Flint v. Chauvin

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale granting 4 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 5 Motion for Sanctions. This Court imposes prefiling restrictions on Plaintiff. Further, on or before April 29, 2016, Plaintiff shall pay the full balance of all financial sanctions, including those imposed herein, totaling $4,700. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Counsel (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
EDWARD H. FLINT,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-381-DJH

MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE,

Defendant.
* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Edward H. Flint has a long history of filing pro se complaints in this Court
against judges and public officials, and prior lawsuits have been dismissed and sanctions
imposed. Plaintiff’s current complaint alleges bias and other misdeeds by Defendant Jefferson
County Circuit Court Judge McKay Chauvin. Defendant Judge Chauvin, by counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss (DN 4) and a motion for sanctions (DN 5). Plaintiff filed a response (DNs 7
& 8) to each motion; Defendant Judge Chauvin filed replies (DNs 9 & 10); and Plaintiff filed
sur-replies (DNs 11 & 12). The motions are ripe for determination. Because Plaintiff’s
complaint is frivolous, baseless, and abusive, it will be dismissed, and additional sanctions will
be imposed.
I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In the complaint, Plaintiff reports that he has filed a number of complaints in Jefferson
Circuit Court that were assigned to Defendant Judge Chauvin. He alleges that “Defendant
despised Plaintiff, because the Plaintiff had sued a number of his Jefferson County fellow judges,
for being corrupt and for violating the Constitutions, statutes and Court rules. The Plaintiff also
sued the Defendant himself once.” He states that Defendant “was Chief Judge in the Jefferson

County Circuit Court, and his actions as Chief Judge harmed Plaintiff and denies Plaintiff civil
rights.”
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Judge Chauvin “took advantage of Plaintiff being pro, se.
and not educated in legal law” and “because of Plaintiff’s age.” In addition, he claims that
Defendant Judge Chauvin’s “odium of him, cause Defendant to discriminate against Flint by
conspiring with Counsels in these cases for the Defendants, because they were licensed attorneys
and he could control their actions” and that Defendant’s “actions in the case as a judge, was bias,
because of his hatred of the Plaintiff.”
Further, alleges Plaintiff, Defendant Judge Chauvin refused to recuse himself, and “[a]t
that point Plaintiff appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals. At the point the case was
appealed Defendant Chauvin lost jurisdiction of the case, but refuse to stop and kept issuing
orders.” Plaintiff continues:
Defendant had Plaintiff order to jail, even though the hearing was not in his
jurisdiction[.] Plaintiff was put into jail and was denied food to eat and medication
for the severe pain he has . . . . Plaintiff alleges that Judge Chauvin refused to
listen to Plaintiff when Plaintiff wanted to defend himself at a hearing, and the
hearing was not in Judge Chauvin Jurisdiction . . . . Plaintiff alleges that at the
illegal hearing he tried to tell Judge C[h]auvin he had a physical problem
concerning be put in jail. Judge Chauvin commented and I quote, “you sure do
have a problems,” With no concern about what jail would do to Plaintiff . . . .
Plaintiff alleges that at the illegal hearing, Judge Chauvin not only refused to list
to Plaintiff but he manipulator the courts video and sound system and at that
hearing, when he turned off the sound and video system, he threaten to get
Plaintiff. Judge Chauvin turned the system on and off to only show what he
wanted shown on the video. He deceived the court as well as the Plaintiff . . . .
Plaintiff allergies that Judge Chauvin at the illegel hearing ordered Plaintiff to
write a letter explaining why Judge Chauvin should not put him back in jail again.
Plaintiff had a document that he had filed, but Judge Chauvin realizing how badly
he handled the whole mess, stated he was withdrawing the order. After he greatly
harmed Plaintiff he pranced over the entire jail thing, saying he was mandating
back the order, but never once saying he was sorry . . . . Plaintiff alleges the
Defendants conspired with Counsels on how to best handle the case to make sure
Plaintiff Flint lost the case and hurt Flint.
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Plaintiff contends that Defendant Judge Chauvin violated 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C.
§ 242,1 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 28 U.S.C. § 1443, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that
Defendant’s actions caused him “great mental stress.”
As relief, Plaintiff demands a jury trial; that Defendant Judge Chauvin “resigns as a judge
in Kentucky and never run for an elected office again or appointed to a civil office again”; that
Defendant Judge Chauvin be disbarred from practicing law; that this Court impose “the
maximum sentence on the Defendant” for violation of his civil rights; that “[a]ny and all
retirement benefits that may be due Defendant Chauvin, from being a judge, is taken away from
him forever”; and that Plaintiff be awarded costs and all other relief to which he may be entitled.
In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Judge Chauvin indicates that although not so
specified in the complaint, it appears that the instant suit against him stems from Plaintiff’s
recent case against Coach House, Inc., Jefferson Circuit Court Case No. 15-CI-571. Defendant
advises that while that case was ongoing, Plaintiff was held in contempt of court for willful
disobedience and disrespect towards the court at the court’s motion hour on March 23, 2015.
Defendant reports that after repeated requests for Plaintiff to leave the courtroom and Plaintiff’s
repeated refusal to comply, Plaintiff was jailed for 24 hours. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and is barred by sovereign and
judicial immunities.
Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss primarily rehashes the allegations he made in
his complaint. He continues to claim that Defendant Judge Chauvin “didn’t have at times and
still don’t have jurisdiction of this case. Some cases are on appeal at this time. Some actions by

