Harbin v. Jabil Global Services LLC
Filing
27
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 6/24/2016; re 23 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Jabil Global Services LLC ; separate judgment shall issue.cc:counsel, plaintiff pro se (KJA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-00475-TBR
STEPHON D. HARBIN,
Plaintiff
v.
JABIL GLOBAL SERVICES LLC,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
(DN 23). Plaintiff has responded. (DN 25). Defendant has replied. (DN 26). For the
following reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of the employment of Plaintiff Stephon D. Harbin with
Defendant Jabil Global Services LLC (“Jabil”). Harbin, proceeding pro se, claims that
Jabil enacted “job policies that disproportionately exclude African-Americans from
leadership positions,” gave “preferential treatment toward White employees,” and failed
to promote and ultimately terminated him because of race. (DN 1-1).
Jabil
1
provides supply chain management, manufacturing services, and
aftermarket product support to technology companies. In November, 2003, Harbin was
hired in a temporary capacity as a quality technician at Jabil’s facility located in
Louisville, Kentucky. Harbin was made a full-time employee in May, 2004 and rose
steadily through the company. From August 2004 to April, 2006, Harbin served as team
Jabil changed its name to iQor Global Services, LLC in June, 2014. Since the parties
refer to this entity as “Jabil,” the Court will do so also.
1
Page 1 of 16
lead in various departments. After April, 2006, Harbin was promoted to a series of
supervisory and managerial roles over several large accounts. In 2006, Harbin served as
production supervisor over the Dell account. Also in 2006, Harbin served as the second
shift repair manager for the HP account. In 2007, Harbin was promoted to the repair
manager for all shifts of the HP account. In 2008, Harbin was promoted to program
manager for the Nokia account, later moving to quality engineer in that department.
Although Harbin’s employment history shows a string of promotions, it is also
filled with incidents in which Harbin was disciplined for his behavior. In September,
2005, Harbin received a glowing Leadership Performance Review, being praised for his
leadership and efficient performance. (DN 23-2). However, Harbin was also informed
that he was “too abrasive” and needed to “always maintain a level head and think things
through.” (DN 23-3).
In November, 2005, Harbin was cited for “using inappropriate
language when talking to another employee.” (DN 23-10, p. 1). Harbin did not dispute
this claim.
In March, 2007, Jabil received several complaints that “Harbin’s style of
management is creating a hostile work environment” and there were “frequent displays of
management by intimidation and the use of inappropriate language.” (DN 23-10, p. 3).
Jabil expressed concern that it may lose employees and transferred Harbin to a different
shift. Harbin disputed these claims and stated he did not use intimidating language but
instead “motivate[d] and encourage[d] my team.” (DN 23-10, p. 3). Jabil subsequently
determined these complaints were “unfounded” and returned Harbin to the second shift.
(DN 23-10, p. 5).
2
In April, 2009, Harbin was cited because he allegedly (1) “openly brags about his
[paid leave] balance,” (2) “made comments as to his level of superiority and how he can
tell anyone in any area what to do at any time and they had better do it;” (3) expressed
frustration with his work and claimed to be using his office to do schoolwork; and (4) had
personal arguments with his girlfriend, also an employee, on the production floor. (DN
23-10, p. 8-9).
In November 5, 2011, Harbin received training on appropriate workplace conduct.
(DN 23-10).
Shortly thereafter, Jabil received several complaints that Harbin was
“treating others with lack of respect, threatening co-workers jobs, [and making] general
threats of physical harm and using inappropriate language.” (DN 23-10, p. 10). This
incident seemed to be precipitated by Harbin’s frustration with Sean Pendergrast, a repair
technician. Several employees gave statements regarding this incident. Justin Greenwell,
a repair team leader, claimed Harbin stated loudly that “if people kept fucking up he
would fire them and fight them” in reference to Pendergrast.
(DN 23-10, p. 12).
Pendergrast claimed that when he first met Harbin, Harbin told him: “I don’t give a shit
about any of your family, I’ll fire your ass.” (DN 23-10, p. 14). He also claimed that
Harbin said things like “I’d beat any mother fucker’s ass in here” and “Who ever took my
rack I’m going to kill y’all.” (DN 23-10, p.14). Another employee, Michael Cole, also
claimed that “Harbin is always threatening jobs but that [Cole] thinks he is joking.” (DN
23-10, p. 15). Several other employees expressed the same sentiment of being unsure
about whether Harbin was serious about firing employees. (DN 23-10, p. 13-14). On
several occasions Harbin, while standing near an employee, openly commented to others
about how that employee needed to be fired. (DN 23-10, p. 13-14).
