Carr v. Buckley et al
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale. Certain of Plaintiff's claims dismissed as set forth. Clerk to terminate Defendants Haynes, Wine, Straw, Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defender Corp., and Commonwealth of Kentucky from docket of this action. Clerk to change name of Defendant City of Louisville to Louisville Metro Government. Certain of Plaintiff's claims to proceed as set forth. Action is stayed pending final disposition of criminal case against Plaintiff. Plaintiff to notify Court of final disposition of state criminal action as set forth. cc:counsel, plaintiff pro se, Jefferson County Attorney (JAC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
THOMAS JEWELL CARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-P748-DJH
OFFICER BUCKLEY et al.,
Defendants.
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Thomas Jewell Carr, a pretrial detainee, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (DN 1). This matter is before the Court for initial review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled
on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons that follow, the Court
will allow the failure to train claim against Defendant Louisville Metro Government1 and the
three federal constitutional claims against Defendant Buckley in his individual capacity to
proceed. The remaining claims and Defendants will be dismissed from this action. Further, as to
the proceeding claims, the Court will stay this action pending final disposition of the state
criminal case against Plaintiff.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff names the following six Defendants in this action: (1) Officer Buckley, a metro
police officer at “(LMD) Jefferson County”; (2) Thomas B. Wine, the Commonwealth Attorney
1
Plaintiff named the City of Louisville as a Defendant in this action. In 2003, the City of Louisville government
merged with the surrounding Jefferson County government and formed what is now referred to as the
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government (Louisville Metro Government). See http://www.louisvilleky.gov.
Therefore, the separate governmental entity of the City of Louisville no longer exists. See Cross v. Louisville Police
Dep., No. 3:15CV-874-GNS, 2016 WL 3129261, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 2, 2016). The Court will construe the claims
against the City of Louisville as being brought against the merged Louisville Metro Government.
for Jefferson County; (3) Courtney Straw, an Assistant Commonwealth Attorney for Jefferson
County; (4) Judge Haynes, a district court judge for Jefferson County, Kentucky; (5) LouisvilleJefferson County Public Defender Corp; and (6) “City of Louisville/State of Kentucky.”
Plaintiff sues the four individuals in both their individual and official capacities. The remaining
two Defendants he sues in their official capacity. As relief, Plaintiff seeks “200-million dollar’s”
and “Lawyer recommandation’s/ Depending on settlement offer if any.”
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Buckley and some other officers responded to a 911
caller reporting that “(4-subject’s with gun’s entered their home) as well as stated ‘3-blackfemale’s’ are ‘Assaulting her,’ then stated ‘2-Black-male’s,’ followed by saying ‘We watching
out the window now & there is at least 16-people outside and they all jumping on her.’” Plaintiff
states that the victim and other witnesses at the scene made statements that “‘Caller’s’ had a
‘Gun.’” Plaintiff states that Defendant Buckley and the other officers ignored statements given
to them and “‘refused’ to locate (9-1-1 caller’s) question them for statements & check weapon
for ‘DNA’ from ‘Victim’ because ‘Victim’ had a bloody nose & mouth as well a ‘HUGE-knot’
on her ‘forehead’ as if she had been ‘Pistol-whipped.’” According to Plaintiff, Defendant
Buckley talked to the first witness, who was a black female
who pointed out the ‘Victim/White-Female,’ which came to his ‘conclusion’ the
‘victim-White-Female’ was ‘DATING’ the ‘1st contact-witness/Black-female’s’
(uncle) which would be a ‘Black-male’ as his (subject), therefore; (Assuming-&
Racial-Profiling) the situation, ‘mis-leading’ himself as well other officer’s to
‘ignore’ (any-statement’s) outside of (her boyfriend-A BLACK MALE) which is
‘why’ officer’s (never) got statement’s from ‘9-1-1- caller’s’ & ‘Immediately’
began searching the area for myself ‘before’ i (returned) to the scene ‘selfWillingly’ because I did ‘Nothing-Wrong.’
Plaintiff states that the victim voiced that she did not want to press charges and did not want to
be bothered. Plaintiff states that this made the officers upset and mad.
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Plaintiff states that Defendant Buckley took statements from other witnesses. According
to Plaintiff, at the end of the investigation during a phone conversation, Defendant Buckley
“admitted (No-Witnesses, witnessed ‘Accussed’ Assault-Victim) and (Assumed) once ‘again’
that ‘victim’ was being ‘Relucktant’ and trying to keep the ‘Accussed’ out of trouble because
‘victim’ wanted to ‘NOT’ press charges & would ‘NOT’ say . . . that ‘Accussed’ Assaulted-her.”
