Sneed v. Kentucky State Reformatory Medical in Segregation et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. The Court construes the 8 9 10 letters as motions to amend the complaint and GRANTS the motions to amend; construes the 13 affidavit as a motion to supplement and GRANTS th e motion to supplement; and GRANTS 17 motion to amend the complaint. On initial review the complaint, its four amendments, and its supplement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court will dismiss the action. A separate Order of dismissal will be entered. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Justice & Public Safety Cabinet (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION

ROBERT EDWARD SNEED
v.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV-P571-JHM

KENTUCKY STATE REFORMATORY MEDICAL
IN SEGREGATION et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert Edward Sneed filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 1). Thereafter, he filed three letters (DNs 8, 9 & 10). The Court construes
the letters as motions to amend the complaint and GRANTS the motions to amend (DNs 8, 9 &
10). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)-(2). He also filed an affidavit (DN 13) raising matters
occurring since the filing of the complaint. The Court construes the affidavit as a motion to
supplement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d), and GRANTS the motion to supplement (DN 13).
Lastly, he filed a motion to amend the complaint (DN 17). The Court GRANTS the fourth
motion to amend (DN 17). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the complaint, its four amendments, and its
supplement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that
follow, the Court will dismiss the action.

I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate currently incarcerated at the Kentucky State Reformatory
(KSR). In the caption of the complaint, as Defendant, he names “Kentucky State Reformatory
Medical in Segregation [] At Kentucky State Reformatory.” In the parties’ section of the
complaint form, he names “Segregation Medical . . . Doctors And Nurses at Kentucky State
Reformatory” and “Guard’s over Segregation.” He sues Defendants in their individual and
official capacities.
Complaint (DN 1)
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
I . . . was in segregation 1 – one- R03 in June of 2014 when [KSR] put
Danny Burkeen in segregation 1 – one-R04 in June of 2014 Danny Burkeen
had M.A.R.S.A.1 a fleash eating “deaease” not sure of spelling I cought that
from Danny Burkeen I putt in a medical slip, First one of the nurses told me
I had jock each, They took a culture it came back and said probale yeast
Now I was married I know a woman can get yeast but not a man . . . . The
way the Medical Department treated me was to give me some save for jock
each in fact the Medical Department in segragation at [KSR] does not no
what ive cought from Danny Burkeen He got transferd to Little Sandy C.C.
yesterday But he told me he would be a witness for me as to him having
M.A.R.S.A.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that in KSR segregation there are bugs “as big as my thum”
and spiders. He reports being bitten by a spider in his cell.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages.
First and Third Amendments to the Complaint (DNs 8 & 10)
In both amendments, Plaintiff alleges that he is “not guilty of the crime the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Harlan County . . . said [he] committed.” To his first amendment,
he attaches documents, which he claims “prove without a doubt that [he] could not have
committed the crime under CR-92-00197.” He states, “I understand about the one year but does
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The Court presumes Plaintiff is referring to methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).
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the Commonwealth keep a innonce man in prison because of one year.” In one of the
attachments, he also indicates that he seeks monetary and punitive damages.
Second Amendment to the Complaint (DN 9)
In this document, Plaintiff again alleges that after Inmate Burkeen, who purportedly had
MRSA, was placed in a cell next to Plaintiff, Plaintiff filled out a medical slip and then the
following events occurred:
First a Nurse came on Segragtion 1 one and with out looking at the part of
my body that was eching told Robert Edward Sneed all he had was Jock
ech, Then I was sent to see Doctor KAD My provder He said along with
Doctor Elaine Smith that I . . . had a yeast infection I ask for a second
Doctor to look at the eching on my body and medical in segragtion at
[KSR] said No that I . . . would have to go with and eccept what Medical in
Segregation at [KSR] said the eching was, so I did not get a second Doctor
to look at the eching I got while I . . . was in Medical Care in Segregation at
[KSR] . . . .
Plaintiff additionally reports that he has three witnesses “as to the bad and nasty buges
and spiders in segregation” at KSR.
Supplement to the Complaint (DN 13)
Plaintiff alleges that on December 3, 2014, he was placed in “segregation 1 one” and was
in “Seg 1 one over 6 ore 7 hours without my personal property.” He continues,
[I] ask time after time about toilet paper AND bedding I was told when thay
got time out of about 30 CO work at segregation Now I ask the Hon Court
out of 30 officers one did not have time to bring the plaintiff toilet paper
and bedding is that no indifference Kentucky State Reformatory and
Segregation are doing the plaintiff this way because plaintiff filed a law suit
314-cv-00571[.]
Fourth Amendment to the Complaint (DN 17)
In his last amendment, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of $75
million and demands a jury trial.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore, 114 F.3d at 604.
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, 557).