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In January, 2012, Harbin applied for the position of Operations Manager. Jabil
awarded the position to Jesselynn Mineo.
In April, 2012, Jabil offered Harbin a
promotion to serve as the repair supervisor on the Lenovo account. (DN 23-8, p. 1).
Jabil was still negotiating with Lenovo at the time Harbin was promoted.
Those
negotiations fell through in late 2012, resulting in a reduction of force. Harbin took over
the position of repair supervisor over the Covidien account, receiving a small pay raise.
(DN 23-8, p. 2).
In July, 2013, Mineo transferred to another location and the Operations Manager
position came open again. (DN 23-4). Harbin applied. Jabil awarded the position to Bill
O’Connor. (DN 23-7, p. 64). In the e-mail announcing the decision, Site Director Mitch
Lewis made a point to mention that Harbin’s “leadership of the Covidien production line
has been an asset and made this a very tough decision.” (DN 23-5). “As part of Jabil’s
efforts to prepare Mr. Harbin to be able to attain that position in the future,” the Human
Resources Manager and outgoing Operations Manager prepared a “Heat Map Personal
Development Plan” for Harbin.
(DN 23-2).
The “heat map” listed all of the
“competencies” required by the position of Operations Manager, explained where Harbin
was deficient, and suggested courses Harbin could complete to improve in these areas.
(DN 23-13). Jabil also sent Harbin to a seminar entitled “How to Communicate with
Tact and Professionalism.” (DN 23-21, 23-23).
Harbin was terminated in February, 2014.
Two incidents preceded his
termination. First, Lewis arranged for Harbin to meet with Jabil’s Vice President Scott
Greer during a site visit and later attend a basketball game together. Lewis felt that
Harbin, instead of taking the opportunity to impress Greer, acted in a “detached manner”
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and “vaguely voiced his unhappiness.”
(DN 23-4).
Lewis met with Harbin and
“explained that he wasted an opportunity to aid his career development.” (DN 23-4).
During that meeting, Lewis and Harbin also discussed plans to transfer Ricky Cole from
Harbin’s team to another team; plans which were supposed to remain confidential. (DN
23-4). Jabil subsequently received a complaint from Cole that he feared for his job and
feared retaliation by Harbin if Harbin learned of the complaint. (DN 23-2). Cole said
that Harbin informed him of his impending transfer, including allegedly misinforming
Cole about certain aspects of the transfer. (DN 23-2). On February 28, 2014, Jabil
terminated Harbin. (DN 23-2).
STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). “[N]ot every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a genuine issue
of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989).
The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has presented a jury question as
to each element in the case. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996). The
plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of her position;
she must present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably find for her. Id.
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Mere speculation will
not suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment: “[T]he mere existence of a
colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment. A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to
5
render summary judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition
Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
Harbin, proceeding pro se, does not title his claims in his complaint. However,
“[p]ro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and
filings.” Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999). The Court construes
Harbin’s complaint as alleging the following claims:
(I) retaliation; (II) disparate
treatment; and (III) disparate impact.
I.
Retaliation.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he
engaged in protected activity; (2) that he suffered adverse employment action; and (3)
that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
Penny v. UPS, 128 F.3d 408, 417 (6th Cir. 1997). “The statute makes it unlawful for an
employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee opposed an
unlawful employment practice, or made a charge, or participated in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing related to Title VII.” E.E.O.C. v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541,
543 (6th Cir. 1993). “[A]n adverse employment action is defined as a ‘materially adverse
change in the terms or conditions’ of employment.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746
F.3d 714, 727 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt. Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885
(6th Cir. 1996)).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer must then offer a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See Monette v. Electronic Data
6
Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996). If the employer satisfies this burden
of production, the plaintiff must introduce evidence showing that the proffered
explanation is pretextual. Penny, 128 F.3d at 417. “The plaintiff, of course, bears the
ultimate burden of proving that the proffered reason for the action was merely a pretext
for discrimination.” Id.
