Bryan v. Gates Rubber Company
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 11/21/2016: The motion by Defendant, Gates Rubber Company, for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, to dismiss 11 is GRANTED. cc: Counsel (JBM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16CV-102-JHM
BILLY JO BRYAN
by Velma Darlene Bryan
PLAINTIFF
V.
GATES RUBBER COMPANY
DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion by Defendant, Gates Rubber Company, for
judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, to dismiss. [DN 11] Fully briefed, this matter is
ripe for decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Billy Jo Bryan, worked for Defendant, Gates Rubber Company, in
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, from 1975 to 1999. The Complaint alleges Gates manufactured
products with the use of the chemical benzene. Plaintiff alleges that while employed at Gates,
Bryan inhaled toxic chemical which caused him numerous illnesses, including bladder cancer.
Bryan died on October 23, 2001. On January 12, 2016, Bryan’s wife filed a complaint in Hardin
Circuit Court alleging that Bryan’s physical injuries and death were caused by his exposure to
chemicals during his employment with Gates. On February 18, 2016, Gates removed this action
from the Hardin Circuit Court to this Court. Gates now moves to dismiss the claims arguing that
they are barred by the statute of limitations. On July 19, 2016, the Court ordered Plaintiff to
supplement or revise her response to this motion by no later than August 18, 2016. (Order, DN
20). No supplemental or revised filings were filed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is weighed under the same standard as a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Wee Care Child Center, Inc. v.
Lumpkin, 680 F.3d 841, 846 (6th Cir. 2012). Upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court “must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ],” League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007), “accept all well-pled factual allegations as true,”
id., and determine whether the “complaint . . . states a plausible claim for relief,” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Under this standard, the plaintiff must provide the grounds for
his or her entitlement to relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A plaintiff satisfies this standard only when he or she
“pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint falls short if it pleads
facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability,” id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557), or if the alleged facts do not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct,” id. at 679. Instead, the allegations must “‘show[ ] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III. DISCUSSION
“‘Under Kentucky law, a wrongful death claim may be brought only by an appointed
estate representative, and the claim must be filed within one year of the representative’s
appointment and no later than two years after the decedent’s death.’” Booker v. Gates Rubber
Company, Inc., 2016 WL 6603943, *1 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2016)(quoting Moody v. Cooper
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Indus., Inc., 2006 WL 1207703, *2 (E.D. Ky. May 3, 2006)). “A personal representative of a
decedent who was injured by a tortious act of another and later dies from those injuries, may
‘recover in the same action for both wrongful death of the decedent and for the personal injuries
from which the decedent suffered prior to death.’” Booker, 2016 WL 6603943, *1 (quoting KRS
§ 411.133).
In the present case, Plaintiff seeks damages for pain and suffering, physical injury,
medical expenses, lost wages, wrongful death, and punitive damages, which constitute claims for
personal injury and wrongful death. The death certificate states Bryan died on October 23, 2001,
which was over 14 years before this action was brought in Hardin Circuit Court by his personal
representative. “This is well outside of the maximum limitations period of two years after the
date of death that Kentucky law provides for wrongful death claims.” Id. Furthermore, “KRS
413.180 provides a maximum period of two years after the date of death for a personal
representative to bring a personal injury claim,” id., and Bryan’s claims were not brought until
January 2016. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.
In response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff argues that KRS § 342.316 should govern
this cause of action because KRS § 342.316 is the statute regarding “radiation diseases and
asbestos and related chemicals.” “While KRS 342.316 does provide a statute of limitations for
actions arising under the statute, KRS 342.316 governs claims brought under the Kentucky
Worker’s Compensation Act.” Booker, 2016 WL 6603943, *2. Plaintiff’s claims were not
asserted under the Worker’s Compensation Act; therefore, KRS § 342.316 does not apply.
Furthermore, just as in Booker, “even if KRS 342.316 were to apply, Plaintiff’s claims
would still be time-barred as KRS 342.316 requires claims to be brought within ‘five (5) years
from the last injurious exposure to the occupational hazard, except that, in cases of radiation
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disease or asbestos-related disease, a claim must be filed within twenty (20) years from the last
injurious exposure to the occupational hazard.’” Booker, 2016 WL 6603943, *2 (quoting KRS
§342.316(4)(a)). Here, Bryan’s employment with Gates ceased in 1999. Accordingly, his last
“injurious exposure to the occupational hazard” is outside of the five-year statute of limitations
of KRS § 342.316. Likewise, Plaintiff does not allege in the complaint that Bryan suffered from
radiation or asbestos-related diseases which extends the time for filing a workers’ compensation
claim. See Booker, 2016 WL 6603943, *2. Given these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
claims against the Defendant are untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion by
Defendant, Gates Rubber Company, for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, to
dismiss [DN 11] is GRANTED. A judgment will be entered consistent with this opinion.
cc: counsel of record
November 21, 2016
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