Plaintiff states that Defendant Buckley changed “the statement in ‘Citation’ as well ‘Testifiedunder oath’” to lock Plaintiff up and have him indicted. Plaintiff contends that he was falsely
arrested and charged.
Plaintiff states that Defendants Wine and Straw “continuously” call and write letters to
Plaintiff’s “fiancée/victim” trying to get her to change her statement and say that Plaintiff
assaulted her. According to Plaintiff, these Defendants have threatened his “fiancée/victim” with
prosecution if she continues to write to Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that she writes him letters about
how she is being “Harrassed & threaned” and how it has caused her to be “hurt/confused and
feeling ‘insulted.’” Plaintiff states that Defendants Wine and Straw flash false evidence,
“photo’s of victim/my fiancée” to mislead the judge to believe that Plaintiff caused her injuries.
Plaintiff contends that he is being judged by his past, and that his past does not make him guilty
of today’s allegations. Plaintiff asserts that he is innocent of the charges.
Plaintiff complains that his “fiancée/victim” was forced to stay outside the courtroom
while Defendant Buckley testified falsely against him. Plaintiff also complains that Defendant
Haynes would not allow his “fiancée/victim” to testify at the probable cause hearing. Plaintiff
contends that if she had been allowed to testify, she would have shown that Defendant Buckley’s
statements were false. Further, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Haynes found probable cause
based on false testimony. Plaintiff states that Defendant Haynes revoked his probation and
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denied him shock probation after serving six months. Plaintiff states that Defendant Haynes also
let Plaintiff’s probation officer testify against him.
As to Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defendant Corp., Plaintiff states that
he has had five different attorneys and has filed complaints with the Kentucky Bar Association
about his attorneys, but “still receive[s] ‘Negative-outcomes’ or ‘None at All.’” Plaintiff asserts
that he has been lied to by a secretary in this Defendant’s office, neglected by counselors,
insulted by counselors, lied to by counselors at this office, “‘Denied’ motion’s to be filed by
‘Attorney’s,’” had his messages ignored, and had conflicts with attorneys in this Defendant’s
office.
Plaintiff states that his first attorney left the office and moved to New York. Thereafter,
Plaintiff was represented by a second attorney who only talked briefly to Plaintiff once right
before his court hearing. This attorney, according to Plaintiff, told Plaintiff that he was making a
deal with the prosecutor on another charge. Plaintiff represents that he informed this attorney
that he wanted a fast and speedy trial “so everything can be taken care of all at once.” Plaintiff
states that the attorney represented he would file such a motion. According to Plaintiff, after
that, this second attorney never contacted Plaintiff to discuss his case, never returned Plaintiff’s
calls, and never filed a motion for a speedy trial. Plaintiff states that when he called to speak
with this attorney, he was informed by Defendant Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defendant
Corp. that this attorney was out sick. Plaintiff asserts that this was a lie because Plaintiff later
found out that this attorney had been suspended.
Plaintiff states that a “step-in’ Attorney” represented him in court in July. This third
attorney, according to Plaintiff, informed Plaintiff that she had spoken with Plaintiff’s fiancé and
his fiancé denied all of the allegations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that he had a fourth
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attorney at his next court date who also told him that he had spoken with Plaintiff’s fiancé, and
his fiancé had denied the allegations against Plaintiff. This fourth attorney, according to
Plaintiff, stated that he was going to file a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s case and that everything
would be “wrapped up & over” by September 2016.
On August 31, 2016, according to Plaintiff, he called the public defender’s office and was
informed that he was now being represented by a fifth attorney. Plaintiff states that he spoke
with this attorney, and she informed him that no dismissal motion had been filed. According to
Plaintiff, she further stated that she did not believe that Plaintiff had been told a motion to
dismiss his case would be filed, and she believed that Plaintiff was lying about the motion.
Plaintiff states that she refused to file only certain motions for Plaintiff.
As to the “City of Louisville/State of Kentucky,” Plaintiff contends that it is responsible
for the poor training of the other Defendants. Further, Plaintiff asserts that this Defendant is
responsible for the actions of the other Defendants.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
2
The Court notes that Plaintiff includes an allegation against this Defendant in which he asserts that it is responsible
for Plaintiff “Being Assaulted & held-Hostage by other inmate’s while incarcerated.” Plaintiff includes no facts in
his complaint regarding this allegation; thus, it will not be addressed herein. The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a
separate lawsuit in this Court in which he raises this issue. See Carr v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:16CV-747-DJH.