1

Plaintiff actually alleges a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 242, but no such statute exists. The Court presumes
that Plaintiff intended to allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 and will construe it as such.

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the Defendants were done, when CR 76.03(3) is clear that it wasn’t in the defendant’s
jurisdiction until the higher courts return it to him.” He also alleges that “CD evidence videos
will show and prove that [] Defendant was forcing Plaintiff Flint to do things that was not in his
jurisdiction” and that “videos and pleadings will show and prove that the Defendant violated the
sworn duties that the justice system demands from judges and attorneys.” Further, he states,
“Defendants at times didn’t have jurisdiction, but wanted the power, like Hitler had. Plaintiff
Flint knows how Hitler operated he lived through it and it is something he will never forget and
fight at all cost.” He also states, “At trial the evidence will show and prove that the Defendant
constantly brow beat the Plaintiff”; that “The devil would have received better treatment in Judge
Chauvin’s Court that the Plaintiff did”; and that “This case was handled by the Defendant in the
style of Judge Roy Beam, who did as he pleased, many years ago in West Texas.”
In reply, Defendant Judge Chauvin asserts that Plaintiff’s response, like his complaint, is
filled with baseless allegations. He states that while it is apparent that Plaintiff is unhappy with
decisions made by him in state-court case(s), adverse rulings do not give Plaintiff a viable claim.
Further, Defendant Judge Chauvin argues that Plaintiff has provided no facts supporting his
allegation that Defendant lacked jurisdiction over his case.
In a sur-reply, Plaintiff claims that “Defendants in their reply are trying to get this court
to buy their statements as true without evidence being submitted by the Plaintiff.”
II. ANALYSIS
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether
the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this plausibility standard, a plaintiff must “plead[]
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint that merely offers “‘naked assertions’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement’” does not satisfy the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, “the allegations of a complaint drafted by a pro se
litigant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers in the sense
that a pro se complaint will be liberally construed in determining whether it fails to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.” Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991).
Finally, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)).
Upon consideration, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
Sections 241 and 242 of Title 28 of the United States Code are criminal statutes that do
not create a private right of action. See United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[T]he district court properly dismissed Oguaju’s claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or
242 because Oguaju has no private right of action under either of these criminal statutes.”).
Further, “[i]t is well settled that the question of whether and when prosecution is to be instituted
is within the discretion of the Attorney General.” Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 235
(D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“Only
the United States as prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242.”).
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1443 must be dismissed because § 1443 is
a federal removal statute, not a cause of action under which to bring a claim. Plaintiff’s claim
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 fails because he alleges neither a contract nor racial discrimination. See,
e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987) (“Although § 1981 does not
itself use the word ‘race,’ the Court has construed the section to forbid all ‘racial’ discrimination
in the making of private as well as public contracts.”) (citation omitted). Similarly, his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 claim fails because he has not alleged that “the conspiracy was motivated by racial, or
other class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1050
(6th Cir. 1999).
The final statute under which Plaintiff seeks to bring his claims is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Under that statute,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief in the complaint. As
all of the alleged actions by Defendant Judge Chauvin were taken in his judicial capacity and
Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was
unavailable, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief under § 1983.
Moreover, even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s demands for various forms of
injunctive relief, the claims for injunctive relief also fail. With regard to Plaintiff’s demand that
Defendant Judge Chauvin be removed from his judicial position, this Court has no jurisdiction to

