Hunter v. Wilson et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Judge John G. Heyburn, II on 11/4/13; Defendant's motion 10 is granted and Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice. This is a final and appealable order.cc:counsel, Plaintiff (pro se) (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-666-H

WILLIAM B. HUNTER

PLAINTIFF

V.
LINDA J. WILSON, et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises from an IRS levy on Plaintiff’s wages and the actions of various
University of Louisville employees to comply with it. Plaintiff has previously filed a similar
case in state court which has been dismissed, raising obvious issues here. Defendants have now
moved to dismiss on various grounds of res judicata and preclusion. For the reasons outlined in
this opinion, Defendants’ motion is granted and Hunter’s claims are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
I.
Considering whether Mr. Hunter has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, this Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to him, accepting all
factual allegations as true. See NHL Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d
462 (6th Cir. 2005). In stating the basis for relief, a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007). Still,
while pro se plaintiffs like Mr. Hunter must satisfy basic pleading requirements, courts “liberally
construe[]” such pleadings and hold them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

II.
For purposes of res judicata, “state court judgments are given the same preclusive effect
in federal court as they would have received in the courts of the rendering state.” Keymarket of
Ohio, LLC v. Keller, 483 Fed. Appx. 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2012). Mr. Hunter already attempted to
litigate in state court claims arising out of Defendants’ garnishment of his paychecks pursuant to
a Notice of Levy issued by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The Jefferson Circuit
dismissed Hunter’s complaint for failure to state a claim in an order entered on August 6, 2010
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this decision after de novo review on August 5,
2011.
The four elements required for res judicata, or claim preclusion, apply in the instant case.
First, the Jefferson Circuit’s dismissal with prejudice, affirmed by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, constitutes a final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. See Federal R.
Civ. P. 41(b); Haddad v. Mich. Nat’l Corp., 34 Fed. Appx. 217, 218 (6th Cir. 2002).
Second, the present action involves the same parties or their privies as the first action in
state court. While Hunter named only the University of Louisville in his first suit, the othernamed defendants here were at all relevant times acting on behalf of the University and are thus
the University’s privies. The plain language of the allegations in the complaint concerns the
individually named defendants’ actions as agents of the University. See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 3-4, 6, 911. Under these circumstances, there is adequate identification of interest to consider the
individuals named in the present complaint as the privies of University of Louisville, and the
doctrine of res judicata applies to bar claims against them.
It is not clear from the styling of Hunter’s federal complaint whether he is suing
individually named defendants in their official or personal capacity. Still, while state officers

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may be personally liable for damages under § 1983 based upon actions taken in their official
capacities, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991), Mr. Hunter’s conclusory and vague
allegations that the individual defendants “conspired to…deprive [him] of his right to due
process of law” and “ignore[d] the information presented to them” in order to accomplish this
deprivation—neither of which is supported by concrete facts—do not warrant treating this suit as
one against the defendants in their personal capacities. Thus, the Court treats Hunter’s claims
against Wilson, Ayres, Koshewa, and Demunbrun as official-capacity claims. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that official capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which as officer is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159 (1985). Just as Hunter’s state court suit has the effect of barring claims against the
University of Louisville, it bars suit against the individually named defendants under the
circumstances.
Third, Hunter’s federal action raises issues that were already litigated or should have
been litigated in the first action. Hunter’s state lawsuit alleged theft by conversion, breach of
contract, and violations of §§ 1, 2, 10, and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Here, Hunter claims
that Defendants deprived him of “his right to due process of law…by garnishing Hunter’s
earnings without the authority of an order from any court…in violation of Kentucky garnishment
laws and federal garnishment laws and forwarding said garnished earnings to the [IRS] which
was not lawfully entitled to them.” ECF No. 1, p. 1. While not identical, both complaints
essentially claim that the University improperly garnished Hunter’s wages by complying with the
IRS’s Notice of Levy. Though Hunter has restyled his complaint to assert the Defendants’
actions were wrong under new legal authority, the bottom line remains that the issue of the

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propriety of the University of Louisville’s agents’ compliance with the IRS Notice of Levy has
already been finally litigated in state court.
Finally, there is identity in the causes of action. In judging whether this element of res
judicata is met, a court must look “beyond the legal theories asserted [and] see if the two claims
stem from the same underlying factual circumstances.” Smith v. Bob Smith Chevrolet, Inc., 275
F. Supp. 2d 808, 813 (W.D. Ky. 2003). “The term ‘same cause of action’ can encompass
claims…that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or
determined in the first proceeding.” Thomas v. Miller, 329 F. App’x 623, 627 (6th Cir. 2009).
There is no disputing that Hunter’s federal court complaint is based on the University’s
compliance with the Notice of Levy and its garnishment of Hunter’s claims in accordance with
that Notice. Hunter had every ability to bring the claims he makes now, arising from the same set
of facts, in Jefferson Circuit Court. Hence, the doctrine of res judicata bars his attempt to bring
them in this Court at this late date.1
Even were it not the case that res judicata bars Hunter’s claims against the individually
named defendants, the fact remains that the individuals, as agents of the University of Louisville,
enjoy the same statutorily-granted immunity from suit that led the state court judge to dismiss
Hunter’s claim against the University of Louisville. The state court judge quoted the applicable
Internal Revenue Code provision in its dismissal of Hunter’s complaint filed in Jefferson Circuit
Court:
The University, in honoring the levy issued by the IRS, is effectively ‘discharged
from any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer […] with respect to
such property or rights to property arising from such surrender or payment.’ 26
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The Court acknowledges that Mr. Hunter has moved to dismiss the University of Louisville as a defendant (ECF
No. 17). That motion constitutes, in effect, a second motion to amend the complaint. Because the Court concludes in
this Order that res judicata and statutory immunity bar Mr. Hunter’s claims against both the University of Louisville
and its agents, the individually named defendants, the Court refrains from ruling on this motion on the grounds that
it would be futile to do so.
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U.S.C. § 6332(e). As such, and even when viewing the pleadings in the light most
favorable to Mr. Hunter, it appears that there are no circumstances under which it
would be possible to prevail at trial.
ECF No. 10-3, p.3. This immunity has been broadly interpreted. See Weissman v. U.S. Postal
Service, 19 F.Supp.2d 254 (D.N.J. 1998). In its affirmation opinion, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals elaborated on the appropriateness of the University of Louisville’s compliance, through
its agents, with the IRS’s Notice of Levy, explaining the substance of pertinent Treasury
regulations and the fact that anyone who refuses to surrender property subject to levy upon
demand by the Secretary (such as Mr. Hunter’s paychecks) can be held personally liable for the
value of the property not surrendered. See ECF No. 10-4, p. 3 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d)(1)).
Being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Hunter’s complaint (ECF. Nos. 1, 12) is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
This is a final and appealable order.

November 4, 2013

cc:

Counsel of Record

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