Watkins v. Trust Under Will of William Marshall Bullitt By And Through Its Trustee, PNC Bank, N.A. et al
Filing
136
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale on 8/6/2018 - Watkins's motion to alter or amend the Judgment (DN 124) is DENIED. Defendants' motion for leave to respond to Watkins's objections to the Bill of Costs (DN 128) is GR ANTED. Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs (DN 122) and Watkins's objections to the Bill of Costs (DN 125) are REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay for a report and recommendation. Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs (DN 122) is STAYED and ADMINISTRATIVELY REMANDED. cc: Counsel(DAK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
LOWRY R. WATKINS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 3:13-cv-1113-DJH-CHL
TRUST UNDER WILL OF WILLIAM
MARSHALL BULLITT BY AND
THROUGH ITS TRUSTEE PNC BANK,
N.A., and PNC BANK, N.A.,
Defendants.
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lowry Watkins is a beneficiary of the William Marshall Bullitt Trust. (See Docket
No. 22-1) Watkins brought this action against the Trust and its Trustee, PNC Bank, N.A., alleging
breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, among other claims. (Id.; D.N. 30) On August
28, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all remaining claims.
See Watkins v. Trust Under Will of William Marshall Bullitt ex rel. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 3:13-cv1113-DJH-CHL, 2017 WL 3710088 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2017). Watkins moves to alter the
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (D.N. 124) Defendants move for
attorney fees and costs and for leave to respond to Watkins’s objections to their Bill of Costs.
(D.N. 122; D.N. 128) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Watkins’s motion to
alter the judgment, grant Defendants leave to respond to Watkins’s objections, and refer
Defendants’ Bill of Costs and motion for attorney fees and costs to Magistrate Judge Colin H.
Lindsay for report and recommendation.
I.
Background
This action centers on a parcel of real property known as Oxmoor Farm, located in
Louisville, Kentucky, and owned in part by the Trust. (See D.N. 22-1) In November 2013,
1
Watkins brought this action against the Trust and its Trustee, alleging that they had failed to
develop the property and to provide him reasons for the lack of development. (Id.) He also claimed
that Defendants had arbitrarily overvalued the property to collect more fees from the Trust’s
beneficiaries.
(Id.)
Based on these alleged actions, Watkins asserted five counts against
Defendants in his original complaint: (i) failure to perform statutorily prescribed fiduciary duties,
(ii) breach of fiduciary duties, (iii) gross negligence, (iv) right to an accounting, and (v) unjust
enrichment. (Id., PageID # 194–96)
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered September 22, 2014, the Court dismissed
Watkins’s claims of failure to perform fiduciary duties, breach of fiduciary duties, and gross
negligence, reasoning that the claims were related to development opportunities that occurred well
beyond the statute-of-limitations period. See Watkins v. Trust Under Will of Bullitt ex rel. PNC
Bank, N.A., No. 3:13–CV–01113–TBR, 2014 WL 4722200, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2014). The
Court allowed Watkins to proceed with his right-to-an-accounting and unjust-enrichment claims,
however. Id. In doing so, the Court noted that Watkins’s accounting claim stemmed from a
September 2013 letter in which he requested information from the Trustee concerning Oxmoor
Farm’s lack of development. Id. at *4. (See also D.N. 22-1, PageID # 192) The Court also
specified that Watkins’s unjust-enrichment claim arose from his allegation that “PNC haphazardly
valued [the Farm] at $72 million, then doubled the property’s value to $130 million . . . without
actually developing the land.”1 Id. at *5. (See also D.N. 22-1, PageID # 193)
Watkins then moved for leave to file an amended complaint, seeking to add claims for
removal of the Trustee and appointment of a special fiduciary to oversee a request for proposals
1
During discovery, it became clear that the alleged $130 million valuation resulted from an
appraisal performed in 2006. (See D.N. 70-1, PageID # 537)
2
regarding Oxmoor Farm. (See D.N. 28) The amended complaint also sought attorney fees and
injunctive relief. (D.N. 28-1, PageID # 221) The Court granted Watkins’s motion to amend. (D.N.