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take such action. The power to do so lies with Kentucky’s Judicial Conduct Commission and the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. See Gormley v. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 332 S.W.3d 717, 725
(Ky. 2011) (“Section 121 of the Kentucky Constitution authorizes the [Judicial Conduct
Commission] to . . . remove, a judge or justice for good cause, with judicial review directly to the
[Kentucky] Supreme Court.”). This Court likewise has no jurisdiction to disbar Defendant Judge
Chauvin, as Plaintiff requests. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (“The two
judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers, among whom . . . lawyers are included.”); In re
Baumgartner, 123 F. App’x 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that the state has jurisdiction
to disbar an attorney and that the state’s power of disbarment cannot be upset by federal review).
Finally, as to Plaintiff’s demand that this Court impose “the maximum sentence” on Defendant
Judge Chauvin, incarceration is not available as relief to Plaintiff in this civil action, and the
Court does not have the power to direct that criminal charges be filed against anyone. See Peek
v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1970) (finding that United States attorneys cannot be
ordered to prosecute because the decision is within their discretion); Fleetwood v. Thompson,
358 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (finding that the “plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted in that none of the United States Attorneys can be
compelled to investigate or prosecute alleged criminal activity”).
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Judge Chauvin’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) (DN 4) is GRANTED.

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III. SANCTIONS
In his motion for sanctions, Defendant Judge Chauvin reports that Plaintiff has a long
history of filing frivolous, vexatious lawsuits against federal and state judges. He asserts that
Plaintiff repeatedly has been warned that he cannot sue judges and has had sanctions imposed
upon him for continuing to file such actions. Arguing that the filing of the instant action violates
prior orders of this Court, Defendant Judge Chauvin seeks the imposition of sanctions against
Plaintiff.
In response, Plaintiff argues that “[s]anctions should never be considered until a trial has
been held and then the evidence shows that the complaint was frivolous.” Plaintiff further states:
In 2007 the Holy Spirit told the Plaintiff that God wanted the Devil out of the
Justice System and wanted the Plaintiff to file a number of lawsuits, to get him
out. The Holy Spirit told Flint, that he the Holy Spirit would tell Flint how to
write the pleadings and tell him what to say in court. The Holy Spirit would also
teach Flint about the law needed. Flint by his action has been and will continue
doing God’s will. Flint has obeyed the courts rules in every case.
Plaintiff also resorts to name-calling by suggesting similarities between the Nazis and “corrupt
judges.”
In reply, Defendant Judge Chauvin maintains that Plaintiff does not overcome the fact
that the instant case is nearly identical to his other cases filed in this Court and almost mirrors
them allegation for allegation. He claims that Plaintiff has done nothing to show that this case is
unique or that this case is meritorious where others are not.
Plaintiff, in his sur-reply, claims that “Defendant is attempting to find a corrupt judge and
they will make any argument hoping to find such a judge.”
In one of Plaintiff’s earlier actions, Flint v. Whalin, Civil Action No. 3:11-cv-316-JGH,
by Memorandum Opinion and Order entered June 21, 2011 (DN 6), the late Senior Judge John

