Masterson v. Xerox Corporation et al

Filing 123

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay on 9/13/2016: The parties shall engage in a brief period of discovery related solely to the Gannett benefits website. All such discovery shall be completed no later than 12/9 /2016; Defendant's motion for protective order 99 is GRANTED IN PART; All discovery not expressly permitted by the instant memorandum opinion and order is hereby STAYED pending further ruling of this Court. The motion for protective order is DENIED IN PART, insofar as it seeks a ruling that Defendants need not respond to Mastersons written discovery requests pending a ruling as to the applicability of ERISA in this action; Masterson's motion to strike 108 is DENIED; Masters on's motion to compel 114 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; The Court's STANDING ORDER requiring ALL parties to contact the Court to request a telephonic conference before filing a discovery-related motion REMAINS IN EFFECT. Counsel may request such a conference by contacting Case Manager. cc: Counsel (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-692-DJH

JOSEPH MASTERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.
XEROX CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court conducted a telephonic status conference in this case on August 23, 2016, with
the following appearances: Ilam E. Smith on behalf of Plaintiff Joseph Masterson (“Masterson”);
Robert L. Steinmetz on behalf of Defendant Xerox Corporation (“Xerox”); Mitzi D. Wyrick on
behalf of Defendant Gannett Co., Inc. (“Gannett”); and Joshua J. Phillips on behalf of Defendant
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”). The Court discussed with counsel a number
of issues surrounding Plaintiff’s desire to take discovery in this case, including the production of
the Gannett benefits website. (See, e.g., DN 95, 121.) The instant memorandum opinion and
order is entered in light of the Court’s discussion with counsel during the August 23, 2016
telephonic conference.
BACKGROUND
As the Court has noted in previous orders, this case suffers from a lengthy procedural
history with little true substantive progress. The purpose of the instant order is to move the case
forward by seeking a resolution to the issues surrounding the Gannett benefits website. On May
28, 2014, following an in-chambers conference with counsel, the Court entered an order (DN 51)
regarding document production. The Court stated that it had “determined that [prior to entering a
scheduling order,] it would be appropriate for there to be a brief period of disclosure . . . [in order

to] assist the parties in reviewing and evaluating the extent to which this case is governed by
ERISA, and the extent, if any to which state law claims may be applicable.” (DN 51 at 1.) The
Court ordered as follows:
[W]ithin forty-five days of the entry of this order, all defendants shall
disclose to the plaintiff and to other parties any documents which may
constitute an agreement, contract of insurance, plan document,
summary plan description, or other document which could be fairly
understood to constitute all or part of the agreement with the plaintiff
Joseph Masterson with respect to the provision of life insurance for
himself, his family, and his son, Riley Masterson, as alleged in the
amended complaint. Hypertechnicality is discouraged.