29) But thereafter, in a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered September 16, 2015, the Court
dismissed Watkins’s requests for removal of the trustee and attorney fees and costs, finding that
the claims had no basis under Kentucky law at the time this action was filed. (See D.N. 54, PageID
# 427) The Court allowed Watkins to proceed with his request for an appointment of a special
fiduciary and claim for injunctive relief, however. (Id., PageID # 432) Meanwhile, the Court
entered a modified scheduling order, which set the deadline for amending the parties’ pleadings as
November 1, 2015. (D.N. 52, PageID # 415)
Nonetheless, in July 2016, eight months after the amendment deadline, Watkins moved to
“modify” his original complaint and requested leave to file a second amended complaint. (D.N.
69; D.N. 97) Watkins’s proposed claims arose from a letter he received in April 2016 from Alan
Titus, who serves as the Trust’s fiduciary officer. In the letter, Titus explained that several
expenses had been improperly categorized and that the Trust beneficiaries were owed money as a
result. (D.N. 73-1, PageID # 911–913) In addition to reimbursing the beneficiaries, the Trustee
voluntarily provided Watkins an accounting for the Trust for the period from January 1, 2008 to
May 2, 2016. (D.N. 65-1, PageID # 505)
According to Watkins, the mischaracterized expenses indicated that the Trustee had also
likely committed accounting errors prior to 2008. Thus, besides moving to amend his complaint,
Watkins also filed a motion to compel “information beginning in 1991 regarding [the Trustee’s]
mismanagement of trust assets.” (D.N. 72, PageID # 892) He additionally moved to compel
certain privileged documents, which he claimed he needed in order to review the Trustee’s
characterization of expenses and ascertain whether any further amounts were owed to him. (D.N.
3
108) Meanwhile, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. (D.N. 70) And
Watkins moved to stay consideration of the motion for summary judgment, contending that the
stay would permit him to complete necessary depositions to confirm the information contained in
the Trustee’s accounting.2 (D.N. 87)
On March 31, 2017, the Court denied Watkins’s motion to modify his original complaint.
(See D.N. 110) In doing so, the Court construed the motion to modify as a motion to amend and
held that because Watkins had filed the motion well after the deadline for amending the parties’
pleadings, the motion was untimely.3 (Id.) Additionally, in a Memorandum Opinion and Order
entered August 28, 2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied
Watkins’s motion to amend, motions to compel discovery, and motion to stay consideration of the
motion for summary judgment. See Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088. Watkins now moves to alter
that judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). (D.N. 124-1) Defendants move for attorney fees and costs
and for leave to respond to Watkins’s objections to their Bill of Costs. (D.N. 122; D.N. 128)
II.
Standard
The Court may grant a motion to alter pursuant to Rule 59(e) “if there is a clear error of
law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest
injustice.” GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations
omitted). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of a manifest error
of fact or law. Doe v. Patton, 381 F. Supp. 2d 595, 605 (E.D. Ky. 2005). A Rule 59(e) motion
does not provide the plaintiff another opportunity to reargue the merits of his case, however.
2
Because of the various pending motions, the Court administratively remanded consideration of
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on March 13, 2017. (See D.N. 103)
3
The Court also found that Watkins had failed to show good cause or excusable neglect for his
untimely request. (D.N. 110, PageID # 1857–59)
4
Gencorp, Inc., 178 F. 3d at 834. Accordingly, motions to alter or amend judgments “are
extraordinary in nature and should be sparingly granted.” Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth
Alive, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 647, 655 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 13, 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
III.
Discussion
Watkins contends that the Court’s August 2017 Opinion “is based on clearly erroneous
readings of pleadings and of caselaw and works a manifest injustice . . . as it stops all discovery
and ignores valid arguments that go to the heart of this matter.” (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2614) In
support of his contention, however, Watkins fails to identify any clear errors of law or persuasively
argue that the Court’s Opinion results in manifest injustice. Instead, he spends inordinate effort
rearguing the merits of his case and presenting arguments that this Court has previously rejected.
Watkins has therefore failed to meet his heavy burden to warrant altering the judgment, and the
Court will deny his Rule 59(e) motion. See Gencorp, Inc., 178 F. 3d at 834.
