United States of America v. Eichhorn Stained Glass, Inc. et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 29 Motion to Alter Judgment; Signed by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 6/11/15: The Court finds that Eichhorn's motion has failed to satisfy the standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit and by Federal R ule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Eichhorn's new legal arguments are not appropriately raised here, as Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration. Nat'l Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Eichhorn's motion, Docket No. 29 , is hereby DENIED. cc: Counsel (DJT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-00933-TBR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v.
EICHHORN STAINED GLASS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion to Alter or Amend Findings and Judgment
submitted by Eichhorn Stained Glass, LLC, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e).
Both the United States and Orionmegan Properties, LLC, have responded. (Docket Nos. 30, 33.) The
matter stands ripe for adjudication. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY Eichhorn’s
motion.
The factual background of this matter is recited in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion of October
9, 2014. (Docket No. 26.) In the portion of that Opinion relevant here, the Court considered the parties’
arguments concerning Eichhorn’s percentage of ownership in real property upon which the Government
placed a tax lien. The Court first noted that Kentucky law does not permit introduction of extrinsic
evidence to vary the terms of an unambiguous deed. Accordingly, the Court looked solely to the deed
itself, which unambiguously conveyed the property to its three original owners as “joint tenants with
remainder in fee simple to the survivor of them.” (Docket No. 15-2, General Warranty Deed, at 3.) The
Court found that following certain conveyances, Eichhorn ultimately owned one-third of the property in a
tenancy in common with Orionmegan, which owned two-thirds. The Court ordered foreclosure of the
federal tax liens against Eichhorn’s one-third interest and sale of the property, with proceeds to be
distributed in accordance with the rights of the parties. Eichhorn now moves the Court to reconsider this
conclusion.
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Legal Standard
The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a Rule 59 motion should not be used either to reargue
a case on the merits or to reargue issues already presented, see Whitehead v. Bowen, 301 Fed. App’x 484,
489 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th
Cir. 1998)), or otherwise to “merely restyle or rehash the initial issues,” White v. Hitachi, Ltd., 2008 WL
782565, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is not the
function of a motion to reconsider arguments already considered and rejected by the court.” Id. (citation
omitted). As a sister district court in this Circuit observed, “Where a party views the law in a light
contrary to that of this Court, its proper recourse is not by way of a motion for reconsideration but appeal
to the Sixth Circuit.” Hitachi Med. Sys. Am., Inc. v. Branch, 2010 WL 2836788, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July
20, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a motion for reconsideration should only be granted
on four grounds. “Under Rule 59, a court may alter or amend a judgment based on: ‘(1) a clear error of
law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent
manifest injustice.’” Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir.
2010)( quoting Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, given the
interest in a decision’s finality, this court and others have held that “[s]uch motions are extraordinary and
sparingly granted.” Marshall v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1175046, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007) (citing
Plakson Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995)); accord
Rottmund v. Cont’l Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Analysis
In the instant motion, Eichhorn argues for the first time that a corporation or other business entity
cannot be a joint tenant in real estate as a matter of law. As an initial matter, the Court notes that
Eichhorn could have, but did not, raise this argument in prior briefing, in either its response to the
Government’s motion for summary judgment or its reply to Orionmegan’s response. “Rule 59(e) does
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not provide parties a forum to present new arguments or theories that, with proper diligence, could have
been asserted prior to the judgment being issued.” Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 857 F.
Supp. 2d 647, 656 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (citing Howard v. U.S., 533 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Because it points to no newly-discovered evidence or an intervening change in the law, the Court
assumes that Eichhorn considers the previous Memorandum Opinion a clear error of law. Litigants who
challenge previously entered judgments as manifest errors of law confront a high standard—one that
requires the “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent on the part
of the court.” Dorger v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:08-56, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61686, at *3 (citing Oto v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[a] ‘manifest error’ is not
demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party”)). Eichhorn is entitled to the relief it seeks only
if the previous was “dead wrong” and “so egregious that an appellate court could not affirm it.” Id. at *34 (quoting H &A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, No. 4:02-458, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25797, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2005)). The Court cannot find that Eichhorn has satisfied this exacting standard,
particularly given the deed’s unambiguous nature.
Moreover, the Kentucky statute enumerating the general powers of a corporation permits the
entity “the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business
and affairs, including without limitation power to . . . [p]urchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and
own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal with . . . any legal or equitable interest in property . . .” KRS
217B.3-020(d). On its face, the statute permits a business entity to hold real property just as an individual
would—presumably including in a joint tenancy.
Conclusion and Order
Therefore, the Court having considered the Motion to Alter or Amend Findings and Judgment
filed by Eichhorn, the responses filed by the United States and Orionmegan, and being otherwise
sufficiently advised, the Court finds that Eichhorn’s motion has failed to satisfy the standard articulated
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by the Sixth Circuit and by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Eichhorn’s new legal arguments are
not appropriately raised here, as “Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at reconsideration, not initial
consideration.” Nat’l Ecological Found.v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Eichhorn’s motion, (Docket No. 29), is hereby DENIED.

June 11, 2015

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