Watkins v. LMPD

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge David J. Hale. On initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and for the reasons set forth herein, the action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se (JLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
GENE DESHAWN M. WATKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-10-DJH

LMPD,

Defendant.
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff Gene DeShawn M. Watkins’
pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that
follow, the action will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff filed suit against the “LMPD,” presumably the Louisville Metro Police
Department, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As his statement of claim, he alleges as follows:
I was takened hostage and captive the police squad car didnt even have a
camera and the cop didnt have a badge or know his badge number my civil
liberties was violated cuz the cop didnt have a badge or the cop car didnt
have a camera I was kidnapped[.]
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $5 million in damages.
II.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). On review, a district court must dismiss a case at any time if it
determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss

a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the
factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III.
“Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for
deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d
340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502,
504 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Court must dismiss the LMPD from this action because it is not an entity subject to
suit under § 1983. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Rhodes v.
McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a police department may not be sued
under § 1983). Rather, the claims against the LMPD are against the Louisville Metro
Government as the real party in interest. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d at 1049 (“Since the
Police Department is not an entity which may be sued, Jefferson County is the proper party to
address the allegations of Matthews’s complaint.”).

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When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so,
whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights,
Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Searcy v. City of
Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir.
1994). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality
from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is
limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1986)) (emphasis in original). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at
691; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate
municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the
policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution
of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis
Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
None of the allegations in the complaint demonstrate that any alleged wrongdoing or
injury occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by the Louisville

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Metro Government. Accordingly, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against the
municipality and fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.
For these reasons, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order.
Date: April 11, 2016

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4415.005

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