A. Administrative Stay
On March 13, 2017, the Court administratively remanded Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (D.N. 103) Watkins argues that the Court erred by thereafter granting summary
judgment without first notifying him of its intent to lift the administrative stay. (D.N. 124-1,
PageID # 2632–33) In support of his argument, Watkins presents no authority indicating that this
Court must provide notice prior to lifting an administrative stay. (See id.) Watkins has therefore
failed to show that the Court clearly erred in its decision to rule on the motion for summary
judgment without first notifying the parties of its intention to do so. See Gati v. W. Ky. Univ., No.
3:14-cv-544-DJH-CHL, 2018 WL 3028572, at *7 (W.D. Ky. June 18, 2018) (“[The plaintiff’s]
argument falls short of showing a clear error on the part of the Court . . . . [The plaintiff] cites no
caselaw contradicting the Court’s position.”).
5
Additionally, Watkins fails to demonstrate that the lack of notice resulted in manifest
injustice. When the Court ruled on Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the motion had been
fully briefed for nearly a year. (See D.N. 84; D.N. 120) Indeed, Watkins had ample opportunity
to present arguments against summary judgment in both his response and surreply to the motion.
(D.N. 75; D.N. 81-1) In any event, Watkins does not explain what actions he would have taken
had he received notice or how notice would have affected the Court’s Judgment. (See D.N. 1241, PageID # 2632–33) Watkins has therefore failed to demonstrate manifest injustice. See Martin
v. Colvin, No. 15-46-ART, 2016 WL 1305891, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2016) (“[A] showing of
manifest injustice requires that there exist a fundamental flaw in the court’s decision that, without
correction, would lead to a result that is both inequitable and not in line with applicable policy.”
(quoting Banks v. Pugh, No. 4:13CV2522, 2014 WL 4441470, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2014))).
B. Declaratory-Judgment Claim
Watkins also maintains that the Court erred by dismissing this action without discussing
his claim for declaratory relief. (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2639–42) In its August 2017 Opinion, the
Court indeed did not mention a claim for declaratory relief. See Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088. This
is because no declaratory-judgment claim was properly before the Court. In his original complaint,
although Watkins explains that “[t]his is an action for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to [the
Kentucky Declaratory Judgment Act],” none of his listed counts relate to declaratory relief. (See
D.N. 22-1, PageID # 189) Indeed, in the prayer section of his original complaint, Watkins does
not ask the Court to grant declaratory judgment. (Id., PageID # 197) Similarly, although Watkins
states in Count 8 of his amended complaint that “[t]his is an action for Declaratory Judgment”
(D.N. 30, PageID # 235), he fails to explain with sufficient detail what controversy requires
adjudication. (See id.) In light of these omissions, the Court did not err in failing to formally
6
discuss Watkins’s supposed declaratory-judgment claim. See Clark v. National Travelers Life Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975) (“There is no duty on the part of the trial court . . . to
create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” (internal alteration and
quotations omitted)); see generally Bowen v. Taft, 62 F. App’x 117, 119 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[The
plaintiff] argues that the district court failed to address his claims of violations of his property
rights and equal protection rights. However, the district court cannot be faulted for failing to
address these conclusory allegations, where [the plaintiff] failed to identify any facts establishing
a property right or to allege membership in a protected class.”).
Additionally, the Court’s course of action did not result in manifest injustice, considering
Watkins received clear notice that the Court understood that no declaratory-judgment claim was
before it. In its September 2014 Opinion, after dismissing most of Watkins’s claims, the Court
explained that “Watkins’[s] remaining claims for Right to an Accounting (Count IV) and Unjust
Enrichment (Count V) may . . . proceed.” Watkins, 2014 WL 4722200 at *5. The Opinion did not
state that Watkins could proceed with a declaratory-judgment claim. Id. Indeed, the Court never
even discussed that claim. Id. And in its September 2015 Opinion, the Court explicitly construed
Count 8 of Watkins’s amended complaint as merely asserting a claim for injunctive relief; the
Court again did not mention a claim for declaratory judgment. (D.N. 54, PageID # 432) Watkins
was therefore aware that since 2014, the Court had proceeded under the view that no declaratoryjudgment claim was before it. Yet, Watkins never moved to clarify these prior Opinions. Nor did
he timely move to amend his complaint to add a declaratory-judgment count. Considering this
background, the Court cannot find that its failure to discuss the alleged declaratory-judgment claim
resulted in manifest injustice.
