Ward v. Kentucky State Police et al
Filing
179
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Signed by Judge Rebecca Grady Jennings on 9/13/2022 granting 152 Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss. Ward's Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are DISMISSED. cc: Counsel (SMJ)
Case 3:16-cv-00393-RGJ-RSE Document 179 Filed 09/14/22 Page 1 of 10 PageID #: 1502
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
TIMOTHY AUGUSTUS WARD
Plaintiff
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-393-RGJ-RSE
KENNETH BORDERS, et al.,
Defendants
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Kenneth Borders (“Borders”) and Sergeant Scott Brown (“Brown”)
(“Defendants”) move to partially dismiss Plaintiff Timothy Augustus Ward’s (“Ward”) complaint
against them. [DE 152]. Ward responded [DE 154], and Defendants replied. [DE 155]. For the
reasons below, Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss [DE 152] is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Ward’s claims relate to Defendants’ arrest of him in May 2016. [See DE 151]. After his
arrest, Ward entered a “conditional plea” in state court. [Id. at 1409]. The Court incorporates the
procedural and factual background set forth in its order on Defendants’ motions to dismiss and
Ward’s motion to file a third amended complaint. [DE 150].
Upon preliminary review of the original complaint, the Court dismissed many of Ward’s
pro se claims. [DE 30]. Ward has since amended his complaint three times [DE 34; DE 101; DE
151] and changed counsel status three times [DE 118; DE 166; DE 174]. The Court last analyzed
Ward’s complaint on a simultaneous motion to dismiss and motion to file a third amended
complaint; at that time it dismissed several defendants and claims, and allowed a fourth
amendment. [DE 150]. The remaining claims against Borders and Brown are two § 1983 claims,
a First Amendment retaliation claim, a Fourth Amendment claim for “false arrest/imprisonment,”
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and state law claims for assault, battery, and punitive damages. [DE 65; DE 150; DE 151].
Defendants now move to dismiss the “false arrest/imprisonment” claim. [DE 152].
The Court addressed this claim when Borders moved to dismiss it previously. [DE 41; 65].
The Court determined that neither the Complaint nor the motion to dismiss contained sufficient
factual or legal information about Plaintiff’s arrest, charges, “conditional plea,” apparent
conviction of certain crimes, and subsequent appeals to determine whether Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), barred Ward’s claim. [DE 65 at 560].
II.
STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) instructs that a court must dismiss a complaint if
the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To state a claim, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When considering a motion to dismiss,
courts must presume all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Plan. Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “But the district court
need not accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim
is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A complaint will be dismissed if no law supports the claims made,
if the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the complaint presents an
insurmountable bar to relief.” Southfield Educ. Ass’n v. Southfield Bd. of Educ., 570 F. App’x
485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–64).
Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, if “matters outside the
pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.” The Court “may consider the Complaint and any exhibits
attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to
defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to
the claims contained therein” without converting to a summary judgment. Bassett v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
I.
Fourth Amendment Claim
In his Third Amended Complaint, Ward alleges “false arrest/imprisonment.” [DE 151 at
1411]. The Court initially allowed this as a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest under §
1983.1 [DE 65]. In this claim, Ward alleges that Defendants arrested him “without probable cause
in retaliation” and in violation of his “First [and] Fourth [] Amendment Rights” which “constitutes
The Supreme Court has noted that false arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983 “overlap,” as
false arrest is a “species” of false imprisonment. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Ward does
not differentiate between the claims [see DE 151 at 1411], and false arrest and false imprisonment claims
are “virtually synonymous,” so the Court will analyze Ward’s “false arrest/imprisonment” claim as a single
“false arrest” claim. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 n.2 (2019); see Saltmarshall v. Prime
Healthcare Servs.-Garden City LLC, 831 F. App’x 764, 768 (6th Cir. 2020) (treating plaintiff’s false arrest
and false imprisonment claims “as one” because “false arrest is a subspecies of false imprisonment” (citing
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388–89)).
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false imprisonment.” [DE 151 at 1411]. Ward’s factual allegations specify that Defendants had
no probable cause to arrest him specifically on the charge of disorderly conduct. [See Id. at 1405].
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Ward’s false arrest claim because Ward stipulated to
probable cause for his arrest by conditionally pleading guilty. [DE 152 at 1414-19]. Defendants
argue Ward’s guilty plea, conviction, and exhaustion of state appellate remedies estop him from
bringing his claim under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). [DE 152 at 1414-19]. Ward
argues that his false arrest claim is not barred because there was no probable cause for his arrest.