(Id. (emphasis added).) Subsequent efforts by Defendants to comply with the May 28, 2014
order are described in an August 18, 2015 order (DN 87) entered by the Court. It suffices to say
that Masterson alleged then -- and continues to allege now -- that Defendants failed to produce
“[t]he Gannett Benefits Website.” (See DN 56.) Masterson claims that the website includes
information regarding the insurance plans provided by Gannett, including those plans in which
he enrolled. (Id.)
In addition to briefing by all parties regarding scheduling, particularly regarding
discovery, Masterson filed a motion to compel production of the website (DN 64). The Court
entered a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Masterson’s
motion to compel (DN 87). In that opinion, the Court described Masterson’s position in relation
to the import of the website as follows:
Masterson argues that the Website is “used by Defendants to
communicate with and enroll up to 25,000 people, and market and
sell benefits, including life insurance.” (DN 64 at 2.) Masterson
alleges that based on “other purported plan documents” produced
in this case, it appears that “information about the plan” is located
on the Website, and that such plan documents direct employees to
the Website in order to enroll. (Id. (citing DN 61-1).) Masterson
emphasizes the Court’s statement in the May 28, 2014 Order that
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“[h]ypertechnicality is discouraged.” (DN 51.) He argues that
Defendants are required, pursuant to the May 28, 2014 Order, to
produce a full copy of the Website . . . because [it] fall[s] within
the scope of the insurance agreement between Masterson and
Defendants, as defined in the May 28, 2014 Order. (See DN 51.)
Masterson describes Defendants’ failure to produce a full copy of
the Website . . . as part of a pattern of failing to provide Masterson
with plan documents in spite of his multiple requests for the same.
(DN 87 at 3-4.) Addressing the motion to compel, the Court noted that the extent to which this
case is governed by ERISA and the extent, if any, to which state law may be applicable, remain
in dispute. (Id. at 6.) The Court further stated that unless and until the Court determines that
ERISA fully preempts Masterson’s state claims, there will be no ruling that discovery in this case
is subject to the traditional limits on discovery in ERISA cases. (Id.) Moreover, the Court
stressed, “[i]t should be clear from th[e] language [of the May 2, 2014 order] that Defendants
were to turn over to Masterson not only the documents that Defendants believe ERISA requires
them to produce.” (Id. (citing DN 51 at 1).) The Court went on to deny the motion to compel as
to MetLife and Xerox, crediting their representations that the website is not in their possession,
custody, or control. (Id. at 7.) The Court granted the motion to compel as to Gannett, ordering it
to produce, no later than September 11, 2015, an electronic copy of the website. (Id.) Later,
after a September 10, 2015 telephonic conference, the Court ordered Gannett to produce an
electronic copy of the website no later than September 17, 2015. (DN 95 at 1.) The Court stated
that “it shall be sufficient for Gannett to produce screenshots of the website[,]” and that Gannett
was “not [] required to recreate and produce an interactive version of the website.” (Id.)
On November, 30, 2015, Masterson filed a motion for sanctions (DN 97) in relation to
Gannett’s purported failure to produce the website in compliance with the Court’s orders.
District Judge David J. Hale entered an order denying the motion for sanctions (DN 121). As
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Judge Hale stated, Gannett produced screenshots of its website as it appeared in 2015. (See id. at
1.) Gannett represented in response to the motion for sanctions, supported by the “statement”1 of
John E. Camp, Vice President of Service Delivery for Xerox HR Solutions, LLC,2 that it
produced screenshots from September 2015 because screenshots from 2011, when Masterson
enrolled in the insurance plans at issue in this case, and from 2013, when Masterson filed his
complaint, “were not available” in 2015. (See DN 102-1.) Camp’s statement also provides that
the screenshots that were produced “show the screen shots that Joseph Masterson would have
navigated through if he had been electing coverage under the [relevant plans] in September
2015,” and that the screenshots depict what a website user would see if he or she was seeking
benefits pursuant to a qualifying life event, rather than during an open enrollment period as
Masterson did. (Id. at ¶ 5 (“The qualifying life event was selected because no open enrollment
period was available on the site at the time the screenshots were produced. It should be noted,
the available selections under a qualifying life event were the same as if a participant had been in
open enrollment.”).)
Judge Hale denied Masterson’s motion for sanctions on July 14, 2016. (DN 121.) He
determined that Gannett’s actions in producing certain portions of the website as it appeared in
September 2015 were “reasonable in th[e] context” of the undersigned Magistrate Judge’s orders
related to the website. (Id. at 2.) Judge Hale concluded that to impose sanctions under the
circumstances would be incongruous with Gannett’s actions. (Id.) He ordered the parties to
participate in a conference with the undersigned Magistrate Judge, with one express purpose of
1

The document submitted by Camp is identified as a “statement” rather than an affidavit or a declaration. It
is signed and dated by Camp. It is not notarized.
2

As of September 2015, when the screenshots were produced, Xerox HR Solutions was responsible for
“administration and maintenance” of Gannett’s benefits website. (DN 102-1, ¶ 3.)

