Bradshaw v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge James D. Moyer on 06/09/2014. cc: Counsel (TJD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE

WALTER E. BRADSHAW
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-61-JDM

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Acting Commissioner has filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Bradshaw’s complaint, in
which she asserts this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Mr. Bradshaw has
not responded. When one party fails to object to a motion, the court typically enters a brief
order granting the motion. Because Mr. Bradshaw is proceeding pro se, however, additional
explanation is warranted, although this court notes that Mr. Bradshaw has repeatedly filed
appeals over which this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and has received thoughtful and
thorough explanations as to why, but seemingly has not yet understood why he cannot continue
to do so.
Plaintiff has spent the past sixteen years attempting to obtain Childhood Disability
Benefits. Mr. Bradshaw, who is now fifty-nine years old, filed his first application when he was
thirty-three. His first application was denied, because he was not disabled at the time of his
application, and had not been disabled at any time during the period before he turned twenty-two
years old. Mr. Bradshaw filed another application in May 2001, which was dismissed on the
basis of the doctrine of res judicata. Undeterred, Mr. Bradshaw filed another application in
November 2003, which was also dismissed as barred by res judicata. In January 2007, Mr.

Bradshaw filed his fourth application for Childhood Disability Benefits, which was, like the
others, dismissed as barred pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
Mr. Bradshaw’s fifth and most recent application was filed in January 2012. The Social
Security Administration denied his application initially, and upon reconsideration, because Mr.
Bradshaw submitted no additional evidence not previously presented that he was, in fact,
disabled before he reached the age of twenty-two. Mr. Bradshaw requested an administrative
hearing, and the administrative law judge dismissed his request, describing in detail Mr.
Bradshaw’s ongoing requests for benefits and the Social Security Administrations’ previous
determinations regarding those requests. After the Appeals Council denied review of the
administrative law judge’s dismissal, Mr. Bradshaw filed this appeal.
As the Social Security Administration and various judges in the Western District of
Kentucky have frequently explained to Mr. Bradshaw, his first application for Childhood
Disability Benefits was definitively decided against him, when he failed to present sufficient
evidence that he suffered from a disability before he reached the age of twenty-two. He did not
appeal that decision, and thus the fact of whether he was disabled before twenty-two was
conclusively decided against him and cannot be relitigated. Accordingly, regardless of whether
Mr. Bradshaw is suffering any impairments as an adult, he cannot now qualify for Childhood
Disability Benefits -- the type of benefits he repeatedly seeks.
This is so, because in our judicial system, once an issue of fact is decided in favor of or
against a particular person, the determinations cannot be changed simply because that person
files a new lawsuit. This is what the Social Security Administration and the other federal judges

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presented with Mr. Bradshaw’s appeal have been referring to when they speak of the doctrine of
res judicata.
Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the administrative law judge assigned to Mr.
Bradshaw’s most recent application for Childhood Disability Benefits properly denied Mr.
Bradshaw’s request for a hearing. When he did so, the processing of Mr. Bradshaw’s application
ceased, because there was nothing new to be decided, and therefore there was no “final decision”
by the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Because there was no “final decision,” this
court lacks any jurisdiction to consider Mr. Bradshaw’s appeal. See 42 U.S.C. §§405(g) and (h);
20 C.F.R. 404.900(a); 20 C.F.R. 404..957(c)(1); Cottrell v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir.
1992). Accordingly, Mr. Bradshaw’s complaint must be dismissed.
The court will enter an appropriate order consistent with the memorandum opinion.
DATE:

June 9, 2014

Cc: Walter E. Bradshaw, pro se plaintiff
Counsel of Record

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