Jeffries v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION & ORDER by Judge David J. Hale on 1/23/2018; re 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Leslie Jeffries, 18 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION by Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay on 9/2 9/2017 re 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment . For the reasons stated forth in this opinion, The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay (D.N. 18) are ADOPTED in full and INCORPORATED by reference herein. Jeffries motion for summary judgment (D.N. 14) is DENIED. A separate judgment will be entered this date. cc:counsel (ARM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
LESLIE JEFFRIES,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-501-DJH-CHL

CAROLYN COLVIN, acting Commissioner of
Social Security,

Defendant.

* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leslie Jeffries filed this action seeking review of the decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security to deny Jeffries’ applications for disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income. (Docket No. 1) The case was referred to Magistrate Judge
Colin H. Lindsay for report and recommendation. Judge Lindsay issued his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation on September 29, 2017, recommending that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed and that Jeffries’ complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
(D.N. 18) Jeffries timely filed objections to Judge Lindsay’s report and recommendation. (D.N.
19) For the reasons set forth below, Jeffries’ objections will be overruled.

After careful

consideration, the Court will adopt in full Judge Lindsay’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation.
I.

Background

On May 30, 2013, Jeffries filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits. (D.N. 12-5, PageID # 237–50) The Commissioner
denied the applications on July 3, 2013, and again upon reconsideration on September 16, 2013.
(See D.N. 12-4) Jeffries thereafter filed a written request for a hearing before an administrative
law judge. (Id., PageID # 182) On January 12, 2015, the ALJ issued an opinion denying
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Jeffries’ claims. (D.N. 12-2, PageID # 65–73) The ALJ found, among other things, that Jeffries
has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform “light work” as defined in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).1 (Id., PageID # 68–72) The ALJ also found that considering
Jeffries’ age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that she can perform. (Id., PageID # 72–73) The appeals
council denied Jeffries’ request for review. (Id., PageID # 54)
Jeffries filed this action on August 4, 2016, challenging the Commissioner’s denial of her
claims. (D.N. 1) Jeffries moved for summary judgment. (D.N. 14) Specifically, Jeffries argues
that the ALJ’s decision warrants reversal on two grounds: (1) the ALJ’s “[RFC] finding does not
include any limitation for . . . Jeffries’ well-documented medical[ly] determinable bilateral hand
impairment” and (2) “the ALJ did not evaluate treating source primary care physician[] Dr.
Virginia Purdom’s medical opinion as a treating source opinion and did not cite good reasons for
rejecting it.” (D.N. 14-1, PageID # 484) The Court referred this matter to Magistrate Judge
Colin H. Lindsay, who issued a report and recommendation on September 29, 2017. (D.N. 13;
D.N. 18) Judge Lindsay recommends that this Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision and
that Jeffries’ complaint be dismissed with prejudice. (D.N. 18, PageID # 532)
II.

Standard

When reviewing a report and recommendation, this Court reviews de novo “those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court may adopt without review any portion of the
report to which an objection is not made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). On
review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further
1

“Residual functional capacity” is the most a claimant can do despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545.
2

evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.”
72(b)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Accordingly, the Court will review de novo the portions of Judge Lindsay’s

recommendation to which Jeffries objects to determine if relief is warranted.
As detailed in Judge Lindsay’s recommendation, “[t]he Commissioner has promulgated
regulations setting forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for evaluating a disability
claim.” (D.N. 18, PageID # 527 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1))) Only steps four and five
are at issue in Jeffries’ objections. At step four, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC with the
physical and mental demands of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). The claimant
has the burden of proof at step four. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir.
1997). At step five, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC with her age, education, and work
experience to determine whether she can make an adjustment to other work.

20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Walters, 127 F.3d at
529.
In reviewing an ALJ’s decision, the Court asks “whether it is supported by substantial
evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486
F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined as more than
a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The
Court “may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of
credibility.” Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)). Where substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision, the Court “must affirm.” Staymate v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 681 F.
App’x 462, 466 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994)).