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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court’s duty “does not
require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979),
or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants Haynes, Wine, and Straw
1. Official-Capacity Claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66
(1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Because
Defendants Haynes, Wine, and Straw are employees or officers of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, the claims brought against them in their official capacities are deemed claims against
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Id. at 166. State officials sued in their official capacities for
money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages from state officers
or employees in their official capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims under § 1983.
Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment3 acts as a bar to claims for monetary damages against
Defendants in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169; Boone v. Kentucky,
72 F. App’x 306, 307 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[Plaintiff’s] request for monetary relief against the
prosecutors in their official capacities is deemed to be a suit against the state and also barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.”); Bennett v. Thorburn, No. 86-1307, 1988 WL 27524, at *1 (6th Cir.
Mar. 31, 1988) (concluding that an official capacity suit against a judge who presided over state
court litigation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
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“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own
citizens, [the Supreme Court] has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63
(1974).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants Haynes, Wine, and
Straw for damages will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
and for seeking monetary relief from Defendants who are immune from such relief.
2. Individual-Capacity Claims
With regard to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Haynes, judges are entitled to
absolute immunity for actions arising out of all acts performed in the exercise of their judicial
functions. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985). Judicial immunity is embedded in the
long-established principle that “a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
[should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences
to himself.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
335, 347 (1871)). The law is clear that a judge acting within the scope of his official duties and
within his jurisdictional authority is absolutely immune from damages liability. Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1440 (6th Cir. 1997); Watts v.
Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 272-73 (6th Cir. 1992). This immunity confers complete protection
from a civil suit. Tulloch v. Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1995).
A judge is subject to liability only for non-judicial actions or for acts which were judicial
in nature but were taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at
11-12; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1440. Whether or not an act is judicial depends on the
nature and function of the act. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d at 1440. Two factors are examined to
perform this analysis. Id. at 1441. The Court must first determine whether the act is “a function
normally performed by a judge.” Id. (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362). The Court
must also look at “whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.” Id.
Moreover, a judge acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction only if the matter acted upon is clearly
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outside the subject matter of his court. Id. at 1441; King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965-66 (6th Cir.
1985); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 271 (6th Cir. 1984). Acting in error, maliciously, or in
excess of his authority is not enough. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356.
The factors used for the functional analysis indicate that the allegedly wrongful acts by
Defendant Judge Haynes were judicial in nature. His actions in not allowing a witness to be in
the courtroom while another witness was testifying, not allowing a witness to testify, allowing a
certain witness to testify, finding probable cause, revoking probation, and denying Plaintiff
shock probation are actions normally performed by a judge, and Defendant Haynes dealt with
Plaintiff only in his judicial capacity. Further, the complaint gives no indication that Defendant
Haynes lacked jurisdiction in presiding over Plaintiff’s criminal case. Consequently, the claims
against Defendant Haynes are barred by judicial immunity and must be dismissed.
Similar to the doctrine of judicial immunity, prosecutors also are entitled to “absolute
immunity from civil liability related to their performance of ‘prosecutorial’ functions.’” Koubriti
v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486
(1991)). “Functions that serve as an ‘integral part of the judicial process’ or that are ‘intimately
associated with the judicial process’ are absolutely immune from civil suits.” Id. (quoting Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). “Meanwhile, functions which are more ‘investigative’
or ‘administrative’ in nature, because they are more removed from the judicial process, are
subject only to qualified immunity.” Id. (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). “As
the line of absolute-immunity cases make clear . . . a prosecutor’s allegedly improper motive
alone is not enough to defeat absolute immunity, so long as the general nature of his actions falls
within the scope of his duties as an advocate for the state.” Cady v. Arenac Cty., 574 F.3d 334,
341 (6th Cir. 2009).
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Nothing in the complaint suggests that Defendants Wine or Straw were acting in any
capacity other than in their role as an advocate for the state in the judicial process. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by prosecutorial immunity and will be dismissed.
B. Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defender Corp.
Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides remedies for deprivations
of rights established elsewhere. As such, it has two basic requirements: (1) the deprivation of
federal statutory or constitutional rights by (2) a person acting under color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flint v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Public Defenders Office “is an agency of the executive branch of the state government.”
See Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Ky. 1978). A state and its agencies, however, are not
“persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71;
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Because the Public Defenders Office is
not a “person” under the Act, the Court will dismiss the claims against it for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to all claims for relief against the
Public Defenders Office. A state and its agencies, may not be sued in federal court, regardless of
the relief sought, unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment or Congress has overridden it. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-46 (1993); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 119-20 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 78l, 782 (l978). The Commonwealth of
Kentucky has not waived its immunity, see Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 857 (6th Cir.