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the conference being “to determine the scope of discovery relating to the benefits website that
remains to be completed.” (Id.)
On August 23, 2016, the undersigned conducted a telephonic conference consistent with
Judge Hale’s order. The Court and counsel discussed the circumstances surrounding production
of the website. Counsel for Gannett and Xerox represented that, consistent with their arguments
in relation to the motion for sanctions, it is not possible to produce a copy of the website as it
appeared in 2011 when Masterson enrolled or in 2013 when he filed his complaint. They further
notified they Court that Xerox is no longer the site administrator for Gannett. Counsel for
Defendants also continued to assert arguments related to their purportedly limited obligations to
conduct discovery due to the ERISA claims in this case. These arguments are addressed below.
The purpose of this memorandum opinion and order is to put to rest the issue of the Gannett
benefits website and move this case forward.
DISCUSSION
1. Discovery Related to Gannett Benefits Website
As the Background section above shows, underlying the ongoing dispute regarding the
website is the Court’s order of May 28, 2014 regarding what documents Defendants were
required to produce in order to ascertain the applicability of ERISA in this case. Defendants
were ordered to disclose to Masterson “any documents which may constitute an agreement,
contract of insurance, plan document, summary plan description, or other document which could
be fairly understood to constitute all or part of the agreement with plaintiff.” (DN 51 at 1
(emphasis added).) The Court further emphasized that “[h]ypertechnicality is discouraged.”
(Id.) Masterson has consistently alleged that the contents of the Gannett benefits website fall
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within the broad scope of the Court’s order as to what Defendants are required to produce. As a
result, the Court ordered Gannett -- which apparently enlisted the help of former site
administrator Xerox -- to produce to Masterson screenshots of the website “in its entirety.” (DN
95 at 1.) Gannett and Xerox now admit that they did not produce the website in its entirety, in
part because of their representation that it is impossible to reproduce the website as it appeared in
2011 or 2013, and in part because they believe they are not required to produce certain parts of
the website due to the types of claims asserted by Masterson. (See, e.g., DN 102-1 (statement of
John E. Camp); DN 102 at 6 n.3 (purporting to explain why Gannett was not required to produce
parts of the website related to the 401(k) and pension plans due to Gannett’s interpretation of the
law governing discovery in ERISA actions).)
The Court ordered Gannett to produce copies of the website in its entirety. Gannett failed
to do so. This failure may have been influenced, at least in part, by some degree of ambiguity on
the part the undersigned as to the time period for which the website should be produced. The
Court recognizes that it did not expressly order Gannett to produce copies of the website as it
appeared in 2011 (or, for that matter, in 2013). However, Gannett appears to have assumed that
it could simply print out the website as it appeared in September 2015 when the Court’s order
requiring production was issued. It further assumed that it could print out the website as it
appeared during the non-open enrollment period, when the website would permit changes in
enrollment only pursuant to a qualifying life event. Masterson claims that the website contained
plan information about the plan and that plan documents directed employees to the Website in
order to enroll. The Court cannot assume that either the 2015 time period or the qualifying life
event perspective accurately reflects what Masterson saw when he enrolled in 2011 or when he
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filed his original complaint in 2013. As Defendants know, that is what Masterson has sought in
relation to the website for over two years. For the foregoing reasons, Gannett’s production -with the assistance of Xerox -- has been insufficient thus far.
Defendants continue to argue that they need not engage in additional discovery regarding
the website because such discovery is not permissible in the context of ERISA. As the Court has
stated in previous orders, this argument is immaterial and unpersuasive—if not specious-- at this
stage of the litigation. The purpose of the inquiry into the website stems from the Court’s order
of May 28, 2014 -- to identify, without being “hypertechnical,” any and all “document(s) which
could be fairly understood to constitute all or part of the agreement with the plaintiff Joseph
