Canders v. Wheatly Elementary et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 9/15/2014; re 9 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by Tamara Bass, Wheatly Elementary, Ann Haigler, Debbie Shontee, William Bunton ; a separate order shall issuecc:counsel (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-01171-TBR

TIJUANA L. CANDERS

Plaintiff,

v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Jefferson County
Public Schools (“JCPS”), William Bunton, Tamara Bass, Ann Haigler, and Debbie Shontee (collectively,
“the JCPS Defendants”). (Docket No. 9). Plaintiff Tijuana L. Canders, proceeding pro se, has responded,
(Docket No. 11), and the JCPS Defendants have replied, (Docket No. 12). Fully briefed, this matter is
ripe for adjudication. For the reasons explained below, the JCPS Defendants’ Motion, (Docket No. 9),
will be GRANTED.
Factual Background
Canders is the mother of B.C. and J.C., both minor children. The children attended Wheatley
Elementary (“Wheatley”) in Louisville, Kentucky, where they were eligible for special accommodation
and related services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §
1400 et seq. In her Complaint, Canders indicates that her children were afraid to enter their classrooms,
perhaps because of their diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, which caused them to experience
anxiety in new settings. (Docket No. 1 at 2, 3.) Shontee, a Wheatley staff member, offered to walk them
to class. (Docket No. 1 at 2.) Haigler, another Wheatley employee, overheard this exchange and
suggested that the children would perhaps benefit from talking with a police officer about the matter, as
the police were occasionally called “to speak to the children on a friendly level for encouragement.”
(Docket No. 1 at 3; Docket No. 11 at 5.) After pointing out that the children’s Individualized Education
Plans (IEPs) included behavior modifications intended to address such issues, Canders assented to
Haigler’s suggestion. (Docket No. 1 at 3.)
When Officer Robert Skaggs arrived with Principal Bunton, he instructed Canders to leave the
school’s premises along with her children, citing the concerns of Wheatley staff that the family was
causing a disturbance. (Docket No. 1 at 4-5.) Canders questioned Bunton; Bunton explained, “No crime
1

was committed, but I cannot force your children to go to class. Therefore, I’m asking you to leave.”
(Docket No. 1 at 5.) Although Canders sought “resources” for her children, Bunton offered no response;
Haigler, Shontee, and Bass suggested spanking them. (Docket No. 1 at 5.) Other suggestions included to
take seek psychiatric care for the children and to involve Child Protective Services. (Docket No. 1 at 56.) After continued conversations and reviewing Canders’ identification, Officer Skaggs issued Canders a
citation for Criminal Trespassing in the Third Degree.1
Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings, including complaints, contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). A complaint may be attacked for failure “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court will presume that all
the factual allegations in the complaint are true and will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing Great Lakes Steel v. Deggendorf, 716 F.2d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Even though a “complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

Instead, the plaintiff’s

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations
omitted). That is, a complaint must contain enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. A claim becomes plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If, from the well-pleaded facts, the
court cannot “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”
Id.
Furthermore, federal courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d

1

Although Officer Skaggs is also listed as a Defendant in this action, he has issued no filings to date. Therefore,
Canders’ claims against Officer Skaggs will not be addressed in this Memorandum Opinion.

2

108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991). However, “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not
require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, this Court is not required “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff,” as this would “transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role
of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278.
Analysis
I.

IDEA
Canders’ Complaint first alleges that the JCPS Defendants violated the IDEA by “refus[ing] to

provide IEP accomodations.”2 Congress enacted the IDEA to “ensure that all children with disabilities
have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and
independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To safeguard such children’s rights to free appropriate
public education, the IDEA requires the development of “IEPs.” 20 U.S.C. §§1401(14), 1412(4). An IEP
is a written statement for a child with a disability detailing the child’s current performance levels, her
short-term and long-term goals, the educational and other services to be provided, and the criteria against
which her progress will be measured. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(c) (1995).
The Act requires individual states to establish procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities
and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate
public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). The IDEA entitles parents concerned with the adequacy of their
child’s IEP to request a due process hearing to be conducted by the local educational agency. 20 U.S.C.
§1415(f).

The state educational agency is required to conduct an impartial review of the local

educational agency’s decision and may take an appeal of it. 20 U.S.C. §1415(g). In Kentucky, a local
hearing officer conducts the initial due process hearing; its decision may be appealed to the Exceptional
Children Appeals Board. 707 KAR 1:340 § 7, 707 KAR 1:340 § 8. The IDEA establishes that after a
complainant has exhausted the state’s administrative procedures, she may bring a civil suit in either
federal district court or in a state court “of competent jurisdiction.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).

