Brown v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge David J. Hale on screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the action will be dismissed by separate Order.cc: Plaintiff, pro se (SG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
LAVON LEE BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-P198-DJH

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,

Defendant.
* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Lavon Lee Brown, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections, sues the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, which he states is employed as “prosecutors.” Plaintiff alleges that
on November 17, 2014, he was acquitted of certain charges. He states that, “[w]hile on my way
to trial I have encountered death in my family, been emotionally ‘stressed out,’ and prosecutors
defamined my character. I was scared for life because these charges carried 20 to 50 to life in
prison.” He further states, “I feel like I should be compensated for my being unlawfully and
unwillingly imprisoned.” As relief, he seeks monetary and punitive damages.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the
Commonwealth of Kentucky for monetary damages by operation of the Eleventh Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. That amendment specifically prohibits federal courts from entertaining
suits brought directly against the states. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 687-88 (1993) (“Absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting
under its control may be subject to suit in federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); Daleure v. Kentucky, 119 F. Supp. 2d 683, 687 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
Although the Eleventh Amendment does not address the situation where a state’s own
citizen initiates suit against it, case law has interpreted the amendment in such a way as to
foreclose that possibility. Barton v. Summers, 293 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). The Sixth Circuit has opined that “[a] state is sovereign within
the structure of the federal system, and ‘it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be

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amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.’” Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)).
Because Plaintiff’s claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court will dismiss those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaint is against the Commonwealth through its role as
prosecutor in a criminal case. Where a prosecutor acts in his or her role as an advocate, i.e.,
initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and presenting the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s
case, the prosecutor enjoys absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
427-28 (1976); see also Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
prosecutors were absolutely immune from claims alleging that they conspired to knowingly bring
false charges despite claims of failure to investigate facts and alleged commission of perjury
before the grand jury). For this reason as well, dismissal is appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will by separate Order dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.
Date:

May 22, 2015

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4415.009

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