[DE 154 at 1427-29]. He argues about the facts underlying his arrest—that they did not lead to
probable cause. [See Id. at 1428-30]. Ward argues that Heck does not bar his claim because he
“is not seeking to invalidate his conviction, but his arrest.” [Id. at 1429].
To state a false arrest claim, Ward must plausibly allege that his arrest “was unsupported
by probable cause.” See Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 429 (6th Cir. 2015). The test for
whether an arrest is constitutionally valid is “whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the
officers had probable cause to make it—whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an
offense.” Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620,
627 (6th Cir. 1993). Without probable cause, an arrest constitutes an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 554 (6th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination,
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or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (citations omitted). In other words, “pleading guilty to a criminal charge
estops the plaintiff from challenging probable cause for the arrest for that violation for purposes
of a section 1983 claim.” Helfrich v. City of Lakeside Park, No. CIV.A. 2008-210 WOB, 2010
WL 3927475, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 4, 2010). When considering whether a claim is barred by Heck,
the Sixth Circuit has stated that “the court must look both to the claims raised under § 1983 and to
the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.” Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d
323, 334 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)). “The Heck doctrine applies
only where a § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction.” Settles v.
McKinney, No. 3:12-CV-00368, 2013 WL 5346503, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2013) (citing
Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)).
To support their argument, Defendants attach by reference video exhibits of a suppression
hearing (and transcription of same), a copy of Ward’s “conditional plea” of guilty, and his
subsequent conviction, all from the underlying criminal case. [DE 141 at 1286; DE 144-1; DE
144-2; DE 149-1; DE 150 at 1397; DE 152 at 1414-18]. Defendants also point to the Court’s
statement that Ward has exhausted his appellate remedies on the underlying disorderly conduct
charge. [DE 150 at 1397]. Generally, “matters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered
by a court in ruling on a . . . motion to dismiss.” Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir.
1997). Still, the Court may “consider other materials that are integral to the complaint, are public
records, or are otherwise appropriate for the taking of judicial notice.”
Ashland, Inc. v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 648 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted). The Court may also consider “exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long
as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett,
528 F.3d at 430 (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)). Additionally,
the Court may take judicial notice of public documents and government documents because their
sources “cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Lyons v. Stovall, 188
F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (courts may take judicial notice of proceedings from other
courts).
Ward relies on his arrest as the basis of his claims, references the criminal case and
conditional plea in his third amended complaint, and does not object to the Court’s consideration
of any of Defendants’ attachments. [See DE 151; DE 154]. The criminal case documents are thus
central to Ward’s claims and the Court may properly consider them in deciding Defendants’
motion. And the Court may also appropriately consider the plea, Circuit Court appellate order,
and orders declining discretionary review as proceedings from other courts. See Bassett, 528 F.3d
at 430; and Lyons, 188 F.3d at 332 n.3; see also Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 608 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2020) (considering defendant’s warrant affidavit in deciding 12(b)(6) motion when plaintiff
alleged unconstitutional search and seizure under § 1983); Harris v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty.
Metro Gov’t, No. 3:11-CV-338-H, 2012 WL 777263, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 8, 2012) (considering
transcript and other exhibits from plaintiff’s underlying criminal action, submitted by defendant
when deciding a motion to dismiss, and noting that the underlying state criminal case “[wa]s
certainly ‘central’ to [p]laintiff’s [§ 1983] claims”); and Battle v. Parr, No. 3:17-CV-500-DJH,
2018 WL 4558200, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2018) (considering exhibits attached to motion to
dismiss that were part of plaintiff’s underlying criminal case and “central” to her false arrest claim).
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a. Conditional Plea
In his Third Amended Complaint, Ward references the fact that his plea was “conditional,”
and states that he “thought he was preserving his claims.” [DE 151 at 1409]. The Court, on earlier
motion to dismiss, concluded that Ward’s “conditional plea” may preserve his claim, but that
neither party had provided the Court with sufficient briefing on the issue. [DE 65 at 560]. The
Court again considers whether the “conditional” portion of Ward’s plea preserves his claim. The
‘condition’ on Ward’s plea was retention of “his rights to appeal decisions of 8/1/16 and 9/15/17.”