Masterson with respect to the provision of life insurance for himself, his family, and his son,
Riley Masterson.” (DN 51 at 1.) The Court could have expressly limited its order to the “plan”
as defined by ERISA, but it did not. Moreover, no determination has been made in this case that
ERISA preempts Masterson’s state law claims. (See DN 87 at 6-7 (“[T]he very purpose of the
May 28, 2014 Order was to encourage Defendants to produce sufficient information to allow for
a determination of whether ERISA applies in this case, and if so, to what extent. For Defendants
to base their arguments in opposition to the Motion to Compel on the scope of discovery in
ERISA cases is circular and not conducive to reaching a determination as to the applicability of
ERISA.”).)
Based on the foregoing, the Court directs the parties to engage in a brief period of
discovery related to the Gannett benefits website. More specifically, the Court concludes that
Masterson is entitled to discovery regarding the contents of the Gannett benefits website at the
time that he utilized it in 2011 through the time that the lawsuit was filed in 2013, as well as the
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ability of Gannett, Xerox, and/or any website administrator that may currently be employed by
Gannett, to produce copies of the website as it appeared during that time period. Masterson may
conduct such discovery through any of the methods permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, including, without limitation, depositions.
2. Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order
Defendants have filed a motion for protective order (DN 99) holding that, pending a
determination as to whether ERISA preempts Masterson’s state law claims, they need not
respond to certain written discovery requests (DN 99-2) served on them by Masterson. (See also
DN 103 (response); DN 107 (reply).) In the alternative, Defendants request that the Court stay
discovery in this case until a determination is made regarding the applicability of ERISA.
Defendants’ latter request is well-taken, particularly in light of the instant order permitting
discovery only on issues related to the Gannett benefits website.
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a scheduling order may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). As has
been noted several times herein, the progression of this case has been unusual and meaningful
progress has been slow. In fact, there is no comprehensive scheduling order now in effect. The
purpose of the instant order is to resolve the issues surrounding the Gannett benefits website, as
well as to close that portion of this case, beginning with the May 28, 2014 order, devoted to
determining the full extent of the documents that could be considered part of Masterson’s
agreement with one or more of the Defendants. Accordingly, the Court finds that the motion for
protective order should be granted in part. To the extent that any previous order of the Court can
be construed as an applicable scheduling order, good cause exists to modify such order and stay
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all discovery with the exception of the strictly confined website-related discovery expressly
permitted herein.
Before moving on, the Court notes that it has examined the discovery requests served by
Masterson that are now at issue in Defendants’ motion for protective order. A number of the
written discovery requests relate to the Gannett benefits website. 3 While certain aspects of those
requests appear to be permissible in light of the brief discovery period permitted herein, the
instant order does not permit Masterson to simply re-serve his previously served discovery
requests that relate to the website. Rather, he must ensure that any and all discovery requests
that he serves during this period of limited discovery are strictly confined to the scope of the
instant order.
3. Masterson’s Motion to Strike
Masterson has filed a motion (DN 108) to strike the reply (DN 107) filed by Defendants
in support of their motion for protective order. Defendants filed a response in opposition and
Masterson filed a reply. (DN 109, 111.) This motion is ripe for review.
Masterson’s motion to strike relates to Defendants’ pending motion for protective order
(DN 99), which is granted in part herein. Masterson seeks to have Defendants’ reply in support
of the motion for protective order -- or at least portions thereof -- stricken from the record.
Masterson argues that Defendants raised certain arguments for the first time in their reply. For
example, he contends that Defendants for the first time make an argument regarding a burden
that would purportedly be imposed on them if they were to respond to his discovery requests,
and that they rely in their reply (erroneously, Masterson says) on several cases that they did not
3

