Heath v. Klein et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge John G. Heyburn, II on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). By separate Order, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous. cc: Plaintiff, pro se (SG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
SHY HEATH

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-255-H

MICHELLE KLEIN et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Shy Heath, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint alleging violations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons
set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff sues the following Louisville Metro police detectives: Michelle Klein, David
Haight, Darrin Balthrop, Ed Louden, and Carl Payne. The statement-of-the-claim(s) portion of
his complaint states in toto:
The Defendants violated the following civil rights complaint Title
42 U.S.C. 1983. On July 26, 2006 [Defendants] violated Plaintiff
constitutional rights under (5) claims of invasion of privacy Fourth
Amendment violation (6) claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment Fourth Amendment violation (7) claims of excessive
and unreasonable use of force Fourth Amendment violation.
As relief, he asks for monetary and punitive damages.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604-05. Upon review, this Court must dismiss a case at any time if
the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may,
therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory
or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a
plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as
true. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A complaint, or portion
thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted “only
if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).
Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations period, but it is well settled
that constitutional claims asserted under § 1983 are governed by the state personal injury statute
of limitations. Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261, 280 (1985)); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Personal injury actions in Kentucky “shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of
action accrued.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1).
Though the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state law, the “date on

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which the statute of limitations begins to run in a § 1983 action is a question of federal law.”
Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (2007) (citing Kuhnle
Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 1997)). “[I]t is the standard rule that
accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action . . . that is, when the
plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citing Bay
Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
The Court finds that the one-year statute of limitations on all of Plaintiff’s claims began
to run on July 26, 2006. See Harper v. Jackson, 293 F. App’x 389, 391 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008)
(noting statute of limitations on illegal search and seizure claim begins to run on the date of the
search and seizure); Fox v. Desoto, 489 F.3d at 233 (holding claims for false arrest, excessive
force, and false imprisonment under Section 1983 accrue at the time of the arrest or no later than
the first judicial proceeding subsequent to arrest). However, Plaintiff did not file his complaint
until March 17, 2014, well outside of the one-year period.
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a court may raise the issue
sua sponte if the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint. Fields v. Campbell, 39 F.
App’x 221, 223 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Haskell v. Washington Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1273 (6th
Cir. 1988)). Consequently, by separate Order, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous.
Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001).

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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Date:

August 6, 2014

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4412.009

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