Manion v. JCIM et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 6/13/2016; re 11 MOTION to Dismiss filed by JCIM ; separate judgment and order shall issue.cc:counsel, plaintiff pro se (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-00216-TBR
JAMES MANION

Plaintiff

v.
JCIM,

Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (DN 11). Plaintiff

has not responded and the time for doing so has elapsed. For the following reasons, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss (DN 11) will be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Manion, pro se, filed this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. (DN 1). Manion alleges that Defendant JCIM US, LLC (“JCIM”) discriminated against
him on the basis of his race and sex. Specifically, Manion alleges he was told he would be
trained to work on a forklift, but that “Mack Litteral didn’t let me, but brouth (sic) in a white lady
in and put her on it.” (DN 1). Litteral also allegedly accused Manion of being unable to get
along with women. Manion also alleges that two supervisors, “Dekita Phipps” and “Coivin
Arnld,” used profanity towards him. (DN 1).
Manion filed a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”). On September 4, 2014, the EEOC dismissed
Manion’s claim and notified him of his right to sue. (DN 1-1). On March 18, 2015, Manion

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filed this action. JCIM now moves to dismiss on the basis that Manion’s claims are time-barred.
Manion has not responded and the time to do so has elapsed.
STANDARD
“When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the district court must accept all of the allegations in the complaint as true, and
construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff.” Lawrence v. Chancery Court of Tenn.,
188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Denial of the motion is proper “unless it can be established beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Achterhof v.
Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 831 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957)). Nonetheless, unwarranted factual inferences or legal conclusions masquerading as fact
will not prevent a motion to dismiss. Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853, 863 (6th Cir. 2002).
A “complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material
elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803,
806 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993)).
DISCUSSION
Manion filed this action claiming age and race discrimination. JCIM now moves to
dismiss on the basis that Manion’s claims are barred because he did not timely file this action
after receiving his Notice of Right to Sue.
“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 embodies Congress’ intent and preference that
discrimination complaints be resolved through the administrative process rather than through
litigation.” Jackson v. Richards Medical Co., 961 F.2d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 1992); Morgan v.
Washington Mfg. Co., 660 F.2d 710, 711 (6th Cir. 1981). “To this end, Congress required that a
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series of conditions be fulfilled before a Title VII suit can be brought by a private party.”
Jackson, 961 F.2d at 581. “[T]he party claiming discrimination must file a charge with the
Commission within a specified period of time after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). “The Commission must then determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, whereupon the Commission may either
bring an action against the charged party or dismiss the charge.” Id. (citing § 2000e-5(f)(1)). If
the charge is dismissed the EEOC shall issue to the charging party a Notice of Right to Sue. Id.
“Only after these steps have been completed may the charging party bring a civil action, and
even then, they must file the complaint within ninety days of receiving the right to sue letter.”
Id. “Compliance with this limitation period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 is a precondition to
asserting a private Title VII action.” Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (W.D.
Tenn. 1975) (quoting Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84 (5th Cir., 1973)).
In this case, Manion has not complied with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The
EEOC dismissed Manion’s claim and issued a Notice of Right to Sue on September 4, 2014.
(DN 1-1). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), Manion was required to file a civil action within
ninety days after receiving the Notice of Right to Sue. Minor v. Northville Public Schools, 605
F. Supp. 1185, 1190-94 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires that any
civil action arising under the statute be filed within 90 days after receipt of a right to sue
‘notice.’”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Manion did not file this action until March 18,
2015—more than six months after he received notice. Accordingly, the Court is required to
dismiss Manion’s claim. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984)
(dismissing claim filed on the 96th day after receipt of right-to-sue letter and stating

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“[p]rocedural requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are
not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (DN 11) will be GRANTED.
A separate judgment and order shall issue.

cc:

Counsel
James Manion
1758 Dixdale Ave
Louisville, KY 40210 

June 13, 2016

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