Rudolph v. Ballard et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell on 5/2/2017; re 17 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Michael Durrett, Rodney Ballard ; an appropriate order shall issue.cc:counsel, plaintiff pro se (KJA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-00342-TBR
WILLIAM E. RUDOLPH,

Plaintiff,

v.
RODNEY BALLARD, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
William E. Rudolph, a state inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Rodney Ballard, the Commissioner of the Kentucky
Department of Corrections, and Michael Durrett, an Assistant Unit Director with the
Kentucky Department of Corrections.

He alleges that Commissioner Ballard and

Assistant Unit Director Durrett violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by detaining him past his “serve-out date.” Now, Commissioner Ballard
and Assistant Unit Director Durrett move for summary judgment, arguing that Rudolph
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. Because
there is no genuine dispute of material fact on that point, Commissioner Ballard and
Assistant Unit Director Durrett’s Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 17], is
GRANTED.
I.
During the period of time relevant to this action, William E. Rudolph was
incarcerated at the Hardin County Detention Center in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. [R. 1 at
1 (Complaint).] He alleges that a state court judge sentenced him to a four-year period of
incarceration, less two-hundred thirty days jail-time credit, on December 7, 2011. [Id. at
4.] After Rudolph believed that the date for his release had come and gone, he wrote to
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Rodney Ballard, whom he thought to be the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department
of Corrections, to petition for relief. [Id.] He received no response, and so wrote to
Assistant Unit Director Michael Durrett, whom he thought worked in the Department’s
Records Office in Frankfort, Kentucky. [Id. at 4–5.] Again, however, no response was
forthcoming.
Rudolph then filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Commissioner Ballard
and Assistant Unit Director Durrett.1

He alleges that Commissioner Ballard and

Assistant Unit Director Durrett violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by detaining him past his “serve-out date.” Now, Commissioner Ballard
and Assistant Unit Director Durrett move for summary judgment, arguing that Rudolph
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. [R. 17
(Motion for Summary Judgment).]
II.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals “that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists where “there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court “may not make credibility
determinations nor weigh the evidence when determining whether an issue of fact
remains for trial.” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing

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William E. Rudolph named Teresa Bailey, whom he identifies as the Class D Coordinator of the
Hardin County Detention Center, in his complaint too. [R. 1 at 2 (Complaint).] However, she has not
joined in the instant motion.

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Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d
365, 369 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The ultimate question is ‘whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Back v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 694 F.3d 571, 575
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52).
As the parties moving for summary judgment, Commissioner Ballard and
Assistant Unit Director Durrett must shoulder the burden of showing the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact as to at least one essential element of Rudolph’s claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Assuming that Commissioner Ballard and Assistant Unit
Director Durrett satisfy their burden of production, Rudolph “must—by deposition,
answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file—show specific facts that
reveal a genuine issue for trial.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 726 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.
at 324).
III.
Commissioner Ballard and Assistant Unit Director Durrett argue that summary
judgment is appropriate because Rudolph failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies with respect to his federal claims. [See R. 17-1 at 2–5 (Memorandum in
Support).] On that point, Commissioner Ballard and Assistant Unit Director Durrett are
correct. Therefore, the Court dismisses Rudolph’s federal claims without prejudice and
declines, in its discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining statelaw claims.

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires a prisoner to exhaust all
available administrative remedies before filing any action “with respect to prison
conditions” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). That
exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive
force or some other wrong.”

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); accord

Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999). Exhaustion is mandatory and the
remedies provided “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, or
effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739
(2001)). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with [the prison’s] deadlines and other
critical procedural rules,” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006), and so “it is the
prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
exhaustion,” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007); accord Lee v. Wiley, 789 F.3d 673,
677 (6th Cir. 2015).
In this case, the Department’s Corrections Policies and Procedures (CPP) do just
that. Brock v. Martin, No. 5:15-CV-00083-TBR, 2016 WL 676466, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb.
18, 2016) (citing Laroche v. Hiland, No. 3:09-CV-683-H, 2011 WL 5085597, at *3
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 25, 2011)), aff’d, No. 16-5236 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2016).

Per the

Department’s procedures, an inmate may “request a review or explanation of the method
of sentence calculation for the sentences on which he is presently committed to the
Department.” CPP § 17.4(I)(A)(1). In order to do so, an inmate confined in a jail or
local detention facility must submit a request in writing to the Jail Management Section
of the Offender Information Services Branch in Frankfort, Kentucky. Id. § 17.4(I)(A)(3).

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Here, it is undisputed that Rudolph failed to follow that procedure. Though
Rudolph allegedly sent letters to Commissioner Ballard and Assistant Unit Director
Durrett, [see R. 1 at 4–5], neither were among the persons responsible for reviewing
sentencing calculations. When Rudolph attempted to contact Ballard, he had not yet been
appointed to the position of Commissioner. [See R. 17-4 at 1 (Commission).] Similarly,
Assistant Unit Director Durrett worked out of the Roederer Correctional Complex in
LaGrange, Kentucky; he has not—at any time—worked for the Jail Management Section
of the Offender Information Services Branch in Frankfort.

[R. 17-5 at 1, ¶¶ 2–6

(Durrett’s Affidavit).]
There is no genuine dispute of material fact, then, that Rudolph has not exhausted
all of his available administrative remedies as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires. See Griffith
v. Pamerleau, No. SA-14-CV-591-PM, 2015 WL 2446003, at *4 (W.D. Tex. May 20,
2015) (requiring exhaustion in similar circumstances). Therefore, the Court will dismiss
his federal claims without prejudice. See Bell v. Konteh, 450 F.3d 651, 653 n.4 (6th Cir.
2006) (“It is well established . . . that the appropriate disposition of an unexhausted claim
under the PLRA is dismissal without prejudice.” (citing Boyd v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 380
F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir. 2004); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 510 (6th Cir.
2001); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998))).
Having dismissed Rudolph’s federal claims against Commissioner Ballard and
Assistant Unit Director Durrett, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over his state-law claims for negligence and false imprisonment.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); Wee Care Child Ctr., Inc. v. Lumpkin, 680 F.3d 841, 849 (6th Cir. 2012);
see also 13D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3567.3 (3d

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ed.), Westlaw (database updated April 2017) (“As a general matter, a court will decline
supplemental jurisdiction if the underlying claims are dismissed before trial.”).
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Rudolph’s state-law claims without prejudice too.
IV.
Commissioner Ballard and Assistant Unit Director Durrett’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, [R. 17], is GRANTED. An appropriate order shall issue.
Date:

May 2, 2017

cc:

Counsel of Record
Plaintiff, pro se

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