D.H. v. Matti et al

Filing 60

MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 9/30/2016, re Defendant Stratford Young's 55 MOTION TO DISMISS, and Defendant Todd Matti's 56 MOTION TO DISMISS. cc: Counsel (RLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
D.H., a minor, by and through
RICHARD HARRIS,

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-732-CRS

v.

TODD MATTI, et al.,

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is in front of the Court on two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by Defendants Stratford Young and Todd
Matti. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 55 & 56. The Court ruled on two similar motions on
November 23, 2015 and March 7, 2016 against Defendants Jerry Clanton and Chris Woosley.
ECF No. 41 & 50. The allegations in the complaint against Defendants Young and Matti nearly
mirror those that the Court dismissed for failure to state a claim against Defendants Clanton and
Woosley.
In both rulings, the Court dismissed the claims without prejudice because Plaintiff failed
to plead sufficient facts in her complaint to state a claim for relief. Ruling on Clanton’s motion,
the Court noted, “While the allegations in this matter are serious, Plaintiff’s counsel has asserted
many legally deficient claims. Indeed, Plaintiff includes factual allegations in her response to
Clanton’s motion to dismiss that may better serve Plaintiff in her complaint.” Nov. 23, 2015
Mem. Op. and Order 2, ECF No. 41. In ruling on Woosley’s motion, the Court similarly
remarked, “Instead of moving to amend the complaint to cure its deficiencies, Plaintiff’s counsel
provided factual allegations in motion practice.” Mar. 7, 2016 Mem. Op. and Order 1, ECF No.
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50. Once again, Plaintiff’s counsel has used her responses to the present motions to dismiss to
assert additional factual allegations, which the Court may not consider. For the reasons stated
below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motions and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Young
and Matti without prejudice.
I.

Procedural and Factual Background
Plaintiff D.H., a minor proceeding through Richard Harris, alleged over one hundred fifty

causes of action in this case against nine defendants. Plaintiff originally filed this action in
Meade County Circuit Court, and Defendants properly removed it to this Court. The complaint
asserts federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well
as related state claims of wrongful imprisonment, assault, battery, negligent hiring, training, and
supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court has dismissed the
majority of these claims. See Mar. 7, 2016 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 50; Nov. 23, 2015
Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 41; July 27, 2015, Order, ECF No. 36.
This Court has issued multiple opinions in the life of this case. At this stage of litigation,
it is unnecessary to rehash the factual narrative. See July 27, 2015 Mem. Op. 2–5, ECF No. 35.
For ease of reference, however, this Court notes that Defendant Young was a Kentucky State
Police Trooper and Defendant Matti was a Police Officer for the Police Department of the City
of Brandenburg during the period of these allegations. Plaintiff sued them in their individual and
official capacities. This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official
capacities. See July 27, 2015 Order, ECF No. 36. Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Defendants
Young and Matti in their individual capacities are for wrongful imprisonment, assault, battery,
and violation of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983.

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II.

Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “apply to a civil action after it is removed from a

state court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1).1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
Court must determine whether the complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Although
the complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The complaint must “give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court does not consider facts or additional documents included in a response to a
motion to dismiss that are not alleged, or at least referenced, in the pleadings. See In re Fair
Finance Co., No. 15-3854, 2016 WL 4437606, at *1 n.1 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016). “Matters

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As the Court pointed out in the last two memorandum opinions, Plaintiff’s continued assertion
that this Court should analyze the complaint under the less stringent Kentucky pleading standard
is incorrect. When in federal court, the complaint is not “considered by the applicable standard
where the Complaint was initially filed.” Pl.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 58; Pl.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 59.
Instead, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in federal court after removal, including in
determining whether a complaint originally filed in state court states a claim for which relief can
be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1) & 12(b)(6).
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outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Id. Thus,
the Court will only consider the allegations in the four corners of Plaintiff’s complaint and will
not consider the factual matters Plaintiff now asserts in her responses to these motions to dismiss.
III.

Discussion
Defendants Young and Matti move this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The allegations in the
complaint against Defendants Young and Matti are nearly identical. The full extent of the
allegations against Defendant Young state:
38. Defendant Stratford Young, while in the course of his employment and duties
with the Kentucky State Police, wrongfully restrained the minor Plaintiff,
transported the Plaintiff, and sexually assaulted the minor Plaintiff on multiple
occasions.
....
41. That the allegations herein constitute a sexual assault upon the minor Plaintiff.
42. That the aforementioned acts and wrongful conduct of Defendants constituted
an assault and battery for which Plaintiff is entitled to damages alleged herein.
43. That the allegations herein constitute a wrongful detention or imprisonment of
Plaintiff, for which Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff in an amount to be
determined at trial.
44. That the acts and wrongful conduct of the Defendants constituted an
intentional infliction of emotional distress for which Plaintiff is entitled to
damages against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.
Compl. ¶¶ 38; 41–44, ECF No. 1-3. The full extent of the allegations against Defendant Matti
similarly state:
22. Defendant Todd Matti, while in the course of his employment and duties with
the Police Department of the City of Brandenburg, Kentucky, wrongfully
restrained the minor Plaintiff, transported the minor Plaintiff, and sexually
assaulted the minor Plaintiff.
....
26. That the aforementioned acts and wrongful conduct of Defendant Matti
constituted an assault and battery for which Plaintiff is entitled to damages alleged
herein.
27. That the allegations herein constitute a wrongful detention or imprisonment of
Plaintiff, for which Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff in an amount to be
determined at trial.
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28. That the allegations herein constitute a sexual assault upon the minor Plaintiff.
29. That the acts and wrongful conduct of the Defendants constituted an
intentional infliction of emotional distress for which Plaintiff is entitled to
damages against Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial.
Compl. ¶¶ 22; 26–29, ECF No. 1-3. Like Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Clanton and
Woosley, Plaintiff’s allegations here may generously be described as mere labels and
conclusions without sufficient factual support. Plaintiff does not address the elements of her
alleged causes of action and gives insufficient factual matter to “give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). While this Court does not require Plaintiff to plead detailed
factual allegations, Plaintiff must plead enough factual matter for the Court to determine whether
the complaint states “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not met this minimal pleading standard.2
It is perplexing that, after having been admonished by this Court for the same language in
the March 7, 2016 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Plaintiff’s counsel would persist in saying,
“Defendant . . . should be well aware of the allegations contained in the Complaint unless he is
involved in so many sexual assaults of minor children that he has difficulty recalling which
sexual assault of a minor female this Complaint addresses.” Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF
No. 58; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF No. 59. Again, this language is unnecessary
and ignores Plaintiff’s burden in federal court to plead in the complaint “factual content that
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Plaintiff asserts in her responses to these motions to dismiss that both Defendants here have
accepted plea agreements in the parallel criminal cases surrounding Defendants’ interactions
with Plaintiff. Such information, along with other facts alleged in Plaintiff’s responses, could
allow the Court to infer that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. However, these
criminal matters and factual allegations were not brought to the attention of the Court through
Plaintiff’s complaint. It is not the duty of this Court to independently investigate matters outside
the complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rather, this Court reiterates that the
allegations within the four corners of this complaint, unamended, fail to plead sufficient facts
necessary to state a claim.
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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (emphasis added).
IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim for relief against Defendants

Young and Matti under wrongful imprisonment, assault, battery, or violation of Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants Young and Matti without prejudice.
The Court will enter an order in accordance with this opinion.

September 30, 2016

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