Akins v. Reed et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III on 3/16/2017.cc: Plaintiff, pro se; Defendants (RLK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
DERRICK D’KEITH AKINS

PLAINTIFF

v.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-P18-CRS

KATHERINE REED et al.

DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Derrick D’Keith Akins, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action by filing a complaint. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons,
the complaint will be dismissed.
I. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections
(LMDC). He names as Defendants in their individual and official capacities Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorneys Katherine Reed and Nathan Ray Batey II. He also names as a
Defendant the Director of the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office Thomas B. Wine, but does not
indicate in which capacity he is suing him.
Plaintiff’s complaint pertains to what he alleges were unconstitutional actions taken by
the Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ Office during grand jury hearings. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Reed asked leading questions that she knew would lead to “an indictment in an unjust
manner.” He further alleges that Defendant Batey knew of false testimony presented at the grand
jury hearing.
As relief, Plaintiff asks for compensatory and punitive damages.

II. ANALYSIS
When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity,
officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore,
dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where
the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to avoid
dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
A. Official-capacity claims
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166
(1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)).
Because Defendants are employees or officers of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the claims
brought against them in their official capacities are deemed claims against the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. State officials sued in their official
capacities for money damages are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich.

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Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, because Plaintiff seeks money damages
from state officers or employees in their official capacities, he fails to allege cognizable claims
under § 1983. Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to claims for monetary
damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 169.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Defendants will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for seeking monetary relief from Defendants
who are immune from such relief.
B. Individual-capacity claims
With regard to Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims, it is well-established that
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for conduct intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Higgason v.
Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 2002). Prosecutorial immunity even applies when a
prosecutor acts wrongfully or maliciously. See, e.g., Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1138
(6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants regarding allowing false testimony against
him in his grand jury proceeding is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 1138
(holding that the prosecutor was absolutely immune from suit for allegedly conspiring to present
false charges to the grand jury); see also Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1446 (6th Cir. 1997)
(“A prosecutor’s decision to file a criminal complaint and seek an arrest warrant and the
presentation of these materials to a judicial officer fall squarely within the aegis of absolute
prosecutorial immunity.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants is barred by
prosecutorial immunity and must be dismissed.

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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action will be dismissed by separate Order.
Date:

March 16, 2017

C al R Smpo I , ei J d e
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Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
4411.009

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