Harbin claims that he “was terminated because he voiced his discontent with the
manner in which discipline, hiring, promoting and termination of African-American
employees were handled.” (DN 25). The opposition of improper employment practices
is a protected activity. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d at 543. Furthermore, an employee who
has been terminated has, of course, suffered an adverse employment action. Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
Finally, “[w]here an adverse
employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected
activity, such temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute
evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of
retaliation.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Harbin has established a prima facie case of retaliation.
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The burden of
establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action is not onerous, but one easily met”).
The burden therefore shifts to Jabil to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for Harbin’s termination.
“This is merely a burden of production, not of
persuasion, and it does not involve a credibility assessment.” Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,
576 F.3d 576, 585 (6th Cir. 2009). Moreover, an employer is not required to “prove
absence of discriminatory motive,” but instead need only “articulate some legitimate,
7
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” (emphasis in original) Bd. of
Trustees of Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (citation omitted).
Jabil claims that it terminated Harbin because he “divulged his past confidential
communications” with to an employee and “communicated with Cole in a manner that
made Cole fear for his job and for retaliation by Harbin if he learned that Cole
complained to Human Resources.” (DN 23-1). Jabil claims that management lost faith
in Harbin after yet another incident in which Harbin demonstrated unprofessional
communication with an employee, despite Jabil’s efforts to train Harbin in this area. The
Court finds these facts are sufficient to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for terminating Harbin.
Once a defendant has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, “the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to
a new level of specificity.” Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255
(1981). “A plaintiff may demonstrate that an employer’s proffered legitimate reason for
an adverse employment action is pretextual on any of three grounds: 1) by showing that
the reason has no basis in fact; 2) by showing that the reason did not actually motivate the
employer’s action; or 3) by showing that the reason was insufficient to motivate the
action.” Macy v. Hopkins Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 366 (6th Cir. 2007)
abrogated by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012).
“Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will depend on
a number of factors” including “the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the
probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other
evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered on a
8
motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000).
Harbin argues Jabil’s stated reason for terminating him has no basis in fact. This
“type of showing is easily recognizable and consists of evidence that the proffered bases”
are “factually false.” Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th
Cir. 1994). Harbin claims “[a]ll of the annual reviews demonstrate the Plaintiff had
excellent communication skills and there were no issues with Plaintiff’s communication
or behavior.” (DN 25). Harbin also claims “[t]here is no documented evidence of
suggested seminars or courses for the Plaintiff to attend.” (DN 25). Harbin does not cite
to the record in support of this assertion and Harbin has not attached any exhibits to his
response. On the contrary, the record shows that in 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2011, Harbin
was informed that he had an “abrasive” manner (DN 23-3), used “inappropriate or
abusive” language (DN 23-10), and made “unprofessional and threatening statements.”
(DN 23-2).
Harbin underwent training “regarding appropriate conduct and
communication on 11/05/11 and 08/19/13.” (DN 23-15). In July, 2013, Jabil constructed
a “heat map” of areas in which Harbin was competent and areas which needed
improvement.
Areas of concern included “Conflict Management,” “Inter-personal
Savvy,” “Communication,” and “Effectively Influence/Motivate Others.” (DN 23-13).
Each came with multiple recommendations of online courses which Harbin could
complete to improve in these areas. Site Director Mitch Lewis and Human Resources
Manager Olivia Rainwater each provided affidavits explaining Jabil’s decision to
terminate Harbin after his incident with Cole. (DN 23-2, 23-4). In light of this evidence,
the Court finds that Harbin’s claim that Jabil’s stated reason for terminating him had no
9
basis in fact is not a plausible. Accordingly, Harbin has not demonstrated that Jabil’s
proffered reason is pretextual and therefore summary judgment on this claim is
appropriate in Jabil’s favor.
II.
Disparate Treatment.
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a claim of disparate treatment
is subject to the burden-shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As above, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish a prima
facie case of disparate treatment. Defendant must then present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their action. Plaintiff must then demonstrate pretext. Penny,
128 F.3d at 417; Hollins v. Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1999).
“In order to satisfy the requirements of the prima facie case of disparate treatment
the plaintiff must produce evidence that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, and (2)
for the same or similar conduct she was treated differently from similarly situated nonminority employees.” Hollins, 188 F.3d at 658. “It is fundamental that to make a
comparison of a discrimination plaintiff’s treatment to that of non-minority employees,
the plaintiff must show that the ‘comparables’ are similarly-situated in all respects.”