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Moreover, “[t]he findings of the [ALJ] are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in
the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.” Buxton v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 246 F.3d 762, 772–73 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388,
389–90 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably support
the conclusion reached.”).
III.

Discussion

A. The ALJ’s RFC Finding
Jeffries first takes issue with the ALJ’s RFC finding, and specifically the ALJ’s failure to
include any limitation regarding Jeffries’ alleged hand impairment. (D.N. 14-1, PageID # 493–
95) In his recommendation, Judge Lindsay rejected this argument, finding that “substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC findings.” (D.N. 18, PageID # 529) He noted that “all of the
experts’ medical reports indicated that while [Jeffries] was experiencing discomfort in her hands,
not only was there . . . no definitive diagnosis for her ailment, but the specialists’ findings did not
support the degree of distress that [Jeffries] claimed.” (Id.) The expert reports included (i) Dr.
Knetsche’s neurological examination of Jeffries, which found that she had normal motor
strength, sensation, and painless range of motion of her upper extremities; (ii) Dr. Nazar’s
neurological examination, which concluded that Jeffries had full motion of all extremities; and
(iii) Dr. Sajid’s report, which found that Jeffries did not have rheumatoid arthritis.2 (Id. (citing
D.N. 12-2, PageID # 70–71))

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The ALJ additionally cited tests applied to Jeffries’ hands. The testing concluded that while
Jeffries had minimal carpal tunnel syndrome and some pain and stiffness, she had normal muscle
strength and sensation in both hands. (D.N. 12-2, PageID # 70) The ALJ also cited Dr. Tsai’s
recommendation that Jeffries could complete light-duty work with no other restrictions. (Id.)
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In her objection, Jeffries alleges that the ALJ and magistrate judge reached their
conclusions “by performing a selective reading of the medical evidence, focusing only on what
they perceived as normal findings to reject Ms. Jeffries’ claims and [Jeffries’ treating physician]
Dr. Purdom’s opinion.”3 (D.N. 19, PageID # 537) This allegation is essentially a claim that the
ALJ and magistrate “cherry picked” the record evidence. An ALJ need not “discuss every piece
of evidence in the record,” however. Conner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x 248, 254 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Thacker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Furthermore, a claim of “cherry picking” is “seldom successful because crediting it would
require a court to re-weigh record evidence.” DeLong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 748 F.3d 723, 726
(6th Cir. 2014). As discussed above, the “substantial evidence” standard does not permit this
Court to make evidentiary rulings. Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528.
As a corollary to her initial objection, Jeffries cites Social Security Rule 16-3p, which
states that an ALJ “will not disregard an individual’s statements about . . . symptoms solely
because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate the degree of impairment-related
symptoms alleged by the individual.” 2016 WL 1119029 at *5 (Mar. 16, 2016). Although
Jeffries does not make her point explicit, by citing SSR 16-3p, she seems to insinuate that the
ALJ erred by discounting her reports of pain based on the objective evidence alone.
Several district courts within this circuit have held that SSR 16-3p does not apply
retroactively. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Colvin, No. 3:16-cv-20, 2017 WL 395087, at *9 n.4 (M.D.
Tenn. Jan. 30, 2017), report & recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1018432 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.
16, 2017); Jefferson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-cv-10167, 2017 WL 411211, at *4 n.1 (E.D.

