Mathis v. Maryhurst, Inc.

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 05/23/2014 granting 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. cc: Counsel (TJD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
DAVID MATHIS

v.

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-00100-CRS

MARYHURST, INC.

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss (DN 5) filed by Defendant
Maryhurst, Inc. (“Defendant”) against Plaintiff David Mathis (“Plaintiff”). For the reasons set
forth below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed. From 2012–13, Plaintiff
was employed by Defendant as a maintenance worker. During his employment, Plaintiff
developed a serious health condition requiring that he take medical leave. Although Defendant
allowed him to take medical leave, Plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully terminated upon his
return to work.
On January 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present action in Jefferson County Circuit Court,
alleging that his termination violated the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) and the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).1 On February 5, 2014, Defendant removed the action on the basis

1

In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint sets forth an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as well as a claim
of “wrongful discharge in violation of Kentucky public policy.” (Complaint, DN 1-2, at ¶ 20). Because Plaintiff
abandoned these claims in his response, the Court will not address them in its opinion.

of federal question jurisdiction. On February 12, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss the action on
the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state a claim for relief under Kentucky and
federal law.
Having considered the parties’ briefs and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the Court
will now address the motion to dismiss.
STANDARD
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine
whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the complaint
need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of
his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Court will begin by addressing the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FMLA claim.
According to Defendant, dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim under the FMLA. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
statement in his Complaint that “[Defendant] terminated [Plaintiff’s] employment in violation of
the [FMLA]” amounts to nothing more than a legal conclusion devoid of factual content as
required by Twombly and Iqbal. In response, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint adequately states

a claim under the FMLA insofar as it “provides the Defendant with notice of: (1) the specific
Federal statute, (2) Plaintiff’s qualifications under the statute, (3) Plaintiff’s claim that Plaintiff
was terminated in violation of the statute, and (4) Plaintiff’s specific claims for relief.” (Resp. to
Mot. to Dismiss, DN 6, at 6). Because Plaintiff’s bare allegation that he was terminated in
violation of the FMLA provides absolutely no basis for concluding that his FMLA claim is
plausible within the meaning of Twombly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to
adequately state a claim for relief. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss will be granted with
respect to Plaintiff’s FMLA claim.
The Court will next address the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s KCRA disability
discrimination claim. According to Defendant, dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff has failed
to adequately plead that he suffered a “disability” as defined by the KCRA. In response, Plaintiff
argues that his Complaint adequately pleaded his disability by stating that “[Defendant]
perceived and regarded [him] and being disabled.” (Complaint, DN 1-2, at ¶ 7).
Although it is true that the KCRA defines disability as including “[b]eing regarded as
having… a physical or mental impairment,” the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s bare allegation
that Defendant perceived and regarded him as being disabled contains insufficient factual content
to state a claim for relief under the KCRA. To be sufficient, Plaintiff’s Complaint should have
included facts related to the reasons for which Defendant perceived him as being disabled as well
as Plaintiff’s basis for alleging that Defendant so perceived him. Without such facts, Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief under Twombly. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss will be granted with respect to Plaintiff’s KCRA disability discrimination claim.
A separate order will be entered in accordance with this opinion.

C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
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May 23, 2014