpson did not possess this power. Thus, Voith’s liability, if any, is for coworker
harassment.
Price-Woodson does not attempt to show that the defendants were aware of the alleged
harassment and failed to take appropriate action in response. As noted above, she admitted at her
deposition that she never reported the incidents. The defendants cannot be said to have acted
unreasonably in response to Price-Woodson’s complaints if she never complained in the first
place. See Waldo, 726 F.3d at 814. As a result, her hostile work environment claim also fails.
12

Whether Lallo qualifies as a supervisor under Vance is immaterial, as Price-Woodson does not
contend that she was harassed by Lallo.
9

D.

Count Seven (Vicarious Liability)13

The final count of Price-Woodson’s complaint asserts that Voith and the Union are
vicariously liable for the alleged wrongful acts of their agents and employees. (See D.N. 1 at
PageID # 8) This count is ultimately irrelevant, because Price-Woodson’s underlying claims
cannot survive summary judgment.
III.

CONCLUSION
The defendants have demonstrated that there is no genuine dispute of material fact with

respect to any of Price-Woodson’s claims. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Voith Industrial Services, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (D.N. 23) and Defendant United Auto Workers Local 862’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on All Claims (D.N. 24) are GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered this
date.
August 26, 2015

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court

13

There is no Count Six in the complaint.
10