2004), and in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override the traditional sovereign
immunity of the states. Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193-94 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Quern
10
v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979)); see Ferritto v. Ohio Dep’t of Highway Safety, No. 903475, 1991 WL 37824, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1991) (“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits
actions against states and state agencies under section 1983 and section 1985.”). Accordingly,
this Defendant is also immune from suit.
C. “City of Louisville/State of Kentucky”
As to Defendant “City of Louisville/State of Kentucky,” Plaintiff states, “poor-training,”
and that this Defendant is “responsible for ‘Action’s’ of ‘state-officials,’ ‘Officers,’
‘Commonwealth Attorney & Assistant Commonwealth Attorney,’ ‘Judge Hayne’s, [and]
‘Louisville-Jefferson County Public-Defender Corp.’” Plaintiff contends that since he is in the
“State’s-custody,” the “City/State” is “‘responsible’ for ‘ALL OFFICIALS’ (wrong-doing’s).”
1. Commonwealth of Kentucky
To the extent Plaintiff may be asserting a claim against the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
such a claim is barred. As previously stated, under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, a state and its agencies may not be sued in federal court, regardless of the relief
sought, unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has overridden it. Puerto Rico
Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. at 146; Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 119-20; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782. Further, as
previously set forth, the Commonwealth of Kentucky has not waived its immunity, see Adams v.
Morris, 90 F. App’x at 857, and in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override the
traditional sovereign immunity of the states. Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d at 193-94 (citing
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 341); see Ferritto v. Ohio Dep’t of Highway Safety, 1991 WL
37824, at *2 (The Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions against states and state agencies under
section 1983 and section 1985.”).
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Accordingly, the claim against the Commonwealth of Kentucky will be dismissed.
2. Louisville Metro Government
a. Respondeat Superior Claims
Plaintiff asserts that the Louisville Metro Government is responsible for the actions of the
other Defendants. The Court notes that only one Defendant, Defendant Buckley, is identified as
an employee over which Defendant Louisville Metro Government would have any influence or
control. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if
so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker
Heights,Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1992). The Court will first address the second issue, i.e.,
whether the municipality is responsible for the alleged constitutional violation.
“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -or, in other
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 691; see also Searcy v. City of Dayton,
38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A] municipality is not liable under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents; the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable. It
is only when the ‘execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury’ that the
municipality may be held liable under § 1983.”) (citations omitted). “The ‘official policy’
requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the
municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
12
deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 694; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty.,
Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). Simply stated, “a plaintiff must ‘identify the policy,
connect the policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of
the execution of that policy.’” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or custom
“must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a
government body under § 1983.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, as to Plaintiff’s claims seeking to hold this Defendant liable for the
actions of the other Defendants, Plaintiff has not alleged that a municipal policy or custom
caused his alleged harm. As nothing in the complaint demonstrates that any purported
wrongdoing occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by Defendant
Louisville Metro Government, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against the
municipality as to this claim, and it fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.
b. Failure to Train
In City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court addressed municipal liability pursuant to
§ 1983 when a plaintiff alleges a failure to train. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
Therein, the Court held that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983
liability, but limited municipal liability. The Court stated, “Only where a municipality’s failure
to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its
inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is
actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 389. “Inadequate training may amount to a municipal policy
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only if ‘the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to
result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the [municipality] can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Russo v. City of
Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1049 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at
390).
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges a failure to train as to Louisville Metro Government.
Plaintiff identifies one Defendant as being an employee of this municipal entity, Defendant
Buckley. Upon consideration, the Court will allow the claim alleging a failure to train Defendant
Buckley to proceed against Defendant Louisville Metro Government.
D. Officer Buckley
1. Official-Capacity Claims
As discussed above, “[o]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. at 165 (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 690 n.55). Plaintiff’s
official-capacity claims against Defendant Buckley are actually against his asserted employer,
Louisville Metro Government. Id. at 166; see also Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439-40
(6th Cir. 2008) (stating that civil rights suit against county clerk of courts in his official capacity
was equivalent of suing clerk’s employer, the county); Smallwood v. Jefferson Cty. Gov’t,
743 F. Supp. 502, 503 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (construing claims brought against the Jefferson County
Government, the Jefferson County Fiscal Court, and the Jefferson County Judge Executive as
claims against Jefferson County itself). The Court will therefore construe the official-capacity
claims as claims brought against Louisville Metro Government.
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As previously stated, when a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court
must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional
violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City
of Harker Heights,Tex., 503 U.S. at 120-21. Regarding the second issue, a municipality cannot
be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. at 694; Deaton v. Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d at 889.