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The opinion at issue is a questionnaire that Dr. Purdom completed at the request of Jeffries’
attorney, in which Purdom recommended certain work restrictions for Jeffries. (See D.N. 12-2,
PageID # 71) That opinion is discussed in more detail below.
5

Mich. Jan. 9, 2017), report & recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 395295 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2017); Cameron v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-169, 2016 WL 4094884, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 2,
2016); see generally Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The
[Social Security] Act does not generally give the [Social Security Administration] the power to
promulgate retroactive regulations.”). That is an issue here because the ALJ rendered her
decision on January 12, 2015 (D.N. 1, PageID # 1), over a year before the rule was adopted.
Accordingly, Jeffries may not rely on SSR 16-3p. See Scott v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-CV-108REW, 2017 WL 875480, at *5 n.7 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 3, 2017) (declining to apply SSR 16-3p
retroactively and instead analyzing “the ruling and legal guidance in effect at the time of [the
plaintiff’s] administrative disability determination”); Cameron, 2016 WL 4094884 at *2 (“It is
well-established that, absent explicit language to the contrary, administrative rules do not apply
retroactively . . . . Because the text of SSR 16-3p does not indicate the SSA’s intent to apply it
retroactively, the Court declines to do so.”).
Even if the Rule applies retroactively, Jeffries’ objection is unavailing.

The stated

purpose of SSR 16-3p is merely to “clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an
examination of an individual’s character.” 2016 WL 1119029 at *1. The Sixth Circuit has
concluded that this is the purpose behind the rule. See Dooley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 656 F.
App’x 113, 119 n.1 (6th Cir. 2016). Thus, so long as the ALJ did not judge Jeffries’ character in
evaluating her reported symptoms against the objective medical evidence, there is no violation of
SSR 16-3p.

See Scott, 2017 WL 875480 at *5 n.7 (“The ALJ evaluated [the plaintiff’s]

complaints against the objective medical evidence; she did not judge [the plaintiff’s]
character.”); see also Huigens v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, No. 17-11682, 2017 WL 6311683
(11th Cir. Dec. 11, 2017) (“[T]o the extent the ALJ stated in his decision that [the claimant’s]

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‘credibility is questionable,’ the ALJ’s statement, viewed in context, was not an assessment of
[the claimant’s] overall character for truthfulness and thus was consistent with . . . SSR 16-3p.”).
In her decision, the ALJ concluded: “[a]fter careful consideration of the evidence, the
undersigned finds that the claimant is generally credible regarding the nature of her impairment;
however, the objective medical evidence does not support the severity of pain she describes.”
(D.N. 12-2, PageID # 70) The ALJ thus evaluated Jeffries’ reported symptoms against the
objective evidence and without judgment of Jeffries’ character. The ALJ therefore complied
with SSR 16-3p.4
Moreover, an ALJ’s finding regarding a claimant’s subjective allegations should not be
lightly disregarded. See Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv’s, 820 F.2d 777, 780 (6th
Cir. 1987). Indeed, “the Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s reliance on a lack of objective
medical testing to discount the severity or existence of a claimant’s [claims of disability] is not
erroneous.” Payne v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-cv-13165, 2017 WL 4985646, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 16, 2017) (citing Long v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 56 F. App’x 213, 214 (6th Cir.
2003)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (“In determining whether you are disabled, we
consider . . . the extent to which your symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with
the objective medical evidence.”). Thus, even under a broad reading of SSR 16-3p, the ALJ did
not err in discounting Jeffries’ reported symptoms where the complaints were inconsistent with
the objective medical evidence.

4

Ultimately, SSR 16-3p simply instructs the ALJ to “consider an individual’s statements about
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms, and . . . evaluate whether the
statements are consistent with the objective medical evidence and the other evidence.” SSR 163p, 2016 WL 1119029 at *4. The ALJ did that by evaluating Jeffries’ reported symptoms in
light of the objective medical evidence and Jeffries’ testimony at the hearing. (D.N. 12-2,
PageID # 68–72)
7