[DE 116-1 at 1216; DE 116-2 at 1219]. Each of these orders was a denial of Ward’s motion to
dismiss the charges against him—the first motion was a pro se motion to dismiss; the second, a
motion to dismiss “as the evidence is insufficient.” [DE 116-2 at 1218-19]. After his plea, Ward
appealed these orders. [Id. at 1217-21]. The Hardin Circuit Court, on appellate review, first
clarified which issues had been preserved for appellate consideration—what the “conditions” of
Ward’s plea were—and explained that only the two motions to dismiss, for insufficiency of
evidence, were preserved. [Id. at 1219-20]. The Circuit Court then explained that the only time
such a motion could be brought, as had been explained by the lower court, is “following the
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s proof by means of a motion for a directed verdict.” [Id. at
1220]. The Circuit Court held that because there was no trial, no such motion could be properly
brought, and they were properly dismissed. [Id.]. The Circuit Court ultimately affirmed Ward’s
judgment of conviction. [Id. at 1221]. The Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
Kentucky each denied discretionary review, exhausting Ward’s state appellate options on his guilty
plea. [DE 116-3; DE 166-4]. The conditions on Ward’s plea thus do not preserve his claim or bar
a finding of probable cause.
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b. Exculpatory Evidence
Ward also argues that his claim is preserved because he “is not seeking to invalidate his
conviction, but his arrest,” because Defendants “fabricated evidence and thus did not have
probable cause for the arrest” and he “would not have pled guilty if [he] would have been presented
with the exculpatory evidence.” [DE 154 at 1429]. This is essentially an argument that Brady
evidence was withheld.
But this argument, if won, “would necessarily call into question the
propriety of his convictions” and thus the rule from Heck bars this argument and does not bar a
finding of probable cause. Hobbs v. Faulkner, No. 19-3303, 2020 WL 12933850, at *2 (6th Cir.
June 9, 2020) (citing Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a
Brady claim “necessarily implies the invalidity of the underlying conviction”)).
c. Estoppel under Heck
Ward was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, among other things. [DE 116-2
at 1217]. He entered a “conditional guilty plea” and was convicted of “disorderly conduct, 2nd
degree.” [Id. at 1217-18; DE 151 at 1409]. Ward does not argue otherwise; he argues only that
there was no probable cause based on the elements—that under Kentucky law disorderly conduct
must occur in a public place, the Merriam Webster dictionary defines public as “exposed to general
view,” and only police observed his conduct. [DE 154 at 1428-29]. His Fourth Amendment false
arrest claim is based on a lack of probable cause on the disorderly conduct charge. [See DE 151
at 1403-11; DE 154 at 1427-30]. Since he conditionally pleaded guilty on the disorderly conduct
charge, Ward is barred from arguing that Defendants arrested him without probable cause on that
same violation. [DE 116-1; DE 116-2; see Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; See also Helfrich, 2010 WL
3927475, at *1 (“pleading guilty to a criminal charge estops the plaintiff from challenging probable
cause for the arrest for that violation for purposes of a section 1983 claim”); and Stoner v. Wills,
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No. CIV.A. 3:08-69-DCR, 2009 WL 3126312, at *2–3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 24, 2009) (“As a result of
his guilty plea, [plaintiff] is estopped from arguing that [the officer defendant] did not have
probable cause to arrest him . . . Because an essential element of a claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for an alleged unreasonable seizure is that probable cause did not exist, [plaintiff’s] claim under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment fails.”).
The Court finds no argument preserving Ward’s claim or barring a finding of probable
cause. Under Heck, Ward’s guilty plea thus bars him from arguing that Defendants arrested him
without probable cause and his Fourth Amendment claim cannot proceed. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–
87; Stoner, 2009 WL 3126312, at *2–3. Thus, Defendants Motion to Dismiss [DE 152] is
GRANTED and Ward’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim is DISMISSED.
II.
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss Ward’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
[DE 152 at 1413-14]. The Court ordered the Third Amended Complaint not to include such claims.
[DE 150 at 1401]. Ward states that references to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
“were intended to be stricken” and “unintentionally missed.” [DE 154 at 1427]. The Court
considers these claims DISMISSED.
III.
First Amendment and State Law Claims
Defendants did not move to dismiss Ward’s First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim or
state law claims, and these claims remain against Borders and Brown. The dispositive motion
deadline is February 6, 2023, and this case remains set for trial September 25, 2023. [DE 178].
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, THE COURT ORDERS
AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss [DE 152] is GRANTED, and Ward’s Fourth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims are DISMISSED.
September 13, 2022
Cc: Counsel of record
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