Gripp v. Obama

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER by Chief Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. on 10/5/2016: Having failed to meet the notice-pleading standard and having failed to state a claim, this action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc: Plaintiff (pro se) (JBM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
DAVID MICHAEL GRIPP

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-333-JHM

BARACK OBAMA

DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, David Michael Gripp, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint (DN 1) which is
before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and McGore v.Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a general complaint form. He brings this action against
President Barack Obama. In the Statement of Claim portion of the complaint, Plaintiff states, “The klan
or group has not done their job.” In the Relief portion of the complaint, it is difficult to decipher what
Plaintiff has written as some of it is not legible and some is crossed off. However, the portion that is
somewhat clear states, “as for the money 1000 [illegible] of flip of a collector.”

II. ANALYSIS
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, “a . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Conclusory allegations or bare legal conclusions will not
suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 F. App’x 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not
suffice.”); Gregory v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e need not accept
as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.”).
In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to provide material facts in support of any viable legal
theory. The complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter that, if accepted as true, states “a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plaintiff fails to place Defendant on notice as to any claim(s)
against him, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (indicating that the short and
plain statement of a claim must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests’”) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), abrogated on
other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544), and the complaint is simply too
vague and sparse to state a cause of action under any legal theory.
Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the duty
“does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.
1979). Additionally, this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l
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Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To do so would require the “courts to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,
1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. CONCLUSION
Having failed to meet the notice-pleading standard and having failed to state a claim, this
action will be dismissed by separate Order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Date:

October 5, 2016

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4414.003

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