Weber v. Louisville Metro Police Department

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) finding dismissal appropriate. The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendant (SG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
GARY DEWAYNE WEBER

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-315-S

LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Gary Dewayne Weber, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint (DN 1).
This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff’s complaint names as Defendant the Louisville Metro Police Department.
Plaintiff alleges that “the police” have been making problems, starting fights with “people” about
Plaintiff, and following Plaintiff around. He states that “they just robbed me using the law.” He
continues: “[T]hey planted drugs on me in Carrollton then the police in Louisville help them to
do it.” He states that “they wont let me spong my records” and that they start fights with other
people in the jail in Louisville and Carrollton. Plaintiff alleges that “they make it were I don’t
get a job they stay outside my job if I do and I have told other police and the bad wons keep
turning up.” He states that “they” attacked him “in jail the guards for no reason and
kidnapping.” He asks to press charges and for $75,000.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint1 which is nearly identical to the original complaint

1

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
[before service of the complaint].”).

except that it clarifies that he wishes to sue the Louisville Metro Police Department Second
Division and also wishes to sue the Carrollton Circuit Court in Carrollton, Kentucky.
II. ANALYSIS
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint must contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, “a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory allegations or bare legal
conclusions will not suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 F. App’x 501, 505
(6th Cir. 2009); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to provide material facts in support of any viable legal
theory. Plaintiff fails to place either Defendant on notice as to any claim(s) against them,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (indicating that the short and plain
statement of claim must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests’”) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated on
other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly), and the complaint is simply too vague and
sketchy to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the
duty “does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19
(1st Cir. 1979). Additionally, this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v.

2

Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To do so would require the
“courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also
transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate
seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City
of Hampton,775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Finally, Plaintiff may not ask this Court to press charges. “It is well settled that the
question of whether and when prosecution is to be instituted is within the discretion of the
Attorney General.” Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 906 (1966). The Court does not have the power to direct that criminal charges be filed.
Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1970); Fleetwood v. Thompson, 358 F. Supp.
310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
III. CONCLUSION
The Court will enter an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:

August 1, 2014

C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
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Plaintiff, pro se
Defendant
4411.009

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