Hurt v. All Federal Circuits et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION by Judge David J. Hale on 4/27/2017; Therefore, the claims will also be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A separate Order dismissing the action will be entered consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.cc:Pro-Se Pla. (ARM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
TYRONE HURT,

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-751-DJH

ALL FEDERAL CIRCUITS et al.,

Defendants.
* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Tyrone Hurt filed the instant pro se action proceeding in forma pauperis. This
matter is now before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Upon initial screening of the complaint, the instant action
will be dismissed for the reasons that follow.
I.
Plaintiff filed the complaint on his own paper. Plaintiff lists his address as located in
Washington, D.C. He names the following Defendants in this action: (1) All Federal Circuits;
(2) The American People; and (3) the United States of America. Plaintiff appears to be bringing
this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The complaint is mostly illegible and incoherent. However,
Plaintiff appears to complain about the Sixth Circuit’s failure or refusal to implement something.
Plaintiff refers to “Article III, Section I, of the U.S. Constitution within the Gene Snyder, United
States Courthouse, 601 West Broadway, Suite 450, Louisville, Ky.” Plaintiff then refers to
in forma pauperis status and “moves the Honorable, Vol, Dist. For the Sixth (6th) Cir, for . . . to

proceed in forma pauperis . . . .” Plaintiff continues stating that he is unable to “pre-pay the . . .
for the foregoing complaint . . . .” Plaintiff then refers to the “U.S.Constitution”; “Title
28 U.S.C. § 1915, . . . Article III, Section 1 to the U.S. Constitution”; “Blacks Law Dictionary”;
and “The American College Dictionary.” In the complaint, Plaintiff includes a section
requesting relief. Therein he refers to the Sixth Circuit, “en Banc,” and requests a trillion dollars
in “punitive and monetary Damages.”
II.
“[A] district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the
allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantiated, frivolous, devoid
of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (listing numerous Supreme Court cases
for the proposition that patently frivolous, attenuated, or unsubstantial claims divest the district
court of jurisdiction)). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable or rational basis in law or
fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198
(6th Cir. 1990). The instant complaint meets this standard.
In addition, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint
contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “[A] . . . complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.”
Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Conclusory allegations or bare legal
conclusions will not suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 F. App’x 501, 505
(6th Cir. 2009) (“Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations
will not suffice.”); Gregory v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e need
not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.”).
In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to provide material facts in support of any viable legal
theory. The complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter that, if accepted as true, states
“a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plaintiff fails to place Defendants on notice as to any
claim(s) against them, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (indicating that
the short and plain statement of a claim must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests’”) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544),
and the complaint is simply too vague and sparse to state a cause of action under any legal

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theory. The complaint fails to meet the basic pleading standard required by Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
In addition, a review of the federal judiciary’s online database, Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (“PACER”), shows that Plaintiff has filed hundreds of cases in federal courts
across the country. See Hurt v. Encinia, No. H-15-2602, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147815, at *6
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2015) (“A national litigation index reveals that since 1985, Hurt has filed at
least 468 civil actions in federal courts across the country.”). Plaintiff has been deemed an
abusive and vexatious litigant by numerous other courts. See, e.g., Hurt v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
544 F.3d 308, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e think ‘the number, content, frequency, and
disposition’ of his filings shows an especially abusive pattern . . . . Hurt has brought numerous
meritless appeals--suits targeting institutions, people and inanimate objects--while asking for
sums of money dwarfing the size of the Federal Government’s annual budget.”); Hurt v.
Ferguson, Missouri, Cleveland, Ohio, Baltimore, Maryland, All Law Enforcement Officials
Within This Nation Et Al, Forty-Seven States To The United States Of America, No. 1:15-cv01054-WTL-TAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89669, at *4 (S.D. Ind. July 10, 2015) (“Mr. Hurt’s
abusive patterns must come to an end. Mr. Hurt’s cases represent countless hours of judicial
time that could be spent on cases which state viable claims.”); Hurt v. Lanier, No. 1:14-cv-484GZS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163201, at *4 (D. Me. Nov. 19, 2014) (“Taking judicial notice of
the other actions Plaintiff has recently filed with this Court as well as his filing history in other
districts, there is ample evidence that Hurt is an abusive and vexatious litigant.”).
Finally, Plaintiff “has been repeatedly warned (to no effect) and ultimately banned from
filing complaints and/or appeals in forma pauperis by numerous other districts and appellate
courts.” Hurt v. Sterling, No. 1:14-CV-436, 2014 WL 2257176, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2014),

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report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14CV436, 2014 WL 3573637 (S.D. Ohio July 21,
2014). In addition, because of the vexatious and frivolous lawsuits Plaintiff has filed in the
Western District of Kentucky, he recently has been prohibited from proceeding in forma
pauperis in any future actions filed in this Court. Hurt v. Civil Rights Lawyer, No. 3:17-cv-39DJH (Document Number 9, Memorandum Opinion and Order dated March 21, 2017).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the allegations of Plaintiff’s
complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantiated, frivolous, devoid of merit, and no
longer open to discussion. Therefore, the claims against Defendants will be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) and Apple v. Glenn,
183 F.3d at 479. Further, the complaint fails to meet the basic pleading standard required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Therefore, the claims will also be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). A separate Order dismissing the action will be entered consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion.
Date:

April 27, 2017

cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4415.003

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court

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