In sum, despite Dr. Purdom’s opinion, the record contains substantial evidence
supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Jeffries’ hand condition is such that she may still perform
“light work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); § 416.967(b); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241. The Court will
therefore adopt Judge Lindsay’s conclusion that “the ALJ adequately considered the objective
medical evidence” in determining Jeffries’ RFC. (D.N. 18, PageID # 529–30)
B. The Treating-Physician Rule
Jeffries also argues that the ALJ erred because she did not evaluate Dr. Purdom’s opinion
as a treating-source opinion and did not cite good reasons for rejecting it. 5 (D.N. 14-1, PageID #
495–98) The treating-physician rule states that an ALJ will generally give greater weight to
medical opinions from “treating sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). A “treating source” is a
medical professional who has provided the claimant with medical treatment or an evaluation and
who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with the claimant. Id. § 404.1527(a)(2).
The ALJ may decline to give greater deference to a treating physician’s opinion, however, if she
articulates “good reasons” for doing so. § 404.1527(c)(2). For example, “[t]he opinion of a
treating physician is entitled to greater weight only if it is based on objective medical findings
and is not contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary.” Edwards v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 97 F. App’x 567, 570 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2) (“If we find that a treating source’s medical opinion . . . is well-supported by
medically acceptable . . . techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial

5

Again, the opinion at issue is Dr. Purdom’s response to a questionnaire Jeffries’ counsel
instructed Dr. Purdom to complete. Although an ALJ may not automatically reject an opinion
solely because it was solicited by plaintiff’s counsel, see Hinton v. Massanari, 13 F. App’x 819,
824 (10th Cir. 2001), an ALJ may properly downplay the opinion’s significance when it is
presented without supporting treatment notes. See Cutlip v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 25
F.3d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding that treating-physician opinions “are only accorded great
weight when they are supported by sufficient clinical findings”).
8

evidence . . . we will give it controlling weight.” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, “[i]f the
opinion of a treating source is not accorded controlling weight, an ALJ must apply certain
factors . . . in determining what weight to give the opinion.” Pasco v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 137
F. App’x 828, 837 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). Specifically, the ALJ must
consider “the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature
and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion
with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)).
In his recommendation, Judge Lindsay found that the ALJ stated “good reasons” for not
awarding greater deference to Dr. Purdom’s opinion. (D.N. 18, PageID # 530–32) First, Dr.
Purdom is a family-medicine doctor. Because the regulations direct ALJs to give greater weight
to medical opinions from relevant specialists, Judge Lindsay concluded that the ALJ correctly
gave greater weight to the specialists’ opinions. (D.N. 18, PageID # 531) Second, the ALJ noted
that Dr. Purdom’s final opinion—the only opinion that placed substantial limitations on Jeffries’
ability to work—conflicted with the medical opinion of every other specialist. Id. (citing D.N.
12-2, PageID # 71) Third, the ALJ found that Dr. Purdom’s opinion was not supported by her
own treatment notes and only appeared on a RFC questionnaire that Jeffries’ counsel requested
she complete. (Id. (citing D.N. 12-2, PageID # 71)) Jeffries objects to this finding, arguing that
since the ALJ and the magistrate judge cited the specialization factor only, they did not provide
“good reasons” for straying from the treating-physician rule.6 (D.N. 19, PageID # 538–39)

6

Jeffries also argued that the ALJ erred by claiming that Dr. Purdom is not a “specialist.” (D.N.
14-1, PageID # 498) Jeffries did not raise this argument in her objection, however, and thus the
Court need not address it. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In any event, district courts within this
circuit have found that family medicine is not a “specialty” as that term is understood in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). See Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12–12639, 2013 WL 4482969, at
9