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992).
Harbin alleges that he “witnesses and experienced preferential treatment toward
White employees and disparate treatment of African-American employees.” (DN 1-1).
Harbin also alleges that he “and other African-American employees were passed over for
promotions and/or not considered at all while less qualified White employees received
promotions and/or positions.” (DN 1-1). Harbin twice applied for and did not receive a
promotion to the position of Operations Manager. In 2012, the position went to Jesselynn
10
Mineo. (DN 23-7, p. 13). In 2013, the position went to Bill O’Connor. (DN 23-7, p.
64). The Court finds Harbin’s allegations sufficient to state a prima facie claim of
disparate treatment.
The burden therefore shifts to Jabil to elucidate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for not promoting Harbin. While it appears that Jabil viewed Harbin as qualified
for the position, (DN 23-5), it also viewed Mineo and O’Connor as qualified. Jabil cites
the lack of disciplinary issues with Mineo and O’Connor and their leadership abilities as
significant reasons why Jabil chose those candidates over Harbin. Conversely, Harbin
acknowledged that that he was not “even keeled” like O’Connor:
Q.
Because you’re passionate?
A.
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Q.
And you get worked up?
A.
Yes, I do.
(DN 23-6, p. 43). As a general rule, “an employer is free to choose among qualified
candidates.” Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1987). “An employer has even
greater flexibility in choosing a management-level employee, as is the case here, because
of the nature of such a position.” Id. The Court finds that Jabil’s preference for the
calmer managerial style of Mineo and O’Connor is a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for not promoting Harbin.
The burden therefore shifts to Harbin to demonstrate that Jabil’s stated reason is
pretextual. Harbin claims that he was the most qualified candidate for the Operations
Manager position. “Whether qualifications evidence will be sufficient to raise a question
of fact as to pretext will depend on whether a plaintiff presents other evidence of
11
discrimination.” Bender v. Hecht's Dep't Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 626 (6th Cir. 2006). “In
the case in which a plaintiff does provide other probative evidence of discrimination, that
evidence, taken together with evidence that the plaintiff was as qualified as or better
qualified than the successful applicant, might well result in the plaintiff's claim surviving
summary judgment.” Id. at 627. However, in this case, Harbin relies on his own
assertions that Jabil acted in a discriminatory fashion and has produced no evidence to
support these assertions. See e.g. Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 392
(6th Cir. 2009) (The record also contains other evidence probative of pretext . . . [such as]
male officers frequently made degrading comments regarding the capabilities of female
officers, expressed the view that female officers would never be promoted to command
positions, and made generally degrading remarks about women); see generally Allen v.
Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387, 399 (6th Cir. 2008).
“[I]n the case in which there is little or no other probative evidence of
discrimination, to survive summary judgment the rejected applicant’s qualifications must
be so significantly better than the successful applicant’s qualifications that no reasonable
employer would have chosen the latter applicant over the former.” Bender v. Hecht's
Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006) (“evidence that a rejected applicant was
as qualified or marginally more qualified than the successful candidate is insufficient”).
Here again, Harbin’s claim suffers from a lack of any evidence outside his own
assertions.
In his response, Harbin does not address Mineo’s qualifications, and it
appears Harbin is not pursuing his claim based on her promotion over him.2 With respect
In his deposition, Harbin was asked: “you’ve already said you didn’t connect the
Jesselynn one with race; right?” Harbin replied: “Not initially, no. I still don’t feel like
it was race related.” (DN 23-6, p. 37).
2
12
to O’Connor, Harbin claims:
“William O’Connor was not at the time a qualified
candidate for the position. He was not a Six Sigma Black Belt. He did not have the
experience. He did not have the tenure. His only qualification is that he was White.”
(DN 25).
Other than Harbin’s own assertions, he has provided no support for his
position. Furthermore, Harbin admits that O’Connor was qualified for the position, had
an “even keeled” demeanor, and that he was unaware of any complaints against
O’Connor. (DN 23-6, p. 41-43). Given the lack of evidence to the contrary, the Court
finds that Harbin has not shown that Jabil’s stated reason for not promoting him was
pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Jabil is appropriate for this
claim.