7
In any event, even if Watkins had properly stated a declaratory-judgment claim, the Court
would have had no reason to discuss it further, given that no actual controversy remained. Watkins
explained in his response to Defendants’ summary-judgment motion that his declaratory-judgment
claim “seeks removal of PNC as Trustee, disgorgement of fees and damages and an injunction
against further waste.” (D.N. 75, PageID # 924) Prior to issuing its August 2017 Opinion, the
Court had dismissed Watkins’s claim concerning removal of the Trustee. (See D.N. 54) And in
the same Opinion, the Court granted summary judgment on Watkins’s disgorgement and
injunctive-relief claims. See Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088. Thus, there remained no actual
controversy that would have supported Watkins’s declaratory-judgment claim and a formal
analysis of the claim would have added nothing to the Court’s Opinion.4 See Foley v. Kentucky,
306 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that a claim under the Kentucky Declaratory Judgment
Act “does not involve a question which is merely hypothetical or an answer which is no more than
an advisory opinion”); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 418.040 (“In any action . . . wherein it is made to
appear that an actual controversy exists, the plaintiff may ask for a declaration of rights.”
(emphasis added)).
C. Arguments Related to Watkins’s Proposed Second Amended Complaint
Although presented as separate arguments, Watkins’s remaining contentions in favor of his
Rule 59(e) motion stem from the same misplaced idea. Specifically, Watkins maintains that his
proposed second amended complaint does not assert new claims for relief; it simply asserts more
Watkins is also incorrect to assert that Defendants’ summary-judgment motion did not address
his declaratory-judgment claim. (See D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2639) Defendants sought summary
judgment on “[t]he surviving claims of the Complaint and Amended Complaint,” and explained
that they were “entitled to judgment on those claims.” (D.N. 70-1, PageID # 540) The “surviving
claims” would necessarily include Watkins’s supposed declaratory-judgment claim.
4
8
facts in support of the claims alleged in his original complaint and first amended complaint.5 (See
124-1) Watkins raises this argument despite the fact that this Court has previously rejected it on
two occasions. (See D.N. 110) Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *4 (“The differences between the
current allegations and the proposed allegations are substantial.”). Because Rule 59 does not
provide Watkins another opportunity to reargue the merits of his case, Gencorp, Inc., 178 F. 3d at
834, his remaining arguments are unavailing.
1. Pleading Standard
Watkins’s first iteration of his amendment argument is that the Court held him to an
incorrect pleading standard in denying him leave to file a second amended complaint. (D.N. 1241, PageID # 2633–38) Essentially, Watkins’s argument results from his belief that the primary
reason the Court denied his motion to amend was because it found that the allegations contained
in his proposed second amended complaint do not relate to those presented in his original
complaint. (Id.) However, in the August 2017 Opinion, the Court also found that Watkins’s
motion to amend was untimely, he had failed to show excusable-neglect for the untimeliness, and
granting him leave to amend would result in unfair prejudice to Defendants. Watkins, 2017 WL
3710088 at *3–*4. Watkins presents no authority indicating that the Court erred in reaching those
conclusions. (See D.N. 124-1)
In any event, the Court correctly concluded that the allegations in Watkins’s proposed
second amended complaint do not relate to those presented in his original complaint. Count 1 of
Watkins’s second amended complaint concerns the “erroneous classifications of [Trust]
expenses.” (D.N. 97-1, PageID # 1647) Notably, Watkins does not mention any “erroneous
Because Watkins’s first amended complaint adds no additional factual content (see D.N. 30), the
Court will hereafter simply refer to Watkins’s original complaint and first amended complaint
collectively as Watkins’s “original complaint.”
