Scott v. Minsin
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge John G. Heyburn II. The complaint will be dismissed by separate Order on initial screening. cc:Plaintiff, pro se (ERH)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV-P209-H
AVREN LAMONT SCOTT
PLAINTIFF
v.
SGT. JAMES MINSIN
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Avren Lamont Scott filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding
in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action.
I.
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR). He sues Defendant Sgt.
James Minsin, whom he identifies as a sergeant at KSR, in his individual and official capacities.
He reports that on January 17, 2013, he was housed in a KSR unit under “(one on one) watch”
with an “Inmate watcher . . . watching me at the time do to my suicidal thoughts.” He states that
he asked Defendant Minsin for some ice but that Defendant Minsin responded, “‘Im not no
f***** made.’” Plaintiff states, “So I asked him what the difference between me and another
Inmate name Gilbert . . . which he give Ice all the time to, and he stated ‘cause you a n******.’
So I felt emotional disturbed right away and I felt Discriminated against . . . .” Plaintiff contends
that he asked Defendant Minsin to speak to a captain and that Minsin denied his request. He
maintains that this is not the first time Defendant Minsin used a racial slur against a black
inmate. Plaintiff states that he has the right to be free from discrimination.
II.
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
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III.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law,
causes the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. A
claim under § 1983 must therefore allege two elements: (1) the deprivation of federal statutory
or constitutional rights by (2) a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Absent either
element, no § 1983 claim exists. Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Eighth Amendment proscribes punishments which involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). However, harassing or
degrading language by a prison official, while unprofessional and despicable, does not amount to
a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2004);
Violett v. Reynolds, 76 F. App’x 24, 27 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[V]erbal abuse and harassment do not
constitute punishment that would support an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Ivey v. Wilson, 832
F.2d 950, 954-55 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Searcy v. Gardner, No. 3:07-0361, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118217, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 11, 2008) (“A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be
based on mere threats, abusive language, racial slurs, or verbal harassment by prison officials.”).
Therefore, while the alleged conduct by Defendant is offensive and despicable, it does not state a
constitutional violation.
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:
June 5, 2014
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4412.010
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