Wieck et al v. Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Teachers' Retirement System (KTRS) et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss: Defendant Jason Howard is hereby DISMISSED as a party in this matter. To the extent that Plaintiffs assert a claim against the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, it is also DIS MISSED, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is hereby DISMISSED as a party in this matter. Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order within which to respond to the pending motions to dismiss. (D.N. [24 ], 25 , 26 , 28 , 31 , 35 ) The defendants may file replies thirty (30) days thereafter. In the event Plaintiffs intend to abandon any of their claims, they shall file a response to that effect. Signed by Judge David J. Hale on 4/21/2016. cc: Counsel(JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
RANDOLPH WIECK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-692-DJH

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
KENTUCKY TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM, et al.,

Defendants.

* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Retired teachers, and pro se plaintiffs, Randolph Wieck, Betsey Bell, and Jane Norman
have brought a putative class action suit against the Board of Trustees of the Kentucky Teachers’
Retirement System (KTRS), and numerous other defendants. (Docket No. 1) They claim that
the Board mismanaged the KTRS in violation of the Federal Labor Standards Act, the United
States Constitution, and various Kentucky statutes. (Id.) Plaintiffs served a summons on Jason
Howard, an employee of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, without naming him or
the SEC as a defendant, or even mentioning Howard in the complaint.1 (D.N. 13, PageID # 91)
Howard has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against him pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (D.N. 13) Plaintiffs responded, arguing that the SEC’s “lack of a response”
to the poor performance of “the sister system of KTRS,” the Kentucky Retirement System, is a
“major contributing factor” to the Kentucky Retirement System’s poor performance. (D.N. 16,
PageID # 16) This response, and Plaintiffs’ complaint, are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.

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Plaintiffs mention the SEC in the complaint in a single sentence: “In a letter dated July 21,
2015, eleven state Treasurers urged the SEC to require better disclosure of private equity
expenses.” (D.N. 1, PageID # 7)
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I.
To overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Plaintiffs’ “complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although the Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable
to Plaintiffs and take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, the Court “need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478,
488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.
1995)). In other words, a complaint will not survive if it “tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Moreover, though federal courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, the Court’s “duty to be less stringent with pro se complaints
does not require [the Court] to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594
(6th Cir. 1989). Consequently, this Court is not required to “explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff,” as this would “transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.
1985) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not meet the well-pleaded complaint standard from Iqbal. 556
U.S. at 678. The complaint does not name Howard as a defendant. And it fails to allege a
plausible claim against the SEC or Howard. Consequently, the Court will grant Howard’s
motion to dismiss.

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II.
There are six additional motions to dismiss pending. (See D.N. 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 35)
Thus far, Plaintiffs have failed to respond to any of them. While the Court may not grant the
motions to dismiss based solely on Plaintiffs’ failure to respond, see Bangura v. Hansen, 434
F.3d 487, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 452, 454-55 (6th Cir.
1991)), it is incongruous for Plaintiffs to bring such serious allegations, yet fail to respond to the
defendants’ motions. The Court will therefore grant Plaintiffs a brief extension of time to
respond to the motions to dismiss.
Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
(1)

Defendant Jason Howard’s Motion to Dismiss (D.N. 13) is GRANTED.

Defendant Jason Howard is hereby DISMISSED as a party in this matter. To the extent that
Plaintiffs assert a claim against the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, it is also
DISMISSED, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is hereby DISMISSED as a
party in this matter.
(2)

Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order within

which to respond to the pending motions to dismiss. (D.N. 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 35) The
defendants may file replies thirty (30) days thereafter. In the event Plaintiffs intend to
abandon any of their claims, they shall file a response to that effect.
April 21, 2016

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
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