Lawrence v. Grise et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge John G. Heyburn II. Plaintiff having failed to prosecute and to comply with a straightforward Court Order 4 containing an easily understood deadline, the action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14CV-P740-JGH

JOHN R. GRISE et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Marcus J. Lawrence, a pro se prisoner incarcerated at the Kentucky State
Reformatory (KSR), initiated this action by filing a handwritten document on his own paper
titled “Title 18 U.S.C.A. Motion, Writ Petition & Court Order for Violent Criminal Offense
Sanctions” (DN 1). On the first page of the document, Plaintiff additionally wrote, “Criminal &
Civil Complaint Against ‘Persons’ Listed as Defendants.” Shortly thereafter, he filed a virtually
identical complaint which was filed as an amended complaint (DN 3).
By Memorandum Opinion and Order entered January 6, 2015, the Court construed the
complaint and amended complaint as attempting to bring both a criminal and a civil action;
dismissed the criminal complaint and its amendment; and construed the civil complaint and its
amendment as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (DN 4). The Court ordered Plaintiff to file
his civil action on a § 1983 form; either to pay the $400 filing fee or file an application to
proceed without prepayment of fees along with a certified copy of his trust account statement;
and complete and return a summons form for each named Defendant. The Court warned
Plaintiff that his failure to comply with the Order within 30 days of its entry would result in
dismissal of the action. The 30-day compliance period has expired, and a review of the record
reveals that Plaintiff has failed to comply.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be entitled
to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal
training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements
that a layperson can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se
litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily
understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than
a represented litigant.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Additionally,
courts have inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that
have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.” Link
v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
Plaintiff having failed to prosecute and to comply with a straightforward Court Order
containing an easily understood deadline, the action will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

February 24, 2015

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4412.005

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