Prather v. Corrections Care Solutions et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 12/7/2016 denying 11 Motion to Dismiss. cc: Counsel, Plaintiff (pro se) (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
JAMES ARCHIE PRATHER, JR.

PLAINTIFF
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-P60-JHM

v.
CORRECTIONS CARE SOLUTIONS et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed by
the only remaining Defendant in this action, Dr. Robert Rozefort (DN 11). Fully briefed, this
matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, Dr. Rozefort’s motion will be denied.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this pro se 42 U.S.C § 1983 civil rights action alleging that the medical care
he received while incarcerated at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC)
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The Court screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (DN 7). Upon its review of the complaint, the
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the other two Defendants – Corrections Care
Solutions, the private entity that provided medical care at LMDC, and Mark Bolton, the director
of LMDC – for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court also
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Rozefort, for the irregular disbursement of Plaintiff’s
seizure medication and insufficient treatment of Plaintiff’s rash, for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

The only claim that survived the Court’s initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaint was his
individual-capacity claim against Dr. Rozefort for the inadequate treatment of Plaintiff’s
degenerative disc disease and lower back stenosis. With regard to this claim, Plaintiff alleged
that the doctor at LMDC discontinued his prescription of “nerontin,” which Plaintiff had been
receiving three times a day for 10 years for degenerative disc disease and lower back stenosis.
Plaintiff also alleged that the doctor discontinued this medication without examining him or
reviewing his x-rays or medical records. He further alleged that this medication helped him with
his seizures, and that he has been in severe pain since the medication was discontinued. Finally,
Plaintiff alleged that he had “put in three times to see the Dr. . . . he said he wanted a follow-up
in 2 weeks and that was six weeks ago.”
On June 16, 2016, Dr. Rozefort filed the motion to dismiss that is now before the Court.
Because Plaintiff failed to timely respond to this motion, the Court entered an Order advising
Plaintiff that he may file a response (DN 12). Plaintiff then filed a document titled “motion of
continuance” (DN 13). The Court construed this document as a response to Dr. Rozefort’s
motion and advised Dr. Rozefort that he may file a reply (DN 14). Dr. Rozefort filed his reply
on November 10, 2016 (DN 15).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)

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(citations omitted)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint need not
contain “detailed factual allegations,” yet must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, “[a] pro
se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Failure to State a Claim
In Dr. Rozefort’s motion to dismiss, he first argues that Plaintiff’s claim against him
should be dismissed because it is unclear from Plaintiff’s complaint “exactly which allegation
Plaintiff is lodging against Dr. Rozefort.” Dr. Rozefort points out that although he is identified
as a Defendant in the caption of Plaintiff’s complaint, he is not specifically mentioned in the
body of Plaintiff’s complaint and that, therefore, it is not clear that Dr. Rozefort is the doctor
who allegedly took Plaintiff off his medication for degenerative disc disease and lower back
stenosis. In Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss, he states: “Dr. Rozefort took me off my
meds without a reason or an examination. I was on nerontin for 10 years for seizures and
neuropathy. Dr. Rozefort took me off for no reason he just discontinued them. Now I suffer
from restless leg syndrome and ache all the time.” In his reply, Dr. Rozefort argues that
Plaintiff’s response “fails to address any of the problems inherent in Plaintiff’s complaint.”
However, Plaintiff’s response directly addresses Dr. Rozefort’s concern that he may not have
been the doctor whom Plaintiff complains took him off his medication by specifically clarifying

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that it was Dr. Rozefort. The Court also notes that Dr. Rozefort is the only doctor Plaintiff
named as a Defendant in his complaint. Thus, in light of Plaintiff’s specific allegations in both
his complaint and his response, the Court finds Dr. Rozefort’s argument that Plaintiff has not put
Dr. Rozefort on notice “of any alleged misconduct” less than compelling. Finally, to the extent
that Dr. Rozefort argues that Plaintiff’s complaint is too broad and non-specific because it does
not specify a time frame, location, or damages, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s allegations
indicate that he received the medical treatment of which he complains during the time that he
was incarcerated at LMDC. Plaintiff also specifically alleges that since Dr. Rozefort took him
off his medication, he has suffered from “severe pain” and restless leg syndrome. In short, the
Court finds that the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s complaint and response are sufficient to
meet the standard set forth in Iqbal and Twombly and more than sufficient to meet “the less
stringent standard” under which pro se complaints must be reviewed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. at 93.
B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Dr. Rozefort also argues that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff
failed to show that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) bars a civil rights action challenging prison conditions until the prisoner exhausts
“such administrative remedies as are available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. at 211 798 (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and
that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court”). In order to exhaust administrative
remedies, prisoners must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the
deadlines and other applicable procedural rules established by state law. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
at 218-19. “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical

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procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006); see Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642,
647 (6th Cir. 2009). Importantly, however, “failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
PLRA is an affirmative defense that must be established by the defendants.” Napier v. Laurel
Cty. Ky., 636 F.3d. 218, 225 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 204) (emphasis
added).
Here, Dr. Rozefort has not met his burden. He has not attached any affidavit to his
motion showing that Plaintiff failed to file a grievance related to the matters at hand or produced
a copy of the relevant grievance procedure. In addition, Plaintiff was not required to
demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint, and he advises in his response to the motion to dismiss
that he has “all the proper paper work as far as grievances I have filed.” For these reasons, the
Court concludes that Dr. Rozefort has not established that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available
administrative remedies. See, e.g., Ward v. ARAMARK Corr. Food Serv., No. 3:09CV-P802-S,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43934 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2011).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dr. Rozefort’s motion to
dismiss (DN 11) is DENIED.
Date:

December 7, 2016

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of Record
4414.011

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