Plaintiff has not alleged that a municipal policy or custom caused his alleged harm. As
nothing in the complaint demonstrates any purported wrongdoing occurred as a result of a policy
or custom implemented or endorsed by Louisville Metro Government, the official-capacity
claims against Defendant Buckley will be dismissed from this action.
2. Individual-Capacity Claims
a. State-law Claims
Plaintiff asserts as to Defendant Buckley, “official-mis-conduct/perjury . . . .” Herein,
Plaintiff appears to be seeking criminal charges against Defendant Buckley. “It is well settled
that the question of whether and when prosecution is to be instituted is within the discretion of
the Attorney General.” Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The Court
does not have the power to direct that criminal charges be filed against anyone as Plaintiff
requests. Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575, 577B78 (6th Cir. 1970); Fleetwood v. Thompson,
358 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1972). To the extent Plaintiff seeks criminal charges be brought
against Defendant Buckley, he fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, the claims regarding official misconduct and perjury will be dismissed from
this action.
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b. Federal Constitutional Claims
Further, based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff sets forth facts
asserting three constitutional claims against Defendant Buckley: (1) a Fourth Amendment claim
for false arrest; (2) a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution; and (3) a Fourteenth
Amendment selective prosecution claim based on his assertion of racial profiling. Upon
consideration, the Court will allow these three claims to proceed against Defendant Buckley.
E. Younger Abstention
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and has not been convicted of the criminal charges that
undergird the basis of the proceeding claims against the Louisville Metro Government and
Defendant Buckley. “Except in extraordinary circumstances federal courts should ‘permit state
courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts.’” Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t
of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
43 (1971)). The underlying concern of Younger is the “threat to our federal system posed by
displacement of state courts by those of the National Government.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
415, 423 (1979).
Younger abstention is built upon common sense in the administration of a dual
state-federal system of justice. When a person is the target of an ongoing state
action involving important state interests, a party cannot interfere with the
pending state action by maintaining a parallel federal action involving claims that
could have been raised in the state case. If the state party files such a case,
Younger abstention requires the federal court to defer to the state proceeding.
Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has held that Younger abstention is appropriate “when the state
proceeding (1) is currently pending, (2) involves an important state interest, and (3) affords the
plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims.” Id. In Wallace v. Kato, the
Supreme Court stated that “[i]f a plaintiff files . . . any . . . claim related to rulings that will likely
16
be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial[], it is within the power of the district court,
and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the
likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007).
Given the nature of Plaintiff’s proceeding claims and the on-going state criminal
proceedings against Plaintiff, the Court will stay this action as to the proceeding claims.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth more fully above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently
advised, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1) That the official-capacity claims against Defendants Haynes, Wine, and Straw for
damages are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary relief
from Defendants who are immune from such relief;
(2) That the individual-capacity claims against Defendants Haynes, Wine, and Straw are
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from
Defendants who are immune from such relief;
(3) That the claims against Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defender Corp. are
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) for seeking monetary relief from a
Defendant who is immune from such relief;
(4) That the claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky are DISMISSED pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a Defendant who is
immune from such relief;
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(5) That the respondeat superior claims against Louisville Metro Government are
DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted;
(6) That the official-capacity claims and the state-law claims against Defendant Buckley
are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; and
(7) That Defendants Haynes, Wine, Straw, Louisville-Jefferson County Public Defender
Corp., and Commonwealth of Kentucky are DISMISSED from this action since there are no
remaining claims against them.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Judge Haynes, Commonwealth
Attorney Wine, Assistant Commonwealth Attorney Straw, Louisville-Jefferson County Public
Defender Corp., and the Commonwealth of Kentucky as Defendants from the docket of this
action. The Clerk of Court is also DIRECTED to change the name of Defendant City of
Louisville in the docket of this action to Defendant Louisville Metro Government.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims shall proceed:
(1) The failure to train claim against Defendant Louisville Metro Government;
(2) The Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest against Defendant Buckley in his
individual capacity;
(3) The Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution against Defendant Buckley
in his individual capacity; and
(4) The Fourteenth Amendment selective prosecution claim against Defendant Buckley
in his individual capacity.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, as to the proceeding claims, that this action is STAYED
pending the final disposition of the criminal case against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff shall notify the Court in writing within 30 days of the final disposition of
the state criminal action against him. Plaintiff is WARNED that his failure to do so will
result in the dismissal of this civil action.
Once Plaintiff has notified the Court of the final disposition of the state criminal action
against him, the Court will conduct review of these remaining claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 608.
Date:
cc:
April 6, 2017
Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Jefferson County Attorney
4415.003
David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
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