Balcar et al v. Kentucky State Reformatory et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Judge Greg N. Stivers on 1/11/2017; For the reasons (set forth), this action will be dismissed by separate Order. cc: Plaintiffs, pro se; Defendants; General Counsel, JPSC (CDR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
YALE LARRY BALCAR et al.

PLAINTIFFS

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-P687-GNS

KENTUCKY STATE REFORMATORY et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs, Yale Larry Balcar and Carl J. Perry, Jr., pro se, have filed a complaint on this
Court’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 form. This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other
grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, the complaint will be
dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiffs, who are incarcerated at the Kentucky State Reformatory (KSR), name as
Defendants KSR; the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC); KSR Warden Aaron Smith;
KSR Deputy Warden James Coynes; and KDOC Commissioner Rodney Ballard. They allege
that Commissioner Ballard has restricted inmate accounts to no more than $1,000 each. They
state that any money over $1,000 will be taken in violation of the Due Process and Takings
Clauses of the Constitution. They also allege that Defendants KSR, Smith, and Coynes “are
restrict or refusal to allow money to be credit to Balcar and Perry, Jr., inmate account and they
are return it back to sender.” They also state that they are not allowed to disburse money from
their inmate accounts to their personal accounts “on the outside.” Plaintiffs further allege that
the “rule is the prison inmate account is a interest-bearing account and is require to paid all
prisoners their interest on their money and KSR do not paid their interest at all” in violation of

the Due Process and Takings Clauses. Finally, they allege that Defendants KSR, Smith, and
Coynes seize their state pay, alleging that Defendants “want plaintiffs to paid for their legal
postage to acess the court, legal copy, medical co-pay and their incarceration. Plaintiffs has a
right to their wages. This is a due process claim. And violate the taking clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” Plaintiffs ask for various injunctive relief as well as monetary and punitive
damages.
II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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Claim related to rule prohibiting more than $1,000 in prison account
Plaintiffs allege that their inmate accounts are restricted to $1,000 each and that they are
not allowed to disburse funds from their inmate accounts to “outside” personal bank accounts.
However, according to their applications to proceed without prepayment of fees, neither Plaintiff
has much money in his KSR account and neither inmate has an outside bank account. In fact,
Plaintiff Balcar’s inmate account had a six-month deposit average of less than $1 with a current
balance of less than $.05 (DN 6). Plaintiff Perry’s inmate account had a six-month deposit
average of under $20 with a current account balance of less than $2 (DN 4).
“Standing is ‘the threshold question in every federal case.’” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). To
satisfy the Constitution’s requirement that the plaintiff bringing the action has standing to do so,
“a plaintiff must have suffered some actual or threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct
of the defendant; the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action; and there must be a
substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiff’s injury.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Neither Plaintiff has funds approaching the $1,000 limit on
inmate accounts, and neither Plaintiff alleges a reason to believe that his economic situation will
change. Further, neither Plaintiff has an “outside” bank account. Thus, Plaintiffs lack standing
regarding allegations that inmate prison accounts are restricted to no more than $1,000 or that
they should be allowed to disburse money from their prison trust account to personal bank
accounts “on the outside.” For this reason, this claim will be dismissed.
Claim related to return of money
Plaintiffs allege simply that Defendants “restrict or refus[e] to allow money to be credit to
Balcar and Perry, Jr., inmate account and they . . . return it back to sender.” Plaintiffs offer no

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specifics. It seems unlikely that Defendants would refuse properly made contributions to
Plaintiffs’ inmate accounts given that, under Kentucky Department of Corrections Policy and
Procedure (CPP) 15.7(II)(D), “If an inmate owes the institution money or restitution, incoming
funds to the inmate’s account shall be applied to outstanding debts . . . .” And, according to the
complaint, in fact, money is being taken out of Plaintiffs’ accounts to pay for Plaintiffs’ debts to
KSR. Therefore, the Court finds that this claim frivolous. See Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898
F.2d 126, 130 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting factual allegations in a complaint may be “clearly
baseless” and therefore frivolous in a § 1915 context if they are contradicted by other allegations
in the complaint).
Claim related to interest on trust account
Plaintiffs allege that their inmate accounts are interest-bearing, but that they have not
been paid any interest. Plaintiffs cite to no authority that KSR is required to pay interest on their
trust accounts. They state that the “rule is the prison inmate account is a interest-bearing
account.” The Court notes that CPP 15.7(II) states: “Any interest earned shall be used strictly
for the benefit of inmates.” Thus, this policy and procedure does not mandate that interest be
paid. Even if such an institutional rule exists, the violation of that rule does not rise to a
constitutional violation. The failure of a prison, or the state, to follow its own policies and
procedures does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d
232, 240 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that failure to comply with an administrative rule does not by
itself give rise to a constitutional violation).
Even if the failure to pay Plaintiffs interest is a misuse of Plaintiff’s funds, such an
allegation fails to state a § 1983 claim because generally the misuse of jail funds does not
establish a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights under § 1983. See, e.g., Blanton v.

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Bedford Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., No. 4:15-cv-14-HSM-WBC, 2016 WL 447490, at *3 (E.D. Tenn.
Feb. 4, 2016); Knight v. Montgomery Cty. Jail, No. 3:15-cv-00309, 2015 WL 1549275, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2015) (“The alleged theft or misuse of jail funds does not establish a
violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights sounding in § 1983.”). Consequently, the Court
will dismiss this claim.
Claim regarding seizure of state pay
Plaintiffs have not stated a constitutional claim with regard to the withdrawal of funds
from their trust accounts which they allege occurs to pay for postage, copies, medical co-pays,
and for the cost of their incarceration. Withdrawing funds to pay court costs, fees, and the cost
of confinement does not violate an inmate’s constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment.
See Bailey v. Carter, 15 F. App’x 245, 249 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that charging inmates per
diem or co-pay fees does not violate the Fifth Amendment because the inmates receive services
(housing, food, and medical care) in exchange for the fees). Thus, Plaintiffs have not alleged a
Fifth Amendment violation.
Further, the Sixth Circuit has held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
does not require the state to provide inmates with a predeprivation hearing prior to assessing fees
against them. Sickles v. Campbell Cty., Ky., 501 F.3d 726, 730-32 (6th Cir. 2007); Cole v.
Warren Cty., Ky., No. 1:11-CV-00189-JHM, 2012 WL 1950419, at *6-8 (W.D. Ky. May 30,
2012) (finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation when defendants deducted fees from
plaintiffs’ inmate accounts that were not authorized by statute); Harper v. Oldham Cty. Jail, No.
3:10CV-P735-S, 2011 WL 1399771, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 2011) (finding that the Oldham
County Jail was not required to provide plaintiffs with a predeprivation hearing before assessing
per diem fees). “In § 1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property interest without

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procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for
redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiffs have failed to allege an inadequacy of state remedies in the case at bar and have,
therefore, failed to allege a Fourteenth Amendment violation as well.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

January 11, 2017

Greg N. Stivers, Judge
District Court

cc:

Plaintiffs, pro se
United States
Defendants
General Counsel, Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, Office of Legal Counsel
4416.009

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