III.
Disparate Impact.
Harbin alleges that Jabil enacted “job policies that disproportionately exclude
African-Americans from leadership positions.” (DN 1-1). The Court interprets this as
alleging a claim of disparate impact.
“Disparate impact analysis is used when an employer’s facially neutral policy
adversely affects a protected class.” Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565,
576 (6th Cir. 2004). “To establish a prima facie disparate-impact case, a plaintiff must:
(1) identify a specific employment practice; and (2) present data indicating that the
specific practice had an adverse impact on a protected group.” Davis v. Cintas Corp.,
717 F.3d 476, 494 (6th Cir. 2013). “[I]t is not enough to simply allege that there is a
disparate impact on workers, or point to a generalized policy.” Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005). The “employee is responsible for isolating and identifying the
specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
13
disparities.” (emphasis in original). Id; Allen v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 545 F.3d 387,
403 (6th Cir. 2008) (“This specific-practice requirement is important because isolating
and identifying such practices ‘is not a trivial burden,’ and involves more than simply
‘point [ing] to a generalized policy that leads to such an impact’”) (citation omitted).
Harbin has failed to identify a specific employment practice which is allegedly
discriminatory. In his complaint, Harbin alleges that he “experienced job policies that
disproportionately exclude African-Americans from leadership positions.” (DN 1-1). In
his response, Harbin explains that “[t]here are currently NO African-Americans in any
operational leadership positions within the current operations.” (emphasis in original)
(DN 25). Harbin also claims that he “can show in a trial that the Defendant’s policies and
procedures had a disparate impact on him and other African-Americans since Plaintiff
was the only one in a supervisor position and there are currently none in any of the
operations positions.” (DN 25).
The Sixth Circuit has explained that a plaintiff challenging promotion practices
must “identify and isolate specific employment practices” which cause a disparate
impact. Grant v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 446 F. App'x 737,
741 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). Plaintiff’s failure to do so may be “forgiven if they
had ‘demonstrate[d] to the court that the elements of [Defendant’s] decisionmaking
process are not capable of separation for analysis.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2(k)(1)(B)(i)). However, a “plaintiff may challenge the process as a whole only if he first
demonstrates that its elements are incapable of separation.” (emphasis in original). Grant
v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 446 F. App'x 737, 741 (6th Cir.
2011). In this case, Harbin has made broad allegations that Jabil enacted discriminatory
14
policies. Harbin has not identified a specific policy which has had an adverse impact on
African-Americans. Nor has Harbin demonstrated how elements of Jabil’s
decisionmaking are so intertwined as to frustrate a separate analysis. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Harbin has failed to establish the first element of a prima facie disparate
impact claim.
The Court also finds that Harbin has failed to present any data indicating an
employment practice had an adverse impact on African-Americans. “[T]he plaintiff must
offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in
question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their
membership in a protected group.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
994 (1988). “Small or incomplete data sets and inadequate statistical techniques are
insufficient to establish a plaintiffs prima facie case.” Austin v. Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div., 129 F.3d 1263 (6th Cir. 1997). “Plaintiffs who present a statistical analysis
of some challenged practice need not rule out all other variables to prevail.” United
States v. City of Warren, Mich., 138 F.3d 1083, 1094 (6th Cir. 1998) (“the City of Warren
employed not a single black person out of a workforce of 1500 certainly demonstrates a
grossly discriminatory impact”). However, a “complete failure to make any such
statistical showing is fatal to [plaintiff’s] claim.” Butts v. McCullough, 237 F. App'x 1, 9
(6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). In this case, Harbin provides no statistical analysis but
instead relies on his own assertion that Jabil does not employ any African-Americans in a
managerial capacity. The Court finds this insufficient to establish the second element of a
prima facie claim for disparate impact. As Harbin has failed to establish either element
15
of a disparate impact claim, the Court holds that summary judgment is appropriate in
favor of Jabil.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (DN 23)
is GRANTED.
A separate judgment and order will issue.
cc:
counsel of record
June 24, 2016
Stephon D. Harbin
2332 W. Burnett Ave
Louisville, KY 40210
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