5
9
classification” in his original complaint, which primarily concerns Defendants’ alleged failure to
develop Oxmoor Farm. (D.N. 22-1; D.N. 30) In fact, the “erroneous classifications” at issue refer
to the mischaracterizations of Trust expenses that Watkins became aware of outside the context of
this litigation and over two years after he filed this action. (See D.N. 73-1) Similarly, Count 4 of
Watkins’s proposed second amended complaint alleges that the Trustee’s failure to keep Watkins
informed caused the mischaracterizations.
(Id., PageID # 1655–58)
Again, the
mischaracterizations do not relate to the original impetus for this action—Oxmoor Farm’s alleged
lack of development. (See D.N. 22-1; D.N. 30) And in Count 5 of his proposed second amended
complaint, Watkins cites the accounting the Trustee provided to him following its discovery of the
mischaracterized expenses to justify a more comprehensive accounting than what he asked for in
his original complaint.6 (D.N. 97-1, PageID # 1658–61)
Based on the substantial differences between Watkins’s proposed second amended
complaint and original complaint, the Court did not err in finding that “[his] motion [to amend]
[was] an obvious attempt to transform the current claims in an effort to avoid summary judgment.”
Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *5.
2. The Court’s Reading of Watkins’s First Motion to Compel
For the second iteration of his amendment argument, Watkins contends that the Court erred
by misreading his first motion to compel discovery. (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2630–32) In its August
2017 Opinion, the Court denied Watkins’s motion to compel, reasoning that the discovery at issue
was ultimately the relief he sought (i.e., an accounting of the Trust from 1991 to January 2008).
Additionally, although Count 2 of Watkins’s proposed second amended complaint refers to
Oxmoor Farm, Watkins creates a new theory of liability to support his claim. Specifically,
Watkins’s proposed Count 2 cites an appraisal of the property that occurred in 2016, over two
years after Watkins filed this action. (D.N. 97-1, PageID # 1651) Watkins’s original unjustenrichment claim, however, was premised on a 2006 appraisal. (See D.N. 22-1)
6
10
See Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *8. Now, Watkins argues that the Court’s interpretation ignored
another aspect of the motion: a request for documents to confirm the veracity of the accounting he
received from the Trustee. (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2630–32)
In denying Watkins’s first motion to compel, the Court did not discuss his request for
documents concerning the veracity of the accounting. See Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *8. As
explained above, however, there was no need for the Court to do so as Watkins’s original
allegations do not relate to the accounting or the mischaracterizations that precipitated its
completion.
(See D.N. 22-1; D.N. 30; see also D.N. 73-1)
Watkins’s motion to compel
verification documents was therefore an untimely attempt to pursue a new claim. Although it is
true, as Watkins contends, that he was entitled to conduct discovery to support his claims, such
entitlement does not extend to conducting discovery to prove new claims. See Diamond Elec., Inc.
v. Knoebel Constr., No. 5:16-023-KKC, 2016 WL 6518625, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 2, 2016) (“A
court may deny leave to file a supplemental pleading where that pleading relates only indirectly,
if at all, to the original complaint and the alleged cause of action arose out [of] an entirely unrelated
set of facts.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).7
In any event, Watkins’s argument relies on the misplaced belief that the Trustee’s
accounting was essential to the Court’s Opinion. (See D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2631) The Court
granted summary judgment on Watkins’s accounting and unjust-enrichment claims because
7
Watkins also cites Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Brokerage Co. v. Skeeters, 395 F. Supp.
2d 541 (W.D. Ky. 2005). According to Watkins, in Skeeters, the Court allowed the
counterclaimant to use facts uncovered during discovery in support of its broad counterclaim. (See
D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2637) However, the discovered facts at issue in Skeeters were not as distinct
and separate from the counterclaimant’s allegations as the mischaracterization of Trust expenses
and the resulting accounting are from Watkins’s original claims here. See Skeeters, 395 F. Supp.
2d 541. (Cf. D.N. 124-4, PageID # 2662–68) In other words, unlike Watkins, the
counterclaimant’s use of the discovered facts in Skeeters did not “amount to an entirely new
lawsuit based on entirely new factual allegations.” Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *4.
