Lawrence v. Thompson et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale denying 32 Motion to Appoint Counsel. cc: Counsel; plaintiff pro se (JAC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-P919-DJH
Defendants.

LADONNA H. THOMPSON et al.,
*****
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Marcus J. Lawrence, a state prisoner, filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. This matter is before the Court upon a motion to appoint counsel (DN 32) by Plaintiff.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff states that he is entitled to counsel because this case
presents complex legal issues; because he is not allowed to use the legal library or a type-writer
at Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR), where he is incarcerated; and because Defendants have
counsel.
The law does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent plaintiffs in cases such
as this, see Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993), nor has Congress provided
funds with which to compensate lawyers who might agree to represent those plaintiffs. The
appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is not a constitutional right and is justified only by
exceptional circumstances. Id. at 605-06; see also Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th
Cir. 2003); Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382, 1384 (6th Cir. 1987) (“‘[T]he appointment of
counsel in a civil case is, as is the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis, a matter within the
discretion of the court. It is a privilege and not a right.’”) (quoting United States v. Madden, 352
F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965)). “In determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist,
courts have examined ‘the type of case and the abilities of the plaintiff to represent himself.’

This generally involves a determination of the ‘complexity of the factual and legal issues
involved.’” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, the Court finds that there are no exceptional circumstances warranting the
appointment of counsel at this time. Plaintiff’s described circumstances which he claims
necessitate the appointment of counsel are not atypical of prisoner litigants. See KnowlesBrowder v. Ca. Forensic Med. Group Staff, No. CIV S-05-1260, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20973,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2006) (“Most pro se litigants believe that their cases are complex, and
all prisoners find that their access to law libraries is limited.”). In addition, although Plaintiff
claims he has no access to the law library, his motions and briefs are replete with citations to
court cases and laws. Furthermore, most pro se litigants face defendants who are represented by
counsel. Finally, based on a review of the documents filed by Plaintiff thus far, it appears that he
is logical in his arguments and familiar with the workings of the legal system and, therefore, able
to represent himself sufficiently at this time.
In his motion, Plaintiff also requests that Defendants’ counsel, Oran S. McFarlan, III,
(Attorney McFarlan) be added as a defendant in this case. However, Plaintiff has stated no
legitimate reason for such and the Court has already instructed Plaintiff that he may not add
parties to this action by adding them to the caption of his filings. As such, Attorney McFarlan
shall not be considered a party to this action.

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For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Appoint Counsel (DN 32) is DENIED.
Date:

January 23, 2016

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of Record
4415.011

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