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G. Heyburn II documented Plaintiff’s lengthy history of frivolous litigation against state and
federal judges in this Court and found that the “submission of frivolous and duplicative lawsuits
serves no legitimate purpose, places a tremendous burden on this Court’s limited resources, and
deprives other litigants with meritorious claims of the speedy resolution of their cases.”
Therefore, Judge Heyburn issued the following warning to Plaintiff:
Flint is WARNED that he will be sanctioned in the amount of $700.00 per
suit should he file any additional lawsuits in this Court against federal or
state judges on the grounds that he believes they were biased against him,
made incorrect rulings, or otherwise improperly oversaw any of his cases.
Additionally, filing any additional such lawsuits could result in the
imposition of additional sanctions, including the imposition of filing
restrictions.
This warning, however, did not deter Plaintiff as he filed a subsequent lawsuit against a
state court judge. See Flint v. McDonald, Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-613-CRS. By Memorandum
Opinion and Order entered January 18, 2013 (DNs 10 & 11), Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson
III held that Plaintiff’s suit plainly fell within the terms of Judge Heyburn’s warning, as it was a
lawsuit against a state judge on the grounds that the state judge was biased against him, made
incorrect rulings, and improperly oversaw a hearing in the case. Finding that the filing of the
subsequent action constituted bad faith, Judge Simpson imposed a $700 sanction, double the cost
of the filing fee at that time, and issued the following warning to Plaintiff to ensure that he was
aware that any future frivolous lawsuits could result in even more severe sanctions:
[T]he plaintiff, Edward H. Flint, is WARNED that if he files any additional
lawsuits in this Court against federal or state judges on the grounds that he
believes they were biased against him, made incorrect rulings, or otherwise
improperly oversaw any of his cases, he will face further sanctions, which
could include, but are not limited to, monetary sanctions of more than $700
or the imposition of filing restrictions[.]

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Again not deterred by Judge Heyburn’s warning or the sanctions imposed by Judge
Simpson, Plaintiff filed an action against a federal judge. See Flint v. McKinley, Civil Action
No. 4:15-cv-130-GNS. There, the Court found that Plaintiff acted in bad faith in bringing the
action against a federal judge despite two earlier warnings by the Court. Judge Greg N. Stivers
imposed a sanction against Plaintiff of $800, an amount double the current cost of the fee for
filing a civil action.
Plaintiff continued to file suits against state court judges. In Flint v. Burkman, Civil
Action No. 3:15-cv-439-JHM, Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr., also imposed an $800
sanction against Plaintiff and further imposed a prefiling restriction on him due to his history of
filing frivolous and burdensome lawsuits targeting state and federal judges.
Thereafter, in Flint v. Acree, Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-588-DJH, a frivolous lawsuit filed
by Plaintiff against several current and former Kentucky Court of Appeals judges, the
undersigned, by Memorandum Opinion and Order entered December 18, 2015, imposed
sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $800; barred Plaintiff from filing any new action
until he paid all sanctions on or before February 17, 2016;2 and imposed a prefiling restriction on
Plaintiff following payment of all sanctions imposed.
Finally, in Flint v. Willett, Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-351-DJH, another suit against a state
court judge and other Defendants, the Court imposed, by Memorandum Opinion and Order
entered on or around the same date of entry of the instant Order, an $800 sanction and again
imposed a prefiling restriction on Plaintiff.

2

Review of the Court’s records reveals that Plaintiff failed to comply with this Court’s Order directing
payment of all prior sanctions on or before February 17, 2016.

