Whittle et al v. Braggs et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell. For the reasons set forth herein, abstention is appropriate, and the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff Ranesha Whittle, pro se (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
RANESHA WHITTLE

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15CV-263-TBR

ADRIANNE BRAGGS et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff Ranesha Whittle’s pro se
amended complaint1 (DN 5) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the
Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this matter.
I.
Plaintiff filed her amended complaint on a general complaint form. As the grounds for
filing this case in federal court, Plaintiff states, “False diagnose For Mental retardation and False
allegations of Neglect of my child Violation of due process and cps worker Stalking my home
and constantly calling my phone without reason specified.” As Defendants, she names the
following: Adrianne Braggs, “my children paternal grandmother”; Amy Gardner and Terri
Watkins with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS); Judge Dolly Wiseman Berry;
Attorneys Russell Ziano and Ellen Friedman; Emily Garrison, CPS (presumably, Child
Protective Services) investigator; and Karen Eisenmenger, psychologist.

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Unrepresented by counsel, two Plaintiffs—Ranesha Whittle and Octavia Whittle—filed a pro se civil
complaint. Both were listed as Plaintiffs in the caption and parties’ section of the general complaint form,
and both signed the complaint. However, on review of the allegations in the complaint, the Court was
unable to discern which Plaintiff was making which allegations or why they were filing the complaint
together. For this reason, among others, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint
clarifying their claims. Only Ranesha Whittle complied. Thus, by Order entered June 19, 2015 (DN 6),
the Court dismissed Plaintiff Octavia Whittle from this action.

In the statement-of-claim portion of the complaint form, Plaintiff claims as follows:
My right haven’t been terminated yet, but they’re Looking Forward to do so
on Aug 11, 2015.2 Dolly Wiseman Berry is involved because she is the
sitting Judge in this case, For which I’ve be denied my civil rights and
constitution. However I wasn’t able to defend myself against the accusers.
Amy Gardner and Terri Watkins are ssw/cps worker who allegly stated
False accusations, and I believe that Adrianne Braggs who called cps on me
are Friends with Terri Watkins and Amy Gardner which is Conflict-ofinterest. my case had already been Jepardized Russell Ziano is the Father
lawyer who presented False documents to help keep the Fathers rights
although the Father never completed his court orders which is Adrianne
Braggs son. Emily Garrison is an investigator that allegly took the case
when Adrianne called cps I believe Adrianne has a vindetta with getting
my kids. She called cps on me three times with False accusations. I have
the cps reports. Karen Eisenmenger is a state psychologist who presented a
False evaluation.
Plaintiff requests the following injunctive relief: Defendant Judge Berry “to be removed
From my case as my Judge”; “cps workers to explain why they lied on my case and to explain
why they’re on my case”; Defendant Braggs “to pay For what she did”; Defendant Russell “to
explain to me why he present False documents”; and Defendant Eisenmenger “to explain the
False diagnose she presented.”
II.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her amended
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On review, a district court must dismiss a case at any time
if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In the original complaint, Plaintiff stated that she wanted her “children to get to come home” and that
“their trying to Terminate my parental Rights.” In the Court’s May 7, 2015, Order directing Plaintiff to
file an amended complaint, the Court ordered Plaintiff to advise whether there is an already terminated
and/or a pending state court action pertaining to the facts alleged in the complaint. This appears to be
Plaintiff’s response to the Court’s inquiry.
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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as
true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting
Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
III.
Because Plaintiff alleges that several state employees denied and are denying her civil
and constitutional rights, including her right to due process, in state-court, child-custody
proceedings, the Court liberally construes the complaint as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983. Vistein v. Am. Registry of Radiologic Technologists, 342 F. App’x 113, 127 (6th Cir.
2009) (“To proceed on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a person
acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.”); Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n cases
where a plaintiff states a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that statute is the exclusive
remedy for the alleged constitutional violations.”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488
U.S. 1036 (1989).
Because Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief asking this federal Court to interfere in
pending state-court, child-custody proceedings, this action is barred by the Younger abstention
doctrine.
“Younger abstention requires a federal court to abstain from granting injunctive or
declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.” O’Neill v.
Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41
(1971)). “Three factors determine whether a federal court should abstain from interfering in a
state court action.” Fieger v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2008). Those factors are
“(1) whether the underlying proceedings constitute an ongoing judicial proceeding, (2) whether
the proceedings implicate an important state interest, and (3) whether there is an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise a constitutional challenge.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, the state-court case is pending. Additionally, important state
interests are implicated in adjudicating pending family-court matters. See Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (recognizing that “[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state
concern”); Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir.
2001) (“Indeed, cases out of the Supreme Court and this Court make it clear that abstention is

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generally appropriate in matters of family relations such as child custody.”). Finally, Plaintiff
offers no argument that Kentucky appellate courts will not fully and fairly litigate her
constitutional claims.
For these reasons, abstention is appropriate, and the Court will dismiss this action by
separate Order. See Shafizadeh v. Bowles, 476 F. App’x 71, 73 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Beltran v.
California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Younger abstention requires dismissal of the
federal action.”)); Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Court of Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x at 206 (“Based
on abstention, it was proper to dismiss the parents’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.”).
Date:

July 15, 2015

cc:
Plaintiff Ranesha Whittle, pro se
4413.005

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