11
Watkins failed to provide any evidence that the Trustee was unjustly enriched. 8 See Watkins, 2017
WL 3710088 at *5–*7. Although the Court briefly mentioned the Trustee’s accounting, it did so
in support of an alternative reason for granting summary judgment. Id. at *6–*7. The Court did
not rely on the Accounting in support of its principal reason for granting summary judgment on
Watkins’s accounting and unjust-enrichment claims. Id. at *6–*7. Thus, no manifest injustice
resulted from the fact that Watkins was unable to confirm the veracity of the accounting.
3. Genuine Issues of Material Fact
For the third iteration of his amendment argument, Watkins contends that “[w]ithout
rearguing the motion for summary judgment, he ha[d] provided . . . numerous examples of genuine
issues of material facts” that warranted denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
(D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2642) In support of that contention, however, Watkins proceeds to do
precisely what he claims he will not—reargue the motion for summary judgment. (See id., PageID
# 2642–2647) As noted above, a movant may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to simply reargue his
case. Whitehead, 301 F. App’x at 489. For that reason alone, Watkins’s argument does not call
for reconsideration of the Court’s Judgment.
Regardless, although Watkins identifies several “issues” of material fact, these issues relate
only to claims asserted in his proposed second amended complaint. (See D.N. 124-1) For the
8
Watkins is incorrect that the Court misread Gentry v. Coffey, No. 2006-CA-00293-MR, 2007 WL
4465573 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2007), in reaching that conclusion. The Court cited Gentry for
the notion that “[t]o be entitled to a court-ordered accounting, Watkins must demonstrate that PNC
owes him money.” Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *7. Despite Watkins’s protests, Gentry indeed
states that the underlying theory of an accounting is “unjust enrichment” and that a claimant must
show he “has a right to an accounting.” Gentry, 2007 WL 4465573 at *1. Having found that
Watkins’s unjust-enrichment claim failed, the Court correctly concluded that he had no right to an
accounting. Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *5–*7; see also 1A C.J.S. Accounting § 34 (“An
accounting will not, as a general rule, be ordered where there is no balance due to the plaintiff
from the defendant, since to do so would avail the plaintiff nothing.”).
12
reasons set forth above, those claims were not properly before the Court and thus Watkins was not
entitled to discovery on any issues related to the claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties
may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” (emphasis added)).
4. Watkins’s Final Objections
Watkins’s final iterations of his amendment argument are meritless. First, Watkins
contends that the Court misread his motion to stay consideration of Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2622; see also D.N. 87) According to Watkins, the
motion to stay related to certain deposition testimony he sought to conduct to confirm the veracity
of the Trustee’s accounting. (Id.) He claims that the Court misconstrued the motion by stating
that it “focuse[d] solely on the deposition of Titus and [did] not request transcripts from any other
depositions or potential depositions.” Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *2. (D.N. 124-1, PageID #
2623) Yet even if the Court read Watkins’s motion too narrowly, the issue would be immaterial.
As explained above, the Trustee’s accounting does not relate to any claim asserted in Watkins’s
original complaint. (See D.N. 22-1, D.N. 30) Depositions related to the accounting’s veracity
were therefore irrelevant as to the resolution of Defendants’ then-pending motion for summary
judgment, and the Court was justified in denying Watkins’s motion to stay.
Second, Watkins claims that “[i]t is certainly a manifest injustice to stop discovery without
notice and grant a premature summary judgment because of too little facts.” (D.N. 124-1, PageID
# 2625) Essentially, Watkins rephrases his argument that this Court granted summary judgment
when issues of fact were still outstanding. However, the issues of fact that Watkins proceeds to
identify relate to the accounting, the mischaracterized expenses that led to its creation, and the
13
2016 appraisal of Oxmoor Farm. (See D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2625) Again, claims related to those
items were not properly before the Court.9
Third, Watkins maintains that the Court ignored his second motion to compel, which
sought privileged documents pertaining to the Trustee’s mischaracterizations of Trust expenses
and the 2016 appraisal of Oxmoor Farm. (See D.N. 108) As noted above, however, claims
concerning those issues were not properly before the Court as they do not relate to any claim
asserted in Watkins’s original complaint. (See D.N. 22-1; D.N. 30) In any event, the Court did
not “ignore” Watkins’s second motion to compel. In its August 2017 Opinion, the Court denied
“[a]ll remaining motions” as moot. Watkins, 2017 WL 3710088 at *9. The “remaining motions”
would necessarily include Watkins’s pending motion to compel.