Essentially, Jeffries claims that the ALJ erred by not weighing all of the factors listed in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
This argument is unpersuasive. The ALJ need not explicitly apply all of the factors listed
in the regulations. Rather, the Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s explanation for straying from
the treating-physician rule must merely be “supported by the evidence in the case record, and
must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Cole
v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011). In fact, “[a]lthough the regulations instruct an ALJ
to consider the[] factors, they expressly require only that the ALJ’s decision include ‘good
reasons’ . . . not an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis.” Francis v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin.,
414 F. App’x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Kepke v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 636 F. App’x
625, 630 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ALJ gave good reasons for discounting [the treating
physician’s] opinion . . . by considering some of the listed factors.” (emphasis added)); Lynn v.
Colvin, No. 16-153-ART, 2016 WL 8943300, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2016) (“[The ALJ] was
not required to type up an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis in his decision.” (internal
quotations omitted)). Here, the ALJ’s decision to stray from the treating-physician rule is
supported by the evidence in the record, and it is clear from her decision what weight she gave to
Dr. Purdom’s opinion and the reasons for that weight. (D.N. 12-2, PageID # 71) This is
sufficient under Sixth Circuit precedent. See Cole, 661 F.3d at 937.
Moreover, Jeffries incorrectly claims that the ALJ weighed only the specialization factor.
“While an ALJ must always give good reasons in a decision for the weight assigned to a treating
source’s opinion, failure to do so is harmless error when the supportability of a doctor’s opinion,
*10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2013); Steward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:07–CV–1012, 2009 WL
1586214, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2009).
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or its consistency with other evidence in the record, is indirectly attacked via an ALJ’s analysis
of a physician’s other opinions or h[er] analysis of the claimant’s ailments.” O’Connell v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16–1392, 2017 WL 4570466, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2017) (citing
Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations
omitted)). Indeed, courts have upheld rulings similar to the one at issue here in which the ALJ
did not explicitly detail her weighing of every factor. See, e.g., Hardman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 13–14309, 2015 WL 869869, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2015) (“[T]he Court finds that [a
factor-by-factor] analysis is not needed where the ALJ did determine that [the treating
physician’s] opinion was inconsistent with the record as a whole, specifically the three opinions
of the [consultative] examiners, as well as her own medical notes and Plaintiff’s testimony.”)
Here, the ALJ indirectly analyzed the supportability and consistency of Dr. Purdom’s opinion by
noting that no other medical opinion in the record supported Dr. Purdom’s findings and that her
own treatment notes did not support the findings contained in her answers to the questionnaire.
(D.N. 12-2, PageID # 71) In sum, the ALJ provided good reasons for straying from the treatingphysician rule. The Court will therefore adopt Judge Lindsay’s conclusion that the ALJ gave
proper weight to Dr. Purdom’s opinion.
Jeffries’ final objection alleges that the magistrate judge “erred by finding that the ALJ
was correct to find Ms. Jeffries had ‘no issues’ performing her activities of daily living.” (D.N.
19, PageID # 539) In support of this objection, Jeffries cites a pain questionnaire completed
during the application process in which she described difficulty with household chores, bathing,
and grocery shopping. (D.N. 12-6, PageID # 281–85) Regardless of how she answered the
questionnaire, Jeffries testified at the hearing before the ALJ that she can do laundry, drive, go to
the grocery store, and properly address her personal hygiene. (D.N. 12-2, PageID # 86–91)

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Perhaps the ALJ’s use of the phrase “no issues” was inartful, but the point remains clear:
Jeffries’ testimony, coupled with the confirming opinions from medical specialists, provided the
ALJ with substantial evidence to conclude that Jeffries could perform “light work.” The Court
will therefore overrule Jeffries’ final full objection.
Jeffries’ remaining argument, which does not rise to the level of a full objection, is
similarly unavailing. Jeffries argues that the ALJ erred because “there is no other medical
opinion evidence in the file from a treating or examining source showing Ms. Jeffries is more
capable than Dr. Purdom opined.” (Id., PageID # 537) Such a particular finding is not required,
however. To affirm the ALJ’s decision, this Court merely needs to conclude that the ALJ’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and was made pursuant to proper
legal standards. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241. As discussed at length above, that standard is satisfied
here.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is
hereby
ORDERED as follows:
(1)

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Magistrate

Judge Colin H. Lindsay (D.N. 18) are ADOPTED in full and INCORPORATED by reference
herein.
(2)

Jeffries’ motion for summary judgment (D.N. 14) is DENIED.

(3)

A separate judgment will be entered this date.

January 23, 2018

12

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court