At a minimum, the following discovery requests relate to the website: (a) Interrogatory numbers 5, 6, 8, 9,
14, 16, 20, 21, and 25; (b) Request for Production numbers 4, 8, 11, 12, 18, 22, 23, and 25; and (c) Request for
Admission numbers 7, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, and 24.

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discuss in their motion. It is not entirely clear from Masterson’s motion whether he requests that
the reply be stricken as a whole, as he seems to suggest at the outset of his motion, or whether he
seeks only to strike those portions of the reply that discuss and rely on three particular decisions,
as the final sentence of his motion seems to suggest.
Defendants filed a joint response to the motion to strike (DN 109). They characterize it
as an attempt by Masterson to file a sur-reply to the motion for protective order without seeking
leave of court. (Id. at 1.) They state that they would not object if the Court chooses to treat the
motion to strike as a sur-reply and considers Masterson’s arguments in relation to the motion for
protective order.

However, they contend, the motion is meritless as a motion to strike.

Defendants argue first that motions to strike pleadings are governed by Rule 12(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and that a reply brief is not properly considered a “pleading” under the
Rules. They further argue that their reply merely responds appropriately to the arguments raised
in Masterson’s response to the motion for protective order. Accordingly, they argue, the motion
to strike is both procedurally and substantively deficient and should be denied.
Masterson’s reply (DN 111) does not address the arguments raised in Defendants’
response. Rather, it consists of arguments as to why ERISA does not control in this case, why
Defendants’ motion for protective order is misplaced based on the procedural posture of this
case, and how Defendants’ attorneys have acted in bad faith. (See, e.g., id. at 3 (“In the end,
Defendants’ motion for protective order and corresponding Reply brief, continue Defendants’
strategy of foisting as much litigation burden as Defendants can muster into the path of Plaintiff,
attempting to force him into unnecessary rounds of discovery and multiple trials, while doing
their best to draw a veil or otherwise conceal their misconduct.”).)

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Masterson’s vitriol is

misplaced, particularly in the context of a motion to strike. Moreover, because his reply is
essentially a diatribe regarding the entirety of this case and is nearly devoid of references to the
motion to strike,4 the Court will not consider the reply in addressing the motion to strike.
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions to strike pleadings. It
provides that upon a motion made by a party, “[t]he court may strike from a pleading any
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f).5 A court may strike portions of the pleading on its own initiative or “on motion
made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within
21 days after being served with the pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1)-(2). “Motions to strike
under Rule 12(f) are addressed within the sound discretion of the Court, although they are
generally disfavored.” Hashemian v. Louisville Reg’l Airport Auth., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59962, *12 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 26, 2013) (citing Ameriwood Indus. Intern. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 961 F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (internal citations omitted)). “Striking a
pleading is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when required for purposes of justice.” Id.
(citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States., 201 F. 2d 819, 822 (6th Cir.
1953)). “A motion to strike should be granted only where there is a clear showing that the
challenged defense has no bearing on the subject matter and that permitting the matter to stand
4

With the exception of the caption and the first three sentences, the reply is devoid of references to the
concept of striking anything from the record. The sentences that do address the motion to strike either rehash the
motion itself or make vague references to case law without any accompanying analysis. (See, e.g., DN 111 at 1
(“This Court thus, pursuant to that line of authority may strike such arguments and portions of Defendants’ Reply, as
it has done many times in the past. The authorities cited by Defendants in their Response have never prevented
this.”).)
5

The Court acknowledges Defendants’ argument that Rule 12(f) does not actually apply to motions to strike
reply briefs because a reply is not a “pleading” for purposes of Rule 7(a). Decisions of this Court routinely address
motions to strike portions of filings beyond those listed in Rule 7(a), including reply briefs, in the context of Rule
12(f). See, e.g., Pixler v. Huff, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133185, *47-48 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 16, 2011) (denying,
pursuant to Rule 12(f), a motion to strike a reply in support of a motion to dismiss). Without ruling that a reply brief
is a “pleading,” the Court will do the same here.

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would prejudice the party.” Id. (citing Ameriwood, 961 F. Supp. At 1083); see also Pixler, 2011
U.S. LEXIS 133185 at *47 (“‘The application of this rule, which is in the discretion of the trial
judge, should be resorted to only where the pleading contains such allegations that are obviously
false and clearly injurious to a party to the action because of the kind of language used or that the
allegations are unmistakably unrelated to the subject matter.’”) (quoting Pessin v. Keeneland
Ass’n, 45 F.R.D. 10, 13 (E.D. Ky. 1968)).
The Court has reviewed the parties’ briefing in relation to Defendants’ motion for
protective order.