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III. ANALYSIS
A. Official-Capacity Claims
As state officials sued in their official capacity for damages, Defendants KSR medical
employees and guards are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994).
Furthermore, official-capacity claims for damages against state officials are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“This [Eleventh Amendment] bar remains in effect when
State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.”). Accordingly, the officialcapacity claims for damages against all Defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim
and for seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
B. Claim of Actual Innocence
Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994), any civil rights claim which would
necessarily call into question the validity of a criminal conviction is not cognizable until that
conviction is reversed or otherwise vacated. The Heck Court held:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). If a ruling on a § 1983 claim would necessarily
imply the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the § 1983 claim
must be dismissed, not for lack of exhaustion of state remedies, but because it is simply not
cognizable until the criminal judgment has been terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 487.
The requirement that the prior criminal action ended favorably for the accused “‘avoids parallel
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litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt . . . and it precludes the possibility of the
claimant [] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal
prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.’” Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
In the present case, a ruling by the Court that Plaintiff is actually innocent of a prior
conviction would necessarily render that conviction invalid. “[C]ivil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . . .” Id. at
486. Plaintiff gives no indication that his criminal conviction has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of actual innocence is not cognizable in this § 1983 action and will
be dismissed.
C. Claim Regarding Medical Treatment
In the context of a § 1983 claim for inadequate medical care, prison personnel violate a
prisoner’s civil rights if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976). However, not every claim of inadequate medical
treatment states an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 105. The indifference must be
substantial; that is, it must be an offense to evolving standards of decency. Id. at 106. A
patient’s disagreement with his physician over the proper medical treatment alleges no more than
a medical malpractice claim, which is a tort actionable in state court, but is not cognizable under
§ 1983. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 816 n.13 (6th Cir. 1996); Sanderfer v.
Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 154-55 (6th Cir. 1995). The question of whether diagnostic techniques or
other forms of treatment are indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. At
most, a medical decision not to order an x-ray or like measures represents medical malpractice.
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Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Furthermore, allegations of “inadvertent failure to provide adequate
medical care” or of a negligent diagnosis or treatment of a prisoner fail to state a cause of action
under § 1983. Id. at 105-06. Simply stated, “medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Id. at 106.
Here, Plaintiff speculates that in June 2014 he contracted an infection from another
inmate. He reports submitting a medical slip; a nurse opining that it was jock itch and dispensing
salve; a culture being taken; and two doctors diagnosing him with a yeast infection. The record
clearly reflects that Plaintiff received treatment. He simply disagrees with this treatment and
diagnosis, and in his multiple amendments, he does not complain of any continued medical
issues. “Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the
adequacy of treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments
and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857,
860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
For these reasons, the Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical treatment will be
dismissed.
D. Claim of Bugs and Spiders in Segregation
The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane
conditions of confinement; [these] officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). In order to state a valid conditions-of-confinement claim under the
Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the conditions were so serious that they
constituted a denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) the prison

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officials acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99 (1991)
(citation omitted).
While some courts have found that prolonged pest infestation may constitute a
deprivation sufficient state a constitutional violation, see, e.g., Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894
(7th Cir. 2008), the conditions described by Plaintiff fall far short of a denial of the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th
Cir.1996) (allegation of “sixteen months of infestation and significant physical harm” stated
claim for inhuman conditions of confinement). He alleges that on a single occasion he was
bitten by a spider, and he does not indicate that he requested or required medical treatment for
this incident. He also does not allege he advised any KSR employee of the spider/bug problems
in segregation or that anyone failed to take any action regarding those conditions. Although the
presence of bugs and spiders in a cell would certainly be unpleasant, Plaintiff has not alleged
facts rising to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim, and this claim will be dismissed.
E. Claims Pertaining to December 3, 2014, Placement in Segregation
Plaintiff’s claim that his personal property (including toilet paper and bedding) was
withheld from him for six to seven hours does not state an Eighth Amendment claim given its
short duration.
As to his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged in protected
conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in
part, by the protected conduct. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
Filing a federal lawsuit is protected conduct. However, the Court concludes that KSR’s
withholding of Plaintiff’s personal property (including toilet paper and bedding) for six to seven
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hours fails to constitute an adverse action. Accordingly, the retaliation claim will also be
dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order.
Date:

March 12, 2015

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4414.005

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