Buckman v. Lietz

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 9/7/2017; For reasons set forth, the Court will dismiss this action by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Counsel (CDR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT LOUISVILLE
JOSEPH BUCKMAN

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-P196-GNS

LMPD OFFICER NICOLAS LIETZ

DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Joseph Buckman initiated this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Upon filing the instant action, he assumed the responsibility of keeping this Court advised of his
current address and to actively litigate his claims. See LR 5.2(e) (“All pro se litigants must
provide written notice of a change of residential address . . . to the Clerk and to the opposing
party or the opposing party’s counsel. Failure to notify the Clerk of an address change may
result in the dismissal of the litigant’s case or other appropriate sanctions.”).
The Court mailed an Order to Plaintiff on May 31, 2017 (DN 14). This mailing was
returned by the United States Postal Service marked “Return to Sender, Not Deliverable as
Addressed, Unable to Forward” (DN 15). Plaintiff apparently no longer resides at his address of
record, and he has not advised the Court of a change of address. Therefore, neither notices from
this Court nor filings by Defendant in this action can be served on Plaintiff.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal
of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See Jourdan
v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the
district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). Although federal courts afford pro se
litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading rules,
the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other procedures readily

understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or failure to pursue a
case. Id. at 110. “Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that courts have an
inherent power to manage their own affairs and may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of
prosecution.” Lyons-Bey v. Pennell, 93 F. App’x 732, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
A review of the docket reveals that no action has been taken by Plaintiff in this case since
August 12, 2016, over one year ago. Further, an Order entered by the Court has been returned to
the Court as being undeliverable, and more than two months have passed without Plaintiff
providing a new address to the Court. Because Plaintiff has failed to provide an updated address
to the Court, Plaintiff has not taken any action in this case in over one year, and an Order sent to
Plaintiff by this Court has been returned, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to comply
with Local Rule 5.2(e), that Plaintiff has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action, and
that dismissal is warranted. See, e.g., White v. City of Grand Rapids, 34 F. App’x 210, 211 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution because he
failed to keep the district court apprised of his current address.”); Hananiah v. Shelby Cty. Gov’t, No.
12-3074-JDT-TMP, 2015 WL 52089, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 2, 2015) (“Without such basic
information as a plaintiff’s current address, courts have no recourse but to dismiss a complaint for
failure to prosecute.”).
For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the action by separate Order.

Date:

September 7, 2017

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court

cc:

Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of Record
4416.011

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