Guldenschuh v. Doe et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Judge David J. Hale on 4/6/2017 - Plaintiff's official-capacity claims are DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate John Doe, LMDC Warden. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with information wit hin 30 days. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a § 1983 complaint form. Amended Complaint due by 5/6/2017.cc: Plaintiff-pro se (with enclosures) (DAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
CHARLES P. GULDENSCHUH,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-P5-DJH
Defendants.

JOHN DOE et al.,
*****
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil rights action brought by a pretrial detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff Charles P. Guldenschuh leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 594
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, the action will be dismissed in part and
allowed to continue in part.
I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is incarcerated at Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC). He
brings this action against unidentified individuals - John Doe, LMDC “Warden,” in his official
capacity; John Doe, LMDC doctor, in both his official and individual capacities; John Doe,
“Correct Care” medical staff, in both his official and individual capacities; and Jane Doe, LMDC
medical staff, in both her official and individual capacities.
In his complaint, Plaintiff states as follows:
My arm/elbow was broken during an altercation in Dorm 12 of [LMDC]. I
requested assistance from staff and photos were taken of my right arm and my
arm was x-rayed. They waited [six] days to x-ray my arm even though I
complained of extreme pain and no mobility of the arm. The results of the x-ray
revealed that my elbow was broken. They then wrapped it in an ace bandage and
refused to take me to the hospital. After complaining for [three] weeks about

pain, they took me to U of L hospital. They x-rayed my arm again and
determined that my arm/elbow set improperly and had to be re-broken and reset.
They had to operate on me and put pins, wires, and a rod into my arm. I suffered
extreme pain due to the medical care given by the doctors of Correct Care, the
[LMDC] staff.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief
in the form of “providing physical therapy and repairing [his right] arm/elbow.”
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers,
and/or employees, this Court must review the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under
§ 1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of
the complaint, if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d at 604. In order to
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC,
561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted)). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, while liberal, this
standard of review does require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions. See Columbia

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Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The court’s duty “does not
require [it] to conjure up unpled allegations,” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979),
or to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
III. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides remedies for deprivations
of rights established elsewhere. Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th
Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980). “A plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “Absent either element,
a § 1983 claim will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
A. Official-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has sued each Defendant in his/her official-capacity. “Official-capacity suits . . .
‘generally represent another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Thus, Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against
the John/Jane Doe Defendants employed by LMDC are actually against the Louisville Metro
Government, and his official-capacity claims against the John/Jane Defendants employed by

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“Correct Care” are actually against “Correct Care.” See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440
(6th Cir. 2008) (stating that civil rights suit against county clerk of courts in his official capacity
was equivalent of suing clerk’s employer, the county).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality such as the Louisville Metro
Government, this Court must analyze two distinct issues: 1) whether Plaintiff’s harm was caused
by a constitutional violation; and 2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that
violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). “[A] municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691;
Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d
1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in original). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff
“must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and
(3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving,
330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th
Cir. 1993)).
This same standard also applies to “Correct Care,” a private entity which Plaintiff seems
to indicate provides medical services to inmates at LMDC. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102
F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Monell involved a municipal corporation, but every circuit to
consider the issue has extended the holding to private corporations as well.”). Thus, liability

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under § 1983 must be based on a policy or custom of “Correct Care” or “the inadequacy of [an
employee’s] training.” Id. at 817; Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“CMS’s [Correctional Medical Systems, Inc.,] liability must also be premised on
some policy that caused a deprivation of [plaintiff’s] Eighth Amendment rights.”).
In the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged that any Louisville Metro Government or
“Correct Care” policy, custom, or practice caused the deprivation of his rights. The complaint,
therefore, fails to establish a basis of liability against either entity. As such, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
B. Individual-Capacity Claims
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are against John Doe, LMDC doctor; John Doe, “Correct
Care” medical staff; and Jane Doe, LMDC medical staff, in their individual capacities. The
Court construes Plaintiff’s against claims against these Defendants as alleging deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners
from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Pretrial
detainees are protected analogously under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). An Eighth
Amendment claim has two components - one objective and one subjective. First, the alleged
deprivation must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” i.e., the “official’s act or omission must
result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1970) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the official
must have been “deliberately indifferent” to the inmate’s health or safety. Id.

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Here, the complaint fails to state how each of these Defendants was personally involved
in the alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. To state a claim for
relief, Plaintiff must make specific allegations regarding this claim against each named
Defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976). However, “under Rule 15(a) a
district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to
dismissal under the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act].” LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to
describe the facts surrounding how each Defendant allegedly violated his rights.
In addition, if Plaintiff’s claims are allowed to proceed, in order to effect service on
Defendants, Plaintiff will have to provide identifying information for each Defendant, e.g., each
Defendant’s first and/or last name, the shift and/or unit where the Defendant worked, and/or a
physical description. The Court instructs Plaintiff that he may be able to learn this information
by requesting his medical records or grievances from LMDC. Furthermore, Plaintiff may attach
any documents relevant to his claims to his amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims are DISMISSED
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As such, the Clerk of Court is Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate John Doe,
LMDC Warden, as a party to this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 30 days from the entry date of this Order,
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint with information about how each John/Jane Doe
Defendant was personally involved in the alleged deliberate indifference to his serious

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medical need. Plaintiff must also provide any information which will help identify these
Defendants.
The Court will conduct an initial review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to
§ 1915A. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint with the above information
within the allotted amount of time, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff should also submit a completed summons form for each named Defendant
within the same 30-day period.1
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a § 1983 complaint form with this
case number and the word “Amended” affixed thereto, as well as four blank summons forms.
Date:

April 6, 2017

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court
cc:
Plaintiff, pro se
4415.011

1

The Court offers the following guidance to Plaintiff in his completion of the summons forms:
(1) prepare a summons for each Defendant sued; (2) write or type Defendant’s name and address on the summons in
the space provided; (3) write or type Plaintiff’s name in the space provided; (4) do not fill in any other part of the
summons form and do not mail the summons to any of the defendants.

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