2

Canders also contends that the JCPS Defendants did not “provide resources for the children to the mother to
receive their education elsewhere citing the mother as trespassing and to leave the premises when no crime was
committed.” (Docket No. 1 at 1.) The Court assumes that this allegation falls within the

3

Only after a plaintiff exhausts her administrative remedies may she pursue a civil action to
enforce her rights under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); see also Doe v. Dublin City Sch. Dist., 453 Fed.
App’x 606, 608 (6th Cir. 2011); Long v. Dawson Springs Indep. Sch. Dist., 197 Fed. App’x 427, 434-35
(6th Cir .2006); Donoho v. Smith Cty. Bd. of Educ., 21 Fed. App’x 293, 296-97 (6th Cir. 2001).
“‘Exhaustion’ enables the agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to the problem, to
exercise its discretion, and to correct its own mistakes, and is credited with promoting accuracy,
efficiency, agency autonomy, and judicial economy.’” Donoho, 21 Fed. App’x at 297-98 (quoting
Christopher W. v. Portsmouth Sch. Comm., 877 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1989)). Should a plaintiff fail
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, a court should dismiss the action without prejudice.
Gibson v. Forest Hills Local Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 1197896, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2012).
The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is particularly broad, encompassing not only claims brought
under the Act but also those that could have been brought under it.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws
seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures
under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as
would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (citations omitted). Any claim that relates directly to a student’s access to a free
appropriate public education is subject to the exhaustion requirement. Long, 197 Fed. App’x at 434.
Accordingly, the IDEA requires Canders to first exhaust its administrative procedures and
remedies before seeking relief from the Court. Because there is no indication that she has engaged this
process, her claims are not yet suitable for judicial review. See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch.
Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[U]nder the IDEA, education professionals are supposed to have
at least the first crack at formulating a plan to overcome the consequences of educational shortfalls.”).
Canders explains that she remains unable to return her children to Wheatley, given her citation for
trespassing.

(Docket No. 11 at 5-6.)

This citation, however, does not justify deviation from the

“statutorily-prescribed administrative process,” which requires her to first seek a due process hearing.
Gean v. Hattway, 330 F.3d 758, 774 (6th Cir. 2003). Because Canders has not exhausted the relevant
administrative procedures, her IDEA claim is untimely and will be dismissed.

4

II.

Defamation
Canders also seeks damages compensating her family for “defamation of character.” (Docket No.

1 at 4.) In her Response, Canders explains that she was “humiliated” by the comments of various
Wheatley Elementary School staff members. She points to statements made by various JCPS Defendants,
first noting Bunton’s acknowledgement that the family had not caused a disturbance but that he could not
force unwilling children to go to class. (Docket No. 11 at 4.) Canders then references Bass’s advice to
take the children to Our Lady of Peace, a psychiatric hospital. (Docket No. 11 at 5.) Next, Canders says
that Haigler advised her to contact children services and that the “police [were] called to ‘per se’ speak to
the children on a friendly level for encouragement.” (Docket No. 11 at 5.) Finally, Canders points to
Shontee’s remark, “Do you spank your kids? Because I do not know about you, but I am old school, and
if they are not going to behave, then you have to spank.” (Docket No. 11 at 5.)
Under Kentucky law, four elements are necessary to establish a claim for defamation: “(1)
defamatory language; (2) about the plaintiff; (3); which is published; and (4) which causes injury to
reputation.” Biber v. Duplicator Sales & Serv., Inc., 155 S.W.3d 732, 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (citing
Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)); see also Stringer v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 793 (Ky. 2004). “Defamatory language” is that which “’tends to (1) bring a
person into public hatred, contempt, or ridicule; (2) cause him to be shunned or avoided; or, (3) injure him
in his business occupation.’” Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (quoting
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ky. 1981)).
Although Canders has provided specific statements allegedly made by various JCPS Defendants,
the Court concludes that she has failed to plead a viable claim for defamation. However embarrassed or
degraded Canders may have felt, exactly what language was defamatory, to whom it was published, and
how it injured Canders’ reputation remain unclear. Therefore, Canders pleads no specific facts sufficient
“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Assoc. of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of
Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007).

Her defamation claim will consequently be

dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the JCPS Defendants’ Motion, (Docket No. 9), will be GRANTED.
An appropriate Order will issue concurrently with this Opinion.

5

September 15, 2014