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This Court agrees with the reasoning in the prior Orders imposing sanctions. Once again,
Plaintiff has brought a frivolous action against a judge after repeated warnings against doing so.
Sanctions are therefore appropriate. See Halliburton v. United States, 59 F. App’x 55, 57 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“Pursuant to its inherent powers, a court in the Sixth Circuit may impose sanctions to
curb vexatious, bad faith litigation if the claims are meritless, the litigant knew or should have
known that the claims are meritless, and the claims were filed for an improper purpose.”) (citing
First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 512, 519 (6th Cir.
2002)). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Judge Chauvin’s motion for sanctions (DN 5) is
GRANTED.
The Court will impose a sanction against Plaintiff in the amount of $800 in the present
action. Further, a review of this Court’s records reveals that Plaintiff has failed to pay the $700
sanction previously imposed by Senior Judge Simpson; the $800 sanction previously imposed by
Judge Stivers; the $800 sanction previously imposed by Chief Judge McKinley; and the $800
sanction previously imposed by the undersigned. Plaintiff, therefore, remains obligated to pay
the prior $3,100 in sanctions in addition to the $800 incurred here and the $800 incurred in Flint
v. Willett, 3:15-cv-351-DJH, also imposed on or around this date. “To make the sanction
effective and thereby protect the processes of a court from abuse, a litigant against whom . . .
sanctions have been imposed must comply with those sanctions before being permitted to pursue
new matters in that court.” Schiff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 766 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (per
curiam); see also Hyland v Stevens, 37 F. App’x 770, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[Plaintiff] is
hereby barred from filing any new civil matter or appeal therefrom in this court or any court
subject to this court’s jurisdiction until he has paid the sanction imposed in [a previous case].”);
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Hymes v. United States, 993 F.2d 701, 702 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Courts have inherent power to
dismiss actions for nonpayment of costs in prior actions. This power also extends to a litigant’s
failure to pay previously imposed sanctions.”). In accord with the previous orders imposing
sanctions discussed above, this Court will also impose the following requirement on Plaintiff:
Flint is barred from filing any new action in this Court until he has paid the
$800 sanction imposed in this case; the $800 sanction imposed in Flint v.
Willett, Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-351-DJH; the $800 sanction previously
imposed in Flint v. Acree, Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-588-DJH; the $800
sanction previously imposed in Flint v. Burkman, Civil Action No. 3:15-cv439-JHM; the $800 sanction previously imposed in Flint v. McKinley, Civil
Action No. 4:15-cv-130-GNS; the $700 sanction previously imposed in Flint v.
McDonald, Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-613-CRS; and any other sanctions
imposed by the Court. The Clerk of Court shall not accept for filing any
future lawsuits by Plaintiff until he pays all sanctions imposed on him.
Therefore, on or before April 29, 2016, Plaintiff shall pay the full balance of all
financial sanctions, including those imposed herein. Those sanctions are as follows:
$700 (Flint v. McDonald, 3:12-cv-613-CRS)
$800 (Flint v. McKinley, 4:15-cv-130-GNS)
$800 (Flint v. McDonald-Burkman, 3:15-cv-439-JHM)
$800 (Flint v. Acree, 3:15-cv-588-DJH)
$800 (Flint v. Willett, 3:15-cv-351-DJH)
$800 (Flint v. Chauvin, 3:15-cv-381-DJH)
Total $4700
Plaintiff shall pay the outstanding sanctions to the Clerk of the Court, U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky, 601 W. Broadway, Louisville, Kentucky 40202. Plaintiff is
WARNED that failure to timely pay all outstanding financial sanctions may subject him to
additional sanctions and restrictions. Plaintiff may not pursue any new action in this Court
until the sanctions have been paid.
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Finally, review of the Court’s records reveals that since April 20, 2015, Plaintiff has filed
nine cases in this Court, six of them against judges. Due to Plaintiff’s continued pattern of filing
abusive and vexatious lawsuits in this Court and his attempt to ignore the previously imposed
sanctions and repeated warnings of additional sanctions, this Court imposes the same prefiling
restriction it imposed on Plaintiff in Flint v. Acree, Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-588-DJH:
Edward H. Flint shall file a motion seeking permission from the Court before
filing any new action in this Court. Flint’s motion shall demonstrate that the
claim or claims he intends to assert are not frivolous and that the suit is not
brought for an improper purpose. He must attach his proposed complaint to
the motion.
See Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998) (“There is nothing
unusual about imposing prefiling restrictions in matters with a history of repetitive or vexatious
litigation.”); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996) (permanently enjoining
plaintiff from filing action based on particular legal and factual claims “without first obtaining
certification from a United States Magistrate Judge that the claim or claims asserted are not
frivolous and that the suit is not brought for any improper purpose”).
The Court will enter a separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order.
Date:

March 3, 2016

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of Record
4415.005

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