Finally, Watkins broadly argues that the Court’s August 2017 Opinion results in manifest
injustice. (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2647–50) In support of his contention, however, Watkins simply
parrots an argument that this Court has rejected twice—that he should be entitled to pursue
untimely claims because he mistakenly believed the deadline for submitting amended pleadings
had been remanded. (D.N. 124-1, PageID # 2648–50) In May 2016, the Court vacated the expert
deadlines in this matter and explained that “[a]ll remaining pretrial deadlines [are] stayed.” (D.N.
66 (emphasis added)) Because the deadline for amending the parties’ pleadings had already
expired on November 1, 2015, it was not a “remaining” deadline as of May 2016. (See D.N. 52)
Thus, any attempt by Watkins to amend his complaint after November 2015 was untimely, and he
had to show good cause or excusable neglect to justify the untimeliness. Watkins, 2017 WL
9
On this point, Watkins’s reliance on CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2008), is
unavailing. In CenTra, the court found that “it is generally an abuse of discretion to deny a Rule
56(f) motion in the absence of any opportunity for discovery.” Id. at 420–21. Unlike Watkins,
however, the plaintiff in CenTra was not in the middle of discovery when it filed its Rule 56(f)
motion; rather, the parties had conducted no discovery. Id. at 421.
14
3710088 at *4. Watkins presents no authority to indicate that the Court erred in that reading of its
own scheduling order. Watkins’s final ground for reconsideration is therefore unavailing.
In sum, a Rule 59 motion does not provide a movant the opportunity to simply rehash failed
arguments. Watts, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 815. If Watkins wishes to present arguments that this Court
has consistently rejected, there is a higher court to which he may appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3.
Because Watkins presents no support to indicate that the Court clearly erred or that its August
2017 Opinion results in manifest injustice, Watkins fails to meet his heavy burden under Rule 59.
Patton, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 605. The Court with therefore deny his Rule 59 motion.
E. Attorney Fees and Costs
Following the Court’s August 2017 Opinion, Defendants moved for attorney fees and costs
pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 386B.10-040. (D.N. 122) Defendants also filed a Bill of Costs
pursuant to Rule 54(d). (D.N. 123) Thereafter, Watkins filed a “response” to the Bill of Costs,
which the Court will construe as an objection. (See D.N. 125) Defendants now move for leave to
file a response to Watkins’s objection. (D.N. 128) Watkins states that he does not oppose the
response “on the condition that [he] is allowed [to file] a reply two weeks after Defendant[s] file[]
[their] response.” (D.N. 131) In light of Watkins’s concession, the Court will grant Defendants
leave to file a response to Watkins’s objections. The Court will also allow Watkins to file a reply.
Finally, considering the issues raised by Defendants’ request for attorney fees and costs, the Court
will refer Defendants’ motion for attorney fees and costs and Watkins’s objections to the Bill of
Costs to the magistrate judge assigned to this action.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is
hereby
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ORDERED as follows:
(1)
Watkins’s motion to alter or amend the Judgment (D.N. 124) is DENIED.
(2)
Defendants’ motion for leave to respond to Watkins’s objections to the Bill of Costs
(D.N. 128) is GRANTED. Defendants shall have twenty-one (21) days from the date of entry of
this Order within which to file their response. The response shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages.
Watkins shall have fourteen (14) days thereafter to file his reply. The reply shall not exceed ten
(10) pages.
(3)
Defendants’ motion for attorney fees and costs (D.N. 122) and Watkins’s objections
to the Bill of Costs (D.N. 125) are REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay for a report
and recommendation.
(4)
Defendants’ motion for attorney fees and costs (D.N. 122) is STAYED and
ADMINISTRATIVELY REMANDED pending further order of the Court.
August 6, 2018
David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
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