The Court concurs with Defendants that their reply directly responds to

Masterson’s response in opposition to the motion. “[T]he purpose of a reply brief [is] to address
the opposing party’s arguments raised in a response brief.” Liberty Legal Found. v. Nat’l
Democratic Party of the USA, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797-98 (W.D. Tenn. 2012) (in context
of a motion for leave to file sur-reply, denying motion on basis that no new arguments were
raised in reply brief and proposed sur-reply actually sought to raise new arguments). In their
reply brief (DN 107), Defendants respond to the arguments raised by Masterson in his response
in an effort to reinforce the arguments that they asserted in their motion. This is consistent with
the purpose of a reply brief. The Court finds that Defendants’ reply is not prejudicial to
Masterson; nor does it raise any of the other concerns identified in Rule 12(f). See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(f) (setting forth Court’s authority to strike material that is insufficient to support a defense,
“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous”).
Additionally, the motion to strike and the reply in support thereof contain lengthy
arguments by Masterson regarding what he sees as Defendants’ problematic use of case law in
their reply in support of the motion for protective order, as well as his view of this case as a
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whole. (See generally DN 108 (addressing at length a Sixth Circuit decision and two decisions
of this Court).) Masterson appears to use his motion to strike and reply for the very improper
purpose that he attributes to Defendants -- as vehicles to assert arguments that he should have
raised in earlier filings, if at all. As Defendants point out, Masterson could have sought leave to
file a sur-reply to the motion for protective order. He did not do so, and his arguments are not
consistent with the purposes of a motion to strike and a reply brief.
Accordingly, Masterson’s motion to strike (DN 108) is denied.
4. Masterson’s Motion to Compel
Finally, Masterson’s motion to compel is ripe for review. (DN 114; see also DN 117
(response); DN 119 (reply).)

Masterson asks the Court to compel Gannett and Xerox to

participate in Rule 30(b)(6) depositions.

Masterson argues that extensive discovery is

permissible, even required, in order for the Court to determine the extent to which ERISA
applies in this case. It should be obvious from the Court’s other rulings in the instant order that
Masterson’s motion is premature. To date, the discovery permitted in this action has been
limited in scope, specifically to determine what documents may constitute the agreement entered
into by Masterson and one or more of the Defendants. The desire to answer that question
remains the goal of the instant order. The Court finds that at this juncture, Masterson may not
take the wide-ranging 30(b)(6) depositions of Gannett and Xerox that he seeks. It would not be
prudent to permit him to take such depositions at this time; however, a time may arise in the
future when Masterson will be permitted to do so. For example, the Court may determine that no
additional discovery is needed before it will make a determination as to the applicability of
ERISA. The scope of any later 30(b)(6) depositions will be impacted by whether or not ERISA
13

governs due to the evolving limitations on discovery in ERISA actions. Consistent with the
ruling in Section 1, above, Masterson may take one or more 30(b)(6) depositions on the topics
discussed therein. Accordingly, the motion to compel (DN 114) is denied without prejudice.
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
(1)

The parties shall engage in a brief period of discovery related solely to the

Gannett benefits website. All such discovery shall be completed no later than December 9,
2016. Masterson is entitled to conduct discovery on (a) the contents of the Gannett benefits
website; and (b) the ability of Gannett, Xerox, and/or any website administrator that is currently
employed by Gannett to produce copies of the website. Discovery on both categories identified
herein shall be limited to the period of 2011, when Masterson allegedly utilized the website in
connection with the events underlying this litigation, through the date on which Masterson filed
his original complaint in this action.
(2)

Defendant’s motion for protective order (DN 99) is GRANTED IN PART. All

discovery not expressly permitted by the instant memorandum opinion and order is hereby
STAYED pending further ruling of this Court. The motion for protective order is DENIED IN
PART, insofar as it seeks a ruling that Defendants need not respond to Masterson’s written
discovery requests pending a ruling as to the applicability of ERISA in this action.
(3)

Masterson’s motion to strike (DN 108) is DENIED.

(4)

Masterson’s motion to compel (DN 114) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(5)

The Court’s STANDING ORDER requiring ALL parties to contact the Court to

request a telephonic conference before filing a discovery-related motion REMAINS IN EFFECT.
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Counsel may request such a conference by contacting Case Manager Theresa Burch at
[e-mail].
September 13, 2016

Colin Lindsay, MagistrateJudge
United States District Court